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EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER ALGORITHMS:
A NEW STATISTICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Crystal S. Yang* & Will Dobbie**
In this Article, we provide a new statistical and legal framework to
understand the legality and fairness of predictive algorithms under the Equal
Protection Clause. We begin by reviewing the main legal concerns regarding
the use of protected characteristics such as race and the correlates of protected
characteristics such as criminal history. The use of race and nonrace
correlates in predictive algorithms generates direct and proxy effects of race,
respectively, that can lead to racial disparities that many view as
unwarranted and discriminatory. These effects have led to the mainstream
legal consensus that the use of race and nonrace correlates in predictive
algorithms is both problematic and potentially unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause. This mainstream position is also reflected in
practice, with all commonly used predictive algorithms excluding race and
many excluding nonrace correlates such as employment and education.
Next, we challenge the mainstream legal position that the use of a protected
characteristic always violates the Equal Protection Clause. We develop a
statistical framework that formalizes exactly how the direct and proxy effects
of race can lead to algorithmic predictions that disadvantage minorities
relative to nonminorities. While an overly formalistic solution requires
exclusion of race and all potential nonrace correlates, we show that this type
of algorithm is unlikely to work in practice because nearly all algorithmic
inputs are correlated with race. We then show that there are two simple
statistical solutions that can eliminate the direct and proxy effects of race,
and which are implementable even when all inputs are correlated with race.
We argue that our proposed algorithms uphold the principles of the equal
protection doctrine because they ensure that individuals are not treated
differently on the basis of membership in a protected class, in stark contrast
to commonly used algorithms that unfairly disadvantage minorities despite
the exclusion of race.
* Crystal S. Yang, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
** Will Dobbie, Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School. We thank Alma
Cohen, Howell Jackson, Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell, and numerous seminar participants at
Harvard, Fordham, Stanford, and Duke for helpful comments and suggestions. Victoria Ange-
lova, Claire Lazar, and Ashley Litwin provided excellent research assistance.
The main data we analyze are provided by the New York State Division of Criminal Jus-
tice Services (DCJS) and the Office of Court Administration (OCA). The opinions, findings,
and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and not those of DCJS.
Neither New York State nor DCJS assumes liability for its contents or use thereof.
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We conclude by empirically testing our proposed algorithms in the context of
the New York City pretrial system. We show that nearly all commonly used
algorithms violate certain principles underlying the Equal Protection Clause
by including variables that are correlated with race, generating substantial
proxy effects that unfairly disadvantage Black individuals relative to white
individuals. Both of our proposed algorithms substantially reduce the
number of Black defendants detained compared to commonly used
algorithms by eliminating these proxy effects. These findings suggest a
fundamental rethinking of the equal protection doctrine as it applies to
predictive algorithms and the folly of relying on commonly used algorithms.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a dramatic increase in the use of predictive algorithms in
recent years. Predictive algorithms typically use individual characteristics to
predict future outcomes, guiding important decisions in nearly every facet of
life. In the credit market, for example, these algorithms use characteristics
such as an individual’s credit and payment history to predict the risk of
default, often summarized as a single “credit score.”1 These credit scores are
used in almost all consumer-lending decisions, including both approval and
pricing decisions for credit cards, private student loans, auto loans, and
home mortgages.2 Credit scores are also widely used in nonlending
decisions, such as rental decisions for apartments.3 In the labor market,
predictive algorithms use characteristics such as an individual’s past work
experience and education to predict productivity or tenure, with employers
using these predictions to make hiring, retention, and promotion decisions.4
In the criminal justice system—the focus of our Article—predictive
algorithms use characteristics such as an individual’s criminal history and
age to predict the risk of future criminal behavior, with these “risk
1. Rob Berger, A Rare Glimpse Inside the FICO Credit Score Formula, DOUGHROLLER
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.doughroller.net/credit/a-rare-glimpse-inside-the-fico-credit-
score-formula [https://perma.cc/2A4B-PHWD].
2. What Is a Credit Score?, MYFICO, https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/credit-
scores [https://perma.cc/48AW-EFEW].
3. Jim Rendon, You Say You’re a Dream Renter? Prove It., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/realestate/prospective-renters-have-much-to-prove-to-
landlords.html [https://perma.cc/R2E7-RZ82].
4. See, e.g., George Anders, Who Should You Hire? LinkedIn Says: Try Our Algorithm,
FORBES (Apr. 10, 2013, 4:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeanders/2013/04/10/who
-should-you-hire-linkedin-says-try-our-algorithm/#175f96f7be66 [https://perma.cc/4KY3-
5AG7]; Steve Lohr, Big Data, Trying to Build Better Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/technology/big-data-trying-to-build-better-
workers.html [https://perma.cc/T2XR-LYYW]; Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Bet-
ter than a Human?, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015
/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html [https://perma.cc/J27N-
VM8L].
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assessments” used to inform pretrial-release conditions, sentencing
decisions, and the dispatch of police patrols.5
The increasing use of these algorithms has contributed to an active
debate on whether commonly used predictive algorithms intentionally or
unintentionally discriminate against certain groups, in particular racial
minorities and other protected classes. In theory, predictive algorithms have
the potential to reduce discrimination by relying on statistically “fair”
associations between algorithmic inputs and the outcome of interest.6 Yet,
critics argue that the algorithmic inputs are themselves biased, resulting in
violations of the equal protection doctrine and antidiscrimination law.7 For
example, many scholars have raised questions about the growing use of pre-
dictive algorithms in making hiring and retention decisions, often arguing
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the primary law prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics such as
race, sex, religion, and national origin, proscribes the use of any such charac-
teristics.8 In addition, scholars have argued that using even seemingly neu-
tral traits in these algorithms can end up “indirectly determin[ing]
individuals’ membership in protected classes” and subsequently harm class
members if these traits are correlated with protected characteristics.9 Reflect-
ing these concerns, recent policy proposals regarding algorithms have sought
5. See, e.g., Jeff Asher & Rob Arthur, Inside the Algorithm that Tries to Predict Gun Vio-
lence in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/06/13/upshot/what-an-algorithm-reveals-about-life-on-chicagos-high-risk-list.html
[https://perma.cc/KZG6-HNRA]; Ellora Thadaney Israni, Opinion, When an Algorithm Helps
Send You to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26
/opinion/algorithm-compas-sentencing-bias.html [https://perma.cc/ZG3C-BYH3].
6. E.g., Israni, supra note 5.
7. In the area of credit and lending, laws like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) of 1974 prohibit discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics and have
been interpreted to prohibit practices like “redlining,” or geographic discrimination using zip
codes as proxies for the racial composition of neighborhoods. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1); cf. Conn.
Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Corelogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 369 F. Supp. 3d 362, 371 (D. Conn. 2019)
(interpreting the Fair Housing Act to ban use of criminal history as it could be a proxy for
race). Regulation B of the ECOA also lists many factors that cannot be used in empirically de-
rived credit-scoring systems, including public-assistance status, marital status, race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, and sex, 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2020), leading some to claim that “the law
requires that lenders make decisions about mortgage loans as if they had no information about
the applicant’s race, regardless of whether race is or is not a good proxy for risk factors not
easily observed by the lender.” Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending,
J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring 1998, at 41, 43.
8. Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst, for example, have argued that, in the employment
context, “considering membership in a protected class as a potential proxy is a legal classifica-
tory harm in itself” and that “[u]nder formal disparate treatment, this is straightforward: any
decision that expressly classifies by membership in a protected class is one that draws distinc-
tions on illegitimate grounds.” Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 695, 719 (2016).
9. Id. at 692.
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to prohibit the use of protected characteristics, either directly or through
proxies. For example, in 2019, the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment issued a proposal that allows landlords to use a predictive algo-
rithm to screen tenants but prohibits the use of inputs that are deemed to be
“substitutes or close proxies” for protected characteristics.10
The debate about whether commonly used predictive algorithms
discriminate against minorities has been particularly heated in the criminal
justice system, where risk-assessment tools are increasingly utilized.11 Critics
of algorithmic risk assessments have argued that use of demographic
characteristics such as race or gender in predictive algorithms “amounts to
overt discrimination based on demographics and socioeconomic status” and
note that use of these characteristics “can be expected to contribute to the
concentration of the criminal justice system’s punitive impact among those
10. Andrew D. Selbst, A New HUD Rule Would Effectively Encourage Discrimination by
Algorithm, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Aug. 19, 2019, 10:51 AM), https://slate.com/technology
/2019/08/hud-disparate-impact-discrimination-algorithm.html [https://perma.cc/29AP-
NS3L].
11. The American Bar Association, for example, has urged states to adopt risk-
assessment tools in order to protect public safety, with a goal of reducing incarceration and
recidivism among low-risk offenders. See CRIM. JUST. SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT 18. The National Center for State Courts’ Conference of Chief Jus-
tices and Conference of State Court Administrators similarly recommends that “offender risk
and needs assessment information be available to inform judicial decisions regarding effective
management and reduction of the risk of offender recidivism.” NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTS. & CONF. OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, RESOLUTION 7: IN SUPPORT OF THE
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USING RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION IN THE
SENTENCING PROCESS (2011), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/Resolution-
7.ashx [https://perma.cc/DHT3-SFP2]. Several states have also passed legislation in recent
years requiring that judges be provided with risk assessments at sentencing. See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.007(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (“Sentencing judges shall consider . . . the results
of a defendant’s risk and needs assessment included in the presentence investigation.”); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.114(A)(1)–(3) (LexisNexis 2014) (the Ohio department of rehabilita-
tion and correction “shall select a single validated risk assessment tool for adult offenders” that
shall be used for purposes including sentencing); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2154.7(a) (West Supp. 2019) (in Pennsylvania, a risk-assessment instrument shall be adopted
to help determine appropriate sentences); see also ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 6–
201.01(J)(3) (2016) (“For all probation eligible cases, presentence reports shall . . . contain case
information related to criminogenic risk and needs as documented by the standardized risk
assessment and other file and collateral information.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 988.18(A)
(West 2016) (an assessment and evaluation instrument designed to predict risk to recidivate is
required to determine eligibility for any community punishment). Many other states permit
the use of such algorithmic tools. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2517 (Supp. 2016) (if an Idaho
court orders a presentence investigation, the investigation report for all offenders sentenced
directly to a term of imprisonment and for certain offenders placed on probation must include
current recidivism rates differentiated based on offender risk levels of low, moderate, and
high); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:326(A) (2016) (some Louisiana courts may use a single presentence
investigation validated risk- and needs-assessment tool prior to sentencing an adult offender
eligible for assessment); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500(1) (2016) (requiring a court to consid-
er risk-assessment reports at sentencing if available).
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who already disproportionately bear its brunt, including people of color.”12
There are also concerns that seemingly neutral algorithmic inputs such as
employment and education may nonetheless result in unwarranted racial
disparities because they may serve as proxies for race.13
These concerns are echoed in statements made by prominent public
officials, including former Attorney General Eric Holder, who argue that
“[b]y basing sentencing decisions on static factors and immutable
characteristics—like the defendant’s education level, socioeconomic
background, or neighborhood—they may exacerbate unwarranted and
unjust disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice
system and in our society.”14 Even commonly used algorithmic inputs such
as current charge and prior criminal history, which many argue are both
relevant and legally permissible,15 may generate unwarranted disparities. For
example, an individual’s prior criminal history can be driven, at least in part,
by racial biases in policing, not just past criminal behavior. In this scenario,
using prior arrests as an algorithmic input can result in past discrimination
being “baked in” to the algorithm.16
12. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Dis-
crimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014).
13. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and
Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 681 (2016)
(“[C]ontroversy has begun to swirl around the use of risk assessment in sentencing. The prin-
cipal concern is that benefits in crime control will be offset by costs in social justice—that is, a
disparate and adverse effect on racial minorities and the poor. Although race is omitted from
these instruments, critics assert that risk factors that are sometimes included (e.g., marital his-
tory and employment status) are ‘proxies’ for minority race and poverty.”).
14. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network
Conference (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-
speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/VX7R-N87B].
Larry Krasner, the current district attorney in Philadelphia, has similarly argued that “there is a
real danger that the components going into the risk assessment are proxies for race and for
socioeconomic status.” Anna Orso, Can Philly’s New Technology Predict Recidivism Without
Being Racist?, BILLYPENN (Sept. 25, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://billypenn.com/2017/09/25/can-
phillys-new-technology-predict-recidivism-without-being-racist/ [https://perma.cc/YM69-
RXHW].
15. See, e.g., Holder, supra note 14 (“Criminal sentences must be based on the facts, the
law, the actual crimes committed, the circumstances surrounding each individual case, and the
defendant’s history of criminal conduct.”).
16. See, e.g., Stephen Goldsmith & Chris Bousquet, The Right Way to Regulate Algo-
rithms, CITYLAB (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:47 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/the-
right-way-to-regulate-algorithms/555998/ [https://perma.cc/5EL2-MWQT] (“Data on patterns
of past arrest rates, for example, might cause an algorithm to target low-income neighborhoods
where officers were historically more likely to pick up black kids for possession.”); see also Beth
Schwartzapfel, Can Racist Algorithms Be Fixed?, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/07/01/can-racist-algorithms-be-fixed [https://perma
.cc/UGD2-C9GP] (“But a legacy of aggressive law enforcement tactics in black neighborhoods
means that real-world policing leads to ‘false positives’ in real life—arrests of people who turn
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In this Article, we provide a new statistical and legal framework to
understand the legality and fairness of using protected characteristics in
predictive algorithms under the Equal Protection Clause. The framework we
develop sheds new light on the main legal and policy debates regarding
which individual characteristics should be included in predictive algorithms,
particularly those characteristics related to race. The framework is general in
nature and applies to any legal setting involving the use of predictive
algorithms, but we focus our theoretical and empirical examples on a context
where algorithms are increasingly ubiquitous and consequential: the
decision of whether defendants awaiting trial should be detained or released
back into the community prior to case disposition.
The Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, we provide an overview of
the legal and policy concerns surrounding the use of protected
characteristics to make predictions about individuals in the criminal justice
system. Protected characteristics are defined as those that can trigger
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, with our focus being
the use of race. Our review of the legal landscape shows that there are two
main concerns related to the use of race in predictive algorithms. First, many
have argued that using race directly as an algorithmic input is problematic
and likely unconstitutional under the anticlassification principle of the Equal
Protection Clause. The general consensus is that the direct use of race will
generate unwarranted racial disparities. Second, some have argued that even
if race itself is excluded as an algorithmic input, the use of seemingly neutral
inputs can still result in unwarranted disparities if those inputs act as racial
proxies. For example, zip code is highly correlated with race in the real
world, likely due in part to residential segregation. This correlation leads
some to argue that using zip code as an algorithmic input is therefore
equivalent to using race directly. As a result, numerous legal scholars and
policymakers have urged jurisdictions using predictive algorithms to exclude
race and factors correlated with race as inputs.17 As noted by some scholars,
the “traditional approach to anti-discrimiantion law” was to “merely . . .
deprive[] the AI of information on individuals’ membership in legally
suspect classes or obvious proxies for such group membership.”18
We then review the most common predictive algorithms in the criminal
justice system and their inputs in Part II. Surveying the field, we find that all
commonly used predictive algorithms exclude race as an input. The
out to be innocent of any crime—as well as convictions that wouldn’t have occurred in white
neighborhoods. And because risk assessments rely so heavily on prior arrests and convictions,
they will inevitably flag black people as risky who are not.”).
17. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019)
(“Among racial-justice advocates engaged in the debate, a few common themes have emerged.
The first is a demand that race, and factors that correlate heavily with race, be excluded as in-
put variables for prediction.”).
18. Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1276 (2020).
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universal exclusion of race as an algorithmic input is unsurprising given the
mainstream legal view that the direct use of race as an input would be
unconstitutional. There is less uniformity in the use of nonracial algorithmic
inputs that may be correlated with race. At least some commonly used
predictive algorithms purposely exclude nonrace inputs such as education
and socioeconomic status out of a concern that they are proxies for race. On
the other hand, other commonly used algorithms include many nonrace
inputs that are likely to be racial proxies.
In Part III, we develop a statistical framework that formalizes the
mainstream legal position that the use of both race and nonrace correlates is
problematic on fairness grounds or potentially unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause. Building on this mainstream position, we define a
predictive algorithm as fair (and “race neutral”) if and only if it does not use
information stemming from membership in a racial group to form
predictions, either directly through the use of race itself or indirectly through
the use of nonrace correlates. We illustrate these direct and proxy effects
through the use of simple examples, showing exactly how both direct use of
race and indirect use of nonrace correlates can generate unwarranted racial
disparities.
Building on this statistical framework, we discuss three potential
solutions in Part IV that can eliminate the direct and proxy effects of race in
predictive algorithms. The first formalistic solution, the “excluding-inputs”
algorithm, reflects what we believe to be the general legal mainstream
position. This algorithm yields race neutrality by explicitly excluding both
race and all race-correlated inputs from algorithms, thereby mechanically
eliminating both direct and proxy effects of race. While such an algorithm
exists in theory, we question its feasibility in practice given the empirical
reality that almost every algorithmic input is likely correlated with race due
to the influence of race in nearly every aspect of American life today. We
argue that, because of this fact, none of the commonly used predictive
algorithms in the criminal justice system, even those that explicitly exclude
some race-correlated inputs, are able to achieve full race neutrality. Even if
there remain some inputs that are uncorrelated with race, the set of
permissible inputs under this formalistic solution is likely so small that the
accuracy of the algorithm will be substantially degraded.
We then introduce our two proposed solutions, the “colorblinding-
inputs” and “minorities-as-whites” statistical models. These two statistical
solutions improve upon current practice by purging all predictions of both
direct and proxy effects of race. As we demonstrate in Part IV, these
statistical solutions are implemented in a two-step procedure where race is
used in the first estimation step in order to eliminate proxy effects. In the
second prediction step, however, no individual-level race data is utilized.
Our first recommended solution purges all algorithmic inputs of the proxy
effects of race in the estimation step of the predictive algorithm, and then
uses these “colorblind” inputs to predict outcomes in the prediction step.
Our second recommended solution instead uses only white individuals in
the estimation step of the predictive algorithm, and then uses these
November 2020] Equal Protection Under Algorithms 299
“colorblind” estimates to predict outcomes for both white and Black
individuals in the prediction step. Our two recommended solutions allow us
to address direct and proxy effects of race without jettisoning all race-
correlated inputs. Both our proposed algorithms achieve race neutrality by
considering or using race in the first estimation step of the algorithm, but
prohibit race from being used in ultimate decisionmaking in the second
prediction step. This important concept, however, may run counter to the
intuitive but statistically incorrect and overly formalistic anticlassification
principle that the use of race in any form would violate the Equal Protection
Clause.19 While not used in practice today, likely because of the perceived
unconstitutionality of using race in any form, we argue that our two
proposed solutions uphold the primary principles underlying the equal
protection doctrine. Our algorithms are consistent with the anticlassification
principle, as they ensure that individuals are not treated differently because
of membership in a particular racial group, eliminating unwarranted racial
disparities. Our proposed algorithms are also consistent with the
antisubordination principle, as they are designed to avoid inflicting harm on
disadvantaged groups.20
In Part V, we empirically test our two proposed solutions in the context
of the New York City pretrial system. We find that all commonly used
algorithmic inputs are correlated with race in the New York City data,
including current charge and prior criminal history, thereby generating
proxy effects even when race itself is explicitly excluded from a predictive
algorithm. These results confirm that commonly used predictive algorithms
violate certain principles underlying the Equal Protection Clause by
including algorithmic inputs that are correlated with race and thus fail to
achieve race neutrality. Our empirical findings also show that the overly
formalistic exclusion of race actually generates unwarranted racial
19. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 12, at 870 (“The inclusion of demographic and socioeco-
nomic variables in risk prediction instruments . . . is normatively troubling and, at least with
respect to gender and socioeconomic variables, very likely unconstitutional.”); see also Mayson,
supra note 17, at 2240 (“[C]olorblindness . . . would [simply] prohibit the use of race as an in-
put variable for prediction [and] the intentional use of race proxies[].” (emphasis omitted)).
20. This antisubordination principle is most closely linked to Owen M. Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107 (1976). As summarized by David Strauss,
[t]his principle holds that the evil of discrimination does not lie in the use of a racial (or
other similar) criterion for distinguishing among people. Rather the evil of discrimina-
tion is the particular kind of harm that it inflicts on the disadvantaged group—in vary-
ing formulations, it subordinates them, or stigmatizes them, or brands them with a
badge of caste. According to the anti-subordination principle, where that particular
kind of harm is absent, there is no unlawful discrimination, even if a racial classification
is used. Affirmative action is (according to its supporters) an example of the non-
subordinating use of a racial classification.
David A. Strauss, “Group Rights” and the Problem of Statistical Discrimination, ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, 2003, at 1, 1.
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disparities, undermining the objective of equal treatment.21 We then
illustrate the value of our two proposed algorithms in predicting pretrial risk.
We find that New York City could substantially reduce the number of Black
defendants detained if it used our proposed statistical models instead of the
more commonly used predictive algorithms.
Finally, in Part VI, we discuss extensions of our proposals. We illustrate
how our methods can readily allow for many protected characterisics, not
just race. Our statistical approaches can also allow for nonlinearities in the
statistical model, more complex interactions between inputs, and extensions
for machine-learning algorithms. We end by describing the relevance of our
approaches to other contexts such as lending and employment.
Our Article links two important literatures: a legal literature on the
constitutionality of predictive algorithms under antidiscrimination law22 and
a social science literature on algorithmic fairness.23 In our reading, the legal
literature has adopted an overly formalistic interpretation of the principles of
equal treatment, leading to the misguided conclusion that the use of
21. This view has been noted by only a few legal scholars in recent years. For example,
Pauline T. Kim notes in the context of employment discrimination and Title VII that
because of the problem of omitted variable bias, forbidding the use of protected class
variables could exacerbate discriminatory effects under certain circumstances. Thus, a
blanket prohibition on the explicit use of race or other prohibited characteristics does
not avoid, and may even worsen, the discriminatory impact of relying on a data model.
Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 904
(2017). Similarly, Aziz Z. Huq notes that
[r]ace is commonly thought to be already highly correlated with socioeconomic charac-
teristics related to criminogenic and victimization distributions. It might hence be rea-
sonably anticipated that many algorithmic tools designed to be predictive of criminality
will, even absent any race feature in the training data, generate a function that either
mimics, or is a good approximation of, racial distributions in the population.
Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1100 (2019).
22. See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 694–95
(2015); Starr, supra note 12, at 821–41; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 698; Kim, su-
pra note 21, at 904.
23. See, e.g., Toon Calders & Indrė Žliobaitė, Why Unbiased Computational Processes
Can Lead to Discriminative Decision Procedures, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 43, 50 (Bart Custers, Toon Calders, Bart Schermer & Tal Zarsky eds.,
2013); Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ashesh Rambachan, Advances in
Big Data Research in Economics: Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC.
22, 26 (2018) (“Our central argument is that across a wide range of estimation approaches, ob-
jective functions, and definitions of fairness, the strategy of blinding the algorithm to race in-
advertently detracts from fairness.”); Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, Implementing Anti-
discrimination Policies in Statistical Profiling Models, AM. ECON. J., Aug. 2011, at 206, 218;
Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt, Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold & Richard Zemel, Fairness
Through Awareness, 2012 INNOVATIONS THEORETICAL COMPUT. SCI. CONF. 214; Moritz
Hardt, Eric Price & Nathan Srebro, Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning, NEURIPS
(2016), https://papers.nips.cc/paper/6374-equality-of-opportunity-in-supervised-learning.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Y4L-QVMF].
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protected characteristics is always unconstitutional. In contrast, the
computer science and economics literature has long recognized the value of
using protected characteristics in predictive algorithms24 but has largely
ignored the implications of such use under the law.25 We seek to provide a
bridge between these literatures by (1) identifying the key challenges that
predictive algorithms pose to existing legal understandings of fairness (as
opposed to social science conceptions of fairness) and (2) suggesting
statistical solutions that we believe can address these notions of fairness. In
doing so, we note that we are not offering a wholehearted endorsement of
the use of algorithms in all aspects of life. Instead, we seek to provide a syn-
thesizing framework that tackles prominent legal concerns related to the use
of protected characteristics in predictive algorithms.
The main contribution of our Article is to challenge the mainstream
legal position that the use of a protected characteristic always violates the
Equal Protection Clause, a position that we argue can actually undermine the
goals of equal protection, while providing concrete solutions to eliminating
unwarranted racial disparities in predictive algorithms. Our findings require
a fundamental rethinking of the equal protection doctrine as applied to
predictive algorithms. The doctrine should embrace the statistical reality that
virtually all algorithmic inputs are correlated with race, and, as a result, that
blinding algorithms to race through exclusion does not best serve the goal of
equal treatment under the law.
I. PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In this Part, we review the main legal concerns surrounding the use of
protected characteristics such as race and the correlates of those protected
characteristics, such as criminal history, in predictive algorithms. We first
describe the view that protected characteristics should not be used directly in
forming predictions, regardless of whether the use of the characteristic
would benefit or harm the protected group, a legal position that arises from
an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. We then discuss the view
that even if protected characteristics are not used directly, the use of other
nonprotected characteristics can essentially “proxy” for these protected
characteristics because of their correlation with those characteristics. We
24. See, e.g., Hardt et al., supra note 23, at 1 (“A naive approach might require that the
algorithm should ignore all protected attributes such as race, color, religion, gender, disability,
or family status. However, this idea of ‘fairness through unawareness’ is ineffective due to the
existence of redundant encodings, ways of predicting protected attributes from other fea-
tures.”); see also Indrė Žliobaitė, Faisal Kamiran & Toon Calders, Handling Conditional Dis-
crimination, 2011 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON DATA MINING 992, 992 (“[D]iscrimination may occur
even if the sensitive information is not directly used in the model . . . .”).
25. One exception is Talia B. Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U.
CHI. L. REV. 459 (2019) (providing an analysis of the gap between the literature on algorithmic
fairness and antidiscrimination law in the context of lending).
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conclude by discussing an alternative view of algorithms that prioritizes
algorithmic accuracy. Throughout, we define protected characteristics as
those that trigger heightened scrutiny (either strict or intermediate) under
the Equal Protection Clause, including both suspect and quasi-suspect
classes. While we largely focus on race, other examples of these classes
include national origin, religion, and gender.
A. Direct Effects of Protected Characteristics
The first legal concern surrounding the use of protected characteristics
is that their use would directly harm or benefit an individual based solely on
membership in a protected class. This “direct effect” of using protected
characteristics is a common concern in the context of the criminal justice
system because of the robust statistical relationship between protected
characteristics and most outcomes of interest. For example, in the context of
pretrial-release decisions, Black defendants are often more likely to not
appear in court or be rearrested before case disposition compared to
otherwise similar white defendants.26 This positive correlation between race
and pretrial misconduct means that predictive algorithms will assign a
higher risk score to Black defendants compared to otherwise similar white
defendants if race is used as an algorithmic input. The fact that women are
statistically less likely to not appear in court or be rearrested before case
disposition similarly means that predictive algorithms will assign women a
lower risk score compared to otherwise similar men if gender is used as an
input.
This concern has led many to argue against the direct use of protected
characteristics in algorithms. These claims are usually constitutional in
nature and center around the prohibition against classification under the
equal protection doctrine. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the use of
protected characteristics such as race or national origin is a form of suspect
classification. Generally speaking, government laws or policies that contain
explicit racial classifications and treat individuals differently on the basis of
those classifications, whether to burden or benefit such groups, violate the
Constitution’s “immunity from inequality of legal protection.”27 While not a
blanket ban on the use of racial classifications, the Equal Protection Clause
does subject such classifications to strict scrutiny.28 Under strict scrutiny, a
policy with a racial classification must serve a compelling government
26. See infra Part V.
27. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (invalidating the conviction of a
Black defendant tried under a state that limited jury service to “white male persons . . . twenty-
one years of age”).
28. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007) (using strict scrutiny when “the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis
of individual racial classifications”).
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interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.29 The Court
applies strict scrutiny to all racial classifications “to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that [the government] is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”30 While many racial
classifications are struck down under strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated,
including most recently the use of race as a “plus factor” in university
admissions.31
Classifications along other lines may also pose constitutional issues,
despite not being subject to strict scrutiny. In the context of gender, for
example, parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification,”32 grounded in the
principle “that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the
equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women,
simply because they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity
to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their
29. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial
classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must
be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”).
30. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
31. Strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)). For example, one of the earliest ex-
amples of a racial classification that was upheld by the Supreme Court was a federal curfew
applicable only to persons of Japanese ancestry. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943). While the Supreme Court noted that “racial discriminations are in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited,” it nonetheless upheld the curfew on due process grounds
because “circumstances within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for
maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made.”
Id. at 100, 102. Under similar arguments, the Court also upheld Executive Order 9066, which
ordered Japanese Americans regardless of citizenship to internment camps under the grounds
of “military necessity.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (holding that alt-
hough “exclusion from the area in which one’s home is located is a far greater deprivation than
constant confinement to the home from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.,” the racially discriminatory order was
nonetheless within the federal government’s power).
In recent years, the application of strict scrutiny has not invalidated the use of race in cer-
tain admissions policies. For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court upheld the
use of race as one factor in the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program, a
consideration designed to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s
education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.” 539 U.S. 306,
315, 343 (2003). Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the Law School had a “compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body” and that the admissions policy was narrowly tai-
lored because race, a “plus factor,” was used in a “flexible, nonmechanical way” that allowed for
a “truly individualized consideration.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, 334. Similarly, in Fisher v. Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin, the Court upheld a race-conscious admissions program at the Uni-
versity of Texas, where race was one factor considered in each applicant’s “Personal
Achievement Score” (PAS). 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205–07 (2016).
32. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519, 531 (1996) (holding that the exclusively
male admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) at the time violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
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individual talents and capacities.”33 The Supreme Court has stated a
demanding standard for gender-based classifications, requiring the state to
show “at least that the [challenged] classification serves ‘important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are
‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’ ”34 While there
are numerous examples of gender-based classifications that have been
invalidated, some have been upheld.35
To date, there is no legal precedent on how these anticlassification
principles are applied to predictive algorithms. The mainstream view on this
issue is best exemplified in a widely cited article by Sonja Starr, who decries
the use of demographic (race and gender) and socioeconomic traits in risk
assessment.36 Focusing on risk-assessment tools used at sentencing, Starr
argues that risk-assessment instruments using characteristics such as race
and gender “amount[] to overt discrimination based on demographics and
socioeconomic status.”37 Starr specifically argues that using demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics to generate predictions of future
criminality violates the Equal Protection Clause and that using such traits
“can be expected to contribute to the concentration of the criminal justice
system’s punitive impact among those who already disproportionately bear
its brunt, including people of color.”38 One of Starr’s main concerns is
33. Id. at 532 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 462–63 (1981), and Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)).
34. Id. at 533 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). For other cases that applied
intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications, see Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
35. For example, in Nguyen v. INS, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that im-
posed different requirements for a child’s acquisition of citizenship depending on whether the
citizen parent is the mother or father. 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) (“It is almost axiomatic that a pol-
icy which seeks to foster the opportunity for meaningful parent-child bonds to develop has a
close and substantial bearing on the governmental interest in the actual formation of that
bond.”). Similarly, in Califano v. Webster, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that fa-
vored the calculation of old-age insurance benefits for female wage earners relative to other-
wise similarly situated male wage earners. 430 U.S. 313, 316–17 (1977) (per curiam)
(“Reduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the
long history of discrimination against women has been recognized as such an important gov-
ernmental objective.”).
36. Starr, supra note 12, at 806.
37. Id. Aziz Huq calls this assertion a “dubious proposition” and “not . . . an accurate
statement of current law.” Huq, supra note 21, at 1058. Richard Primus has also noted,
“[M]any practices that do involve government actors’ identifying people by race are not always
subject to strict scrutiny.” Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 505 (2003) (citing to examples like the collection of demograph-
ic data by the Census Bureau, state legislatures’ race-based redistricting practices, and social
service agencies’ race-conscious adoption placements).
38. Starr, supra note 12, at 806, 819; see also Sonja B. Starr, The New Profiling: Why Pun-
ishing Based on Poverty and Identity Is Unconstitutional and Wrong, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 229,
230 (2015) (“When the government instructs judges to consider risk scores based on factors
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therefore that the use of protected characteristics will exacerbate
unwarranted disparities in the criminal justice system, particularly along
racial lines.
Race as an Algorithmic Input: The strongest arguments against the use of
protected characteristics as algorithmic inputs concern race and ethnicity.39
like these, it is explicitly endorsing sentencing discrimination based on factors the defendant
cannot control. It is embracing a system that is bound to worsen the intersectional racial, class,
and gender disparities that already pervade our criminal justice system.”).
39. In contrast to the general consensus that race is prohibited from algorithms, the use
of gender and socioeconomic factors as algorithmic inputs is far less settled. For example, the
Model Penal Code on Sentencing, while expressly disapproving of using race in predicting risk,
has argued that “consideration of gender for the narrow purpose of risk and needs assessments
is expressly permitted.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note (AM. L.
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2 2011). Similarly, in a recent article, Christopher Slobogin argues
that “race should never be a risk factor. Other noncriminal risk factors should be included in
an RAI only if they appreciably improve predictive validity. This limitation would probably
still permit reliance on variables such as age and gender, since they appear to improve accuracy
significantly.” Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 592 (2018). For example, John Monahan has argued, with respect to
gender, that the fact “[t]hat women commit violent acts at a much lower rate than men is a sta-
ple in criminology and has been known for as long as official records have been kept.” John
Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators,
and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 416 (2006). Based on this fact, Monahan unequivocally states
that
classifying by gender for the purpose of violence risk assessment should have little diffi-
culty surviving an equal protection challenge: The government’s police power objective
in preventing violence in society is surely “important,” and including gender as a risk
factor on an actuarial prediction instrument is “substantially related” to the accuracy
with which such an instrument can forecast violence—and therefore assist in its preven-
tion.
Id. at 431. However, other scholars like Starr have argued that equal protection principles for-
bid the use of gender and poverty in risk-assessment tools. With respect to gender, for exam-
ple, Starr claims that Supreme Court cases pertaining to drinking, juries, and workforce
participation have prohibited actors from making decisions that differ by gender simply be-
cause there is a statistical difference between groups. See Starr, supra note 12, at 823–29. Starr
specifically questions the notion that “actuarial fairness,” or relatedly statistical discrimination,
is permissible under the Constitution. Id. at 825–26 (citing cases like Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 191–92 (1976)). She concludes that “the Supreme Court has squarely rejected statistical
discrimination—use of group tendencies as a proxy for individual characteristics—as a permis-
sible justification for otherwise constitutionally forbidden discrimination.” Id. at 827. She
therefore argues that the use of gender in risk-assessment tools would be constitutionally im-
permissible as well, even though consideration of gender would typically lead to lower predict-
ed risk for women. See id. at 825; see also Sidhu, supra note 22, at 700 (arguing that sex-based
classifications would also fail intermediate scrutiny). With respect to poverty and socioeco-
nomic status, some argue that these inputs would be constitutionally permissible in predictive
algorithms. See, e.g., id. at 700–01 (“Whereas classifications based on race, national origin, reli-
gion, and sex are presumptively unconstitutional, different treatment premised on socioeco-
nomic status enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. . . . Accordingly, socio-economic status
does not seem to offend the constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection . . . .”); see also Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing
alone, is not a suspect classification.”). Others argue that that use of socioeconomic inputs in
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For example, Starr claims that there “appears to be a general consensus that
using race would be unconstitutional.”40 Starr therefore takes the position
that it is relatively settled in the law that race is an impermissible input into
risk-assessment instruments. A more recent paper by Dawinder Sidhu
echoes many of these claims, stating that the Supreme Court’s
anticlassification cases “should put to rest any suggestion that [race and
religion] are constitutionally appropriate in risk-assessment[].”41 Sharing
these views, Christopher Slogobin raises similar equal protection issues with
risk assessment in the juvenile context. As he notes, “use of race[ and]
ethnicity . . . as risk factors should require a compelling justification”42
because they are highly suspect classifications. But he argues that such a
justification is “unlikely, given the less-than-robust correlation between
these characteristics and risk, as well as the large number of other risk factors
available to the government.”43 Ultimately, Slogobin states that “most courts
have accepted the proposition that race may not be considered in
determining dangerousness.”44 Significantly, because the Equal Protection
Clause has been viewed as prohibiting classifications based on protected
characteristics, regardless of whether the classification would harm or benefit
the protected group, it does not matter if race would in some instances
benefit individuals in the protected class.
The view that race is impermissible as an algorithmic input is perhaps
not surprising, and even intuitive, given that courts have typically struck
down sentencing decisions made by human decisionmakers on the basis of
race.45 Numerous courts and sentencing commissions have, for example,
risk-assessment tools is unconstitutional because it is equivalent to “punishing a person for his
poverty.” Starr, supra note 12, at 831, 834; Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983).
40. Starr, supra note 12, at 812.
41. Sidhu, supra note 22, at 699.
42. Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Juvenile Justice,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2013, at 10, 13–14.
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id. at 13–14.
45. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and Gender as Explicit Sentencing Factors,
14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 127 (2010) (providing an in-depth history of the use of race and
gender in sentencing). For example, in United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2007), the
Second Circuit vacated and remanded the defendant’s case, finding that the district court im-
permissibly based its sentence on the defendant’s national origin. While the district court justi-
fied the sentence on deterrence grounds, the Second Circuit stated that “[a]lthough deterrence
is undoubtedly a proper consideration in imposing sentence, we reject the view that a defend-
ant’s ethnicity or nationality may legitimately be taken into account in selecting a particular
sentence to achieve the general goal of deterrence.” Id. at 156 (quoting United States v. Leung,
40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994)). In another case, United States v. Borrero-Isaza, the Ninth Cir-
cuit vacated and remanded the defendant’s case, finding that the district court judge impermis-
sibly considered the defendant’s Colombian nationality when setting his sentence. 887 F.2d
1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The conclusion is unavoidable: Borrero was penalized because of
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proclaimed that “[a] defendant’s race or nationality may play no adverse role
in the administration of justice, including at sentencing.”46
Two examples are particularly notable. The first is the Sentencing
Reform Act (SRA) of 1984, which directed the United States Sentencing
Commission to “assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely
neutral as to the race . . . of offenders.”47 This provision embodies the
Judiciary Committee’s position that it is inappropriate “to afford preferential
treatment to defendants of a particular race.”48 However, this provision was
made with respect to decisions made by human judgment alone and is
related to concerns about unwarranted sentencing disparities,49 not
decisions made with the aid of risk assessments, which may generate
statistically valid differences across groups. Thus, the extension of the SRA to
risk-assessment tools is unclear, although some scholars have claimed that
the SRA shows that “Congress declared race . . . off-limits in risk-assessment
instruments in the federal system.”50
The second noteworthy example is the American Law Institute’s Draft of
the Model Penal Code (MPC), a highly influential law-reform project that
takes the position that race is impermissible in risk assessments. In general,
the MPC has expressly endorsed the use of risk-assessment instruments:
Responsible actors in every sentencing system—from prosecutors to judges
to parole officials—make daily judgments about . . . the risks of recidivism
posed by offenders. These judgments, pervasive as they are, are notoriously
imperfect. They often derive from the intuitions and abilities of individual
decisionmakers, who typically lack professional training in the sciences of
human behavior.
. . . .
. . . Actuarial—or statistical—predictions of risk, derived from objective
criteria, have been found superior to clinical predictions built on the
his national origin, and not because he trafficked in drugs that emanated from a source coun-
try.”).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
48. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 171 (1983).
49. See id. at 38 (“[E]very day Federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of
sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under
similar circumstances. . . . These disparities, whether they occur at the time of the initial sen-
tencing or at the parole stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers
on those judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and implementing the sen-
tence.”); id. at 49 (“[T]he present practices of the Federal courts and of the Parole Commission
clearly indicate that sentencing in the Federal courts is characterized by unwarranted disparity
and by uncertainty about the length of time offenders will serve in prison.”).
50. See, e.g., Sidhu, supra note 22, at 694.
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professional training, experience, and judgment of the persons making
predictions.51
However, according to the reporter’s note in the March 2011 draft of the
Model Penal Code on Sentencing, “[t]he consideration of race and ethnicity
is disapproved . . . and raises serious constitutional concerns.”52
Case law suggests that a court would still likely apply heightened
scrutiny in assessing the permissibility of using protected traits in algorithms
even if statistical differences in risk between Black and white individuals are
“actuarially fair.”53 Relying on statistically fair differences in risk is akin to
the economics concept of statistical discrimination, or the use of observable
group traits, such as race, to form accurate beliefs about the unobservable
characteristics of defendants, such as risk.54 While the Supreme Court has
never explicitly addressed the constitutionality of statistical discrimination
on the basis of race,55 it has suggested that strict scrutiny would likely apply
to most policies that rely on this type of rationale.56 This is due to the fact
51. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No.
2, 2011).
52. Id. § 6B.09 reporter’s note.
53. One of the cases that addresses the idea of statistical discrimination, although not
framed in those terms, is Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). In that case, a local judge
granted custody of a child to the father rather than the white mother, who had remarried a
Black man since being initially granted custody. The judge reasoned that this decision was in
the best interests of the child because “it is inevitable that [the child] will, if allowed to remain
in her present situation and attains school age and thus more vulnerable to peer pressures, suf-
fer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come.” Id. at 431. Despite finding that “[t]he
goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial
governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause,” and acknowledging that a
child living with a stepparent of a different race may face social pressures, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the decision, holding that “[t]he effects of racial prejudice, however real,
cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody.” Id. at 433–34. Thus, Palmore
suggests that statistical discrimination may be impermissible, although the Court has often
described the danger of such predictions as being driven by no more “than personal specula-
tions or vague disquietudes,” Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 536 (1963), suggesting
that statistical evidence showing a true relationship between race and risk may yield a different
conclusion. However, most recently, in Buck v. Davis, an ineffective assistance of counsel case
where the defense attorney introduced statistical evidence that the defendant was more likely
to act violently because he is Black, the Court stated that “[i]t would be patently unconstitu-
tional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future danger because of his race.”
137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017).
54. See, e.g., Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination 1 (Princeton
Univ. Indus. Rels. Section, Working Paper No. 30A, 1971).
55. The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that Title VII prohibits statistical
discrimination. See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716–17
(1978); Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991).
56. See Huq, supra note 21, at 1086 (“The Court has not been clear on whether such sta-
tistical discrimination triggers constitutional concerns. . . . All that can safely be said is that, at
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that using race to predict the behavior of individuals is at odds with a core
commitment of the anticlassification approach to equal protection, which is
to treat people as individuals.57 However, the Court has noted that strict
scrutiny does not preclude the use of race-based policies narrowly tailored to
the government’s compelling interest in maintaining safety in the criminal
justice system.58
Perhaps given the government’s important objective of maintaining
public safety, not all legal scholars agree that race is impermissible as an
algorithmic input under the Equal Protection Clause. For example, J.C.
Oleson argues that even under strict scrutiny, a risk assessment that included
race would likely survive such analysis because race operates as a “plus
factor” analogous to the use of race in affirmative action cases like Grutter v.
Bollinger.59 In Grutter, the Supreme Court upheld the use of race as one fac-
tor in the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program, a con-
sideration designed to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to
enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than
the sum of its parts.”60 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the Law
School had “a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body” and
least in some instances, statistical discrimination will be subject to close judicial scrutiny, and
sometimes it won’t be. The cut-point between those domains remains to be defined.”); Strauss,
supra note 20, at 4 (“It has, I think, been generally understood that, except in extraordinary
circumstances, a claim under the Equal Protection Clause or the civil rights laws cannot be de-
fended on the ground that the act of discrimination conformed to an accurate generalization.
But there was little explicit consideration of this issue, and the reason for forbidding rational
statistical discrimination was never fully worked out by courts or commentators.”); see also
Starr, supra note 12, at 827 (“[T]he Supreme Court has squarely rejected statistical discrimina-
tion—use of group tendencies as a proxy for individual characteristics—as a permissible justi-
fication for otherwise constitutionally forbidden discrimination.”).
57. See Benjamin Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J.
1600, 1629 (2020) (stating that the Supreme Court’s cases on race-based inferences “stand for a
fairly straightforward proposition: practices that treat race as predictive of what individual
people are likely to think or do show disrespect for the fact that they are individuals, not fungi-
ble members of a racial group”).
58. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005). In this case, the Court considered an
unwritten California prison policy that racially segregated inmates for up to sixty days upon
arrival. Id. at 502. The asserted rationale for the policy was to prevent violence by racial gangs
because an “inmate’s race is a proxy for gang membership, and gang membership is a proxy for
violence.” Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, while the Court held that strict scrutiny
would apply to this policy, it noted that “[p]risons are dangerous places, and the special cir-
cumstances they present may justify racial classifications in some contexts. Such circumstances
can be considered in applying strict scrutiny, which is designed to take relevant differences into
account.” Id. at 515. In doing so, the Court noted that “[s]trict scrutiny does not preclude the
ability of prison officials to address the compelling interest in prison safety. Prison administra-
tors, however, will have to demonstrate that any race-based policies are narrowly tailored to
that end.” Id. at 514.
59. J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1377, 1385–86 (2011).
60. 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003).
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that the admissions policy was narrowly tailored because race, a “ ‘plus’ fac-
tor,” was used in a “flexible, nonmechanical way” that allowed for a “truly
individualized consideration.”61
With these cases in mind, Oleson argues that protecting the public from
crime is a compelling state interest,62 and that inclusion of race in predicting
risk is narrowly tailored given studies showing that race is highly correlated
with recidivism.63 Finally, he claims that no less restrictive means will
achieve the state’s public-safety goal given that exclusion of race decreases
the predictive accuracy of models, such that using race directly would
withstand strict scrutiny.64 As he argues, “[r]ace and its correlates can be
excluded from evidence-based sentencing, but only at the cost of
compromising the ability of the government to achieve its compelling
interest (preventing crime).”65 Similarly, Judge Richard Kopf has argued that
“a sentencing system based upon a robust actuarial data set consisting of all
factors [including age, race, and gender] statistically correlated with risk
would arguably pass constitutional muster, even under strict scrutiny.”66
Many of these dissenting views therefore stem from the belief that, in order
to protect the community from crime, one ought to use the fullest set of
input characteristics possible, even protected characteristics such as race.
Summary: Based on our review, we see the mainstream legal view as
generally rejecting the direct use of protected characteristics in predictive
algorithms, with the strongest consensus on the impermissibility of race.
This mainstream legal position views the use of protected characteristics like
race as running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on racial
classifications. This consensus is summarized well in a recent Berkman Klein
report on the use of algorithms in the criminal justice system, where the
authors argue that
[v]irtually everyone agrees that race would be a constitutionally
impermissible factor to include, and thus it is not included as an explicit
variable in any of these systems. . . . Thus if race was explicitly included as
61. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, 334.
62. Oleson, supra note 59, at 1385.
63. Id. at 1350, 1385–86 (citing meta-analysis of studies that identify the variables most
predictive of re-offending, which include having criminal peers, antisocial personality, crimi-
nogenic needs, adult criminal history, and race).
64. See id. at 1337 (citing Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Guideline-Based Justice: Pre-
diction and Racial Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST. 151, 173 (1987) (noting that omitting race-
correlated factors reduces accuracy of recidivism prediction by five to twelve percentage
points)).
65. Id. at 1386.
66. Richard G. Kopf, Federal Supervised Release and Actuarial Data (Including Age,
Race, and Gender): The Camel’s Nose and the Use of Actuarial Data at Sentencing, 27 FED.
SENT’G REP. 207, 213 (2015).
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an input . . . , its use in sentencing criminal defendants would almost
certainly constitute an Equal Protection violation.67
We also view it as highly likely that courts in the near future will have to
address the constitutionality of using protected characteristics, in particular
race and gender, in risk-assessment instruments. For example, the United
States stated in its brief as amicus curiae in Loomis v. Wisconsin, a case
addressing the constitutionality of risk assessments at sentencing, that “the
use of actuarial risk assessments might raise issues of gender or racial bias.”68
Citing the concerns raised by scholars like Starr and Sidhu,69 the United
States flagged this important question for the Supreme Court, claiming that
“[i]t is a serious constitutional question, however, the extent to which
actuarial assessments considered at sentencing may take account of
statistical differences for male and female offenders, such as, for example, in
recidivism rates. That question may warrant the Court’s attention in the
future in an appropriate case.”70
B. Proxy Effects of Protected Characteristics
The second legal concern regarding protected characteristics is that
seemingly neutral algorithmic inputs such as criminal history can proxy for
suspect classes such as race. In this scenario, the use of these seemingly
neutral inputs can also indirectly harm or benefit individuals based on
membership in a protected class. Zip code of residence is, for example,
highly correlated with race in a variety of contexts, potentially due in part to
residential segregation. The correlation between race and zip code, along
with the positive correlation between, say, race and pretrial misconduct,
means that predictive algorithms will assign a higher risk score to individuals
from majority-Black zip codes compared to otherwise similar individuals
from majority-white zip codes, even when the zip code of residence has no
direct effect on outcomes. As a result, some have argued that using
residential zip codes in predictive algorithms is “almost tantamount to using
race.”71 For example, Zach Harned and Hanna Wallach have argued, “[a]
decision maker who selects applicants on the basis of race and a decision
67. DANIELLE KEHL, PRISCILLA GUO & SAMUEL KESSLER, RESPONSIVE CMTYS.,
ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE USE OF RISK ASSESSMENTS IN
SENTENCING 24 (2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33746041/2017-
07_responsivecommunities_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYP9-8DCY] (citation omitted).
68. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae at 19, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct.
2290 (2017) (No. 16-6387).
69. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
70. Brief for the United States, supra note 68, at 19 (although arguing that the petition
for a writ of certiorari should be denied in this case).
71. Cathy O’Neil, The Ethical Data Scientist, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Feb. 4, 2016, 8:30
AM), https://slate.com/technology/2016/02/how-to-bring-better-ethics-to-data-science.html
[https://perma.cc/23XJ-U3XJ].
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maker who selects applicants by inferring their race from their zip code are
doing ‘exactly the same [thing], only [the latter uses] two steps rather than
one. This too is a form of disparate treatment.’ ”72
It is important to note that these proxy effects of protected
characteristics are completely distinct from the direct effects discussed
above. Even when race itself is directly excluded from an algorithm, the
inclusion of correlated algorithmic inputs may generate racial disparities.73
We show formally in Part IV that these potentially harmful “proxy effects”
will emerge whenever there is a correlation between an algorithmic input
and the protected characteristic. Our empirical results demonstrate that all
commonly used inputs are highly correlated with race, such that all inputs
have the potential to generate proxy effects.
As with direct use of protected characteristics, there is no legal precedent
regarding the use of proxies in general. Nevertheless, the mainstream view is
that these proxy effects are likely problematic from a fairness perspective,
and thus inputs such as zip code of residence, education, and employment
status should be excluded from predictive algorithms,74 although whether
any particular algorithmic input is actually correlated with race is an
empirical question that may differ across contexts.75
Racial Proxies as Algorithmic Inputs: The strongest arguments against
the use of proxies again center on race. In the context of the criminal justice
system, the main concern is that use of algorithmic inputs correlated with
race will “exacerbate the unacceptable racial disparities in our criminal
justice system.”76 For instance, Larry Krasner, the current district attorney in
Philadelphia, has argued that “there is a real danger that the components
72. Zach Harned & Hanna Wallach, Stretching Human Laws to Apply to Machines: The
Dangers of a “Colorblind” Computer, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25)
(quoting James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Response, Incomprehensible Discrimina-
tion, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 176 (2017)).
73. Excluding protected characteristics from predictive algorithms may be completely
pointless if there are other potential inputs such as socioeconomic status or education that are
highly correlated with the protected characteristic. E.g., Kim, supra note 21, at 904. Computer
scientists have also highlighted the importance of proxy effects, labeling this problem “redun-
dant encodings,” defined as a situation where membership in a protected class is highly corre-
lated with, and thus already coded, in other characteristics used in the algorithm. See, e.g.,
Dwork et al., supra note 23, at 226. Economists have also noted the potential importance of
proxy effects in predictive algorithms, in particular how such proxy effects could generate un-
warranted disparities. E.g., Pope & Sydnor, supra note 23, at 206.
74. E.g., Starr, supra note 12, at 838 (“[S]ocioeconomic and family variables that [the
instruments] include are highly correlated with race, as is criminal history, so they are likely to
have a racially disparate impact.”).
75. For example, repayment history and credit scores may generate proxy effects in the
context of lending but not the criminal justice system.
76. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27
FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015). These racial proxy effects are enormously prevalent as “most
data we collect has some proxy power, and we are often unaware of it.” O’Neil, supra note 71.
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going into the risk assessment are proxies for race and for socioeconomic
status.”77 These concerns have led to the exclusion of inputs such as
education, employment status, zip code, and socioeconomic status from
many predictive algorithms in the criminal justice system, as we will explore
in further detail below.78 Despite the fact that current charge and prior
criminal history are routinely used,79 some have also argued that use of these
inputs “will unquestionably aggravate the already intolerable racial
imbalance in our prison populations” because of their correlation with
race.80 For example, prior arrests may reflect not just actual criminal
behavior but also biases in policing, such that use of prior arrests can result
in past discrimination being “baked in” to the algorithm.81 As noted by
Richard Frase in the context of sentencing, for instance:
Even when [racial] disparity results from the application of seemingly ap-
propriate, race-neutral sentencing criteria, it is still seen by many citizens as
evidence of societal and criminal justice unfairness; such negative percep-
tions undermine the legitimacy of criminal laws and institutions of justice,
making citizens less likely to obey the law and cooperate with law enforce-
ment.82
Some of the arguments against the use of racial proxies are
constitutional in nature. However, the Equal Protection Clause is relatively
permissive when it comes to the use of racial proxies in predictive
algorithms. For instance, if a risk-assessment instrument utilized an
algorithmic input such as employment or education but was otherwise
facially neutral, the legality of the instrument would likely turn on the
motivation for including the characteristic in the first place.83 This position
77. Orso, supra note 14.
78. See infra Section II.B.
79. E.g., Holder, supra note 14 (“Criminal sentences must be based on the facts, the law,
the actual crimes committed, the circumstances surrounding each individual case, and the de-
fendant’s history of criminal conduct.”).
80. Harcourt, supra note 76, at 237; see also Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing:
An “Unsettled” Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 279–84 (2013) (critiquing the use of criminal his-
tory variables in risk assessments because criminal history may be influenced by past discrimi-
nation).
81. E.g., Goldsmith & Bousquet, supra note 16. (“But many worry that the biases are
simply baked into the algorithms themselves. Some opponents have argued that policing algo-
rithms will disproportionately target areas with more people of color and low-income residents
because they reinforce old stereotypes: Data on patterns of past arrest rates, for example, might
cause an algorithm to target low-income neighborhoods where officers were historically more
likely to pick up black kids for possession.”).
82. RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A
WORKABLE SYSTEM 210–11 (2013).
83. See Slobogin, supra note 42, at 14 (“A more complicated question is whether risk
factors that might serve as a proxy for one of these classifications are legitimate. For instance,
employment and education status could be statistical stand-ins for both race and age. Under
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reflects current law, which states that, with respect to facially neutral laws, a
government policy or law is only constitutionally problematic under the
Equal Protection Clause if “motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose.”84 Indeed, the Supreme Court has clarified that “official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dispropor-
tionate impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is re-
quired to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”85
But there is a growing recognition that racial proxies (even if seemingly
neutral) can be normatively troubling and undesirable even if their use is not
premised on a racially discriminatory motive.86 Thus, legal scholars have
bemoaned that the equal protection doctrine would likely be a poor basis for
any challenge of a facially neutral risk-assessment instrument because it
would be difficult to show that the algorithm was specifically designed with a
racially discriminatory motive.87 As explained in a Berkman Klein report,
while
using factors which correlate with race may be troubling, existing
constitutional doctrine does not suggest that their inclusion in a risk
assessment instrument would constitute an Equal Protection violation. . . .
[S]trict scrutiny is only triggered if the individuals challenging the law can
current equal protection law, however, unless the intent behind using these types of factors is
race- or age-motivated, such a claim is likely to fail.”).
84. Accord Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213 (1995); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (“[T]he basic equal protection principle [is] that the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially dis-
criminatory purpose.”); see also Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–55 (2016) (reversing
the Georgia Supreme Court’s rejection of defendant’s claim that the prosecution’s use of per-
emptory strikes against black jurors was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory in-
tent” (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008))). In McCleskey v. Kemp, the
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Georgia’s capital punishment scheme despite statistical
evidence showing large racial disparities in the receipt of death penalty because the evidence
was “clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in [the defend-
ant’s] case acted with discriminatory purpose.” 481 U.S. 279, 297–99 (1987).
85. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977).
86. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
87. See Huq, supra note 21, at 1090 (“Without knowing the full spectrum of features
that could, conceivably, have been included in the training data . . . it will be difficult or impos-
sible to diagnose this kind of conduct absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent. It will,
moreover, be especially difficult to show that, but for race, a specific feature would or would
not have been included, as the doctrine requires.” (citing Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979))); see also Sidhu, supra note 22, at 699 (“To find that a facially neutral statute vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause, the statute must be motivated by an impermissible purpose.
Here, there is no indication that risk-assessment tools are driven by animus or any other ille-
gitimate reason. Rather, these instruments are clearly used to control crime. As a result, facially
neutral risk-assessments would likely survive a constitutional attack.” (citation omitted)). Simi-
lar arguments have been made in the context of predictive algorithms and Title VII. See Baro-
cas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 697–98 (“Except for masking, discriminatory data mining is by
stipulation unintentional.”).
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show that it was also adopted with a racially discriminatory intent. If not,
rational basis review applies, a highly deferential standard.88
In fact, some argue that proxy effects themselves should constitute
disparate treatment under the law. Harned and Wallach, for example, argue
that “the uniform application of a machine learning system—even one that is
blinded to race—does not necessarily insulate against disparate treatment
claims, because the system might inappropriately use proxies for race.”89
Nevertheless, given the lack of current constitutional constraints on the
use of proxies, many insead resort to normative judgments to determine
whether certain racial proxies should be permitted. But the dividing line
among legal scholars and policymakers between which proxies are
problematic (and thus should be excluded) and which are not problematic
(and thus can be included) is hard to define in theory. For example, Cathy
O’Neil, author of Weapons of Math Destruction, has argued that figuring out
which proxies are unacceptable and which are acceptable (if any) is no easy
task. As she notes,
[W]e shouldn’t use race because essentially it creates this negative feedback
loop, then you say, OK, well, OK, let’s not use race, but should we use zip
code, which of course is a proxy for race in our segregated society?
And so once they acknowledge that zip code is just as good as race, then
you’re like, OK, so how do we choose our attributes? Because there are so
many proxies to race. And it’s really actually very tricky. It’s tricky. And I’m
not trying to claim that it’s easy.90
Similarly, Ignacio Cofone writes:
Blocking proxies for protected categories may be key for avoiding discrimi-
natory outcomes. However, two central problems have been identified for
doing that. The first problem is that we may not know which those proxies
are and, if we did, it may be impossible to block all proxies. The second
problem is that, even if it is possible to block proxies, it may be undesirable
as those proxies could also contain valuable information.91
One possible dividing line is that correlated inputs should be excluded if
the reason for the correlation is because of past discrimination or racial
88. KEHL ET AL., supra note 67, at 24 (citing Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
(holding that a statute is only invalid when the state has acted with the purpose of discriminat-
ing against a minority group, not when the statute merely has negative effects on such a
group)).
89. Harned & Wallach, supra note 72 (manuscript at 25).
90. When Not to Trust the Algorithm, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://hbr.org/ideacast/2016/10/when-not-to-trust-the-algorithm.html.
91. Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1413 (2019).
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animus.92 Otherwise, including these variables can result in discrimination
being “baked in” to the algorithm, generating unjust or unwarranted
disparities. In contrast, if the reason for the correlation between a variable
and race is not due to discrimination, it should be included because any
disparities that result may be “warranted.” For example, Cass Sunstein has
noted that:
Especially difficult problems are presented if an algorithm uses a factor
that is in some sense an outgrowth of discrimination. For example, a poor
credit rating or a troubling arrest record might be an artifact of
discrimination by human beings that occurrred before the algorithm was
asked to do its predictive work. There is a risk here that algorithms could
perpetuate discrimination and extend its reach, by using factors that are
genuinely predictive but products of unequal treatment. This might turn
discrimination into a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy.93
Excluding proxies that are likely an “outgrowth of discrimination” is of
course a challenging task, as it relies on normative judgments about the
nature of discrimination. But even supposing that this principle could be
implemented in theory, the current practice seems to deviate substantially
from this idea. Commonly used inputs in many predictive algorithms often
include racial proxies that are highly likely to be “an artifact of
discrimination.” For example, there is a plethora of empirical evidence
suggesting that lengthier prior criminal histories among Black individuals
could be due to discriminatory policing.94 As a result, criminal history is
consistently highly correlated with race.95 Yet it is nearly universally
embraced by legal scholars and policymakers and is almost always used in
risk-assessment instruments.96 In fact, criminal history is often portrayed as
92. See, e.g., Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 1296–97 (“By allowing discriminators
to indirectly but reliably take into account the ways in which historical discrimination impacts
marginalized groups, proxy discrimination by AIs can cloak the reproduction of these histori-
cal hierarchies in seemingly neutral and objective structures.”).
93. Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RSCH. 499, 509 (2019) (cita-
tion omitted).
94. See, e.g., Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of Black-White Dis-
parities in NYPD’s Stop and Frisk Program (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
18803, 2013); Roland G. Fryer Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of
Force, 127 J. POL. ECON. 1210 (2019); Felipe Goncalves & Steven Mello, A Few Bad Apples? Ra-
cial Bias in Policing (Princeton Univ. Indus. Rels. Section, Working Paper No. 608, 2017); Jer-
emy West, Racial Bias in Police Investigations (Oct. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review).
95. Harcourt, supra note 76, at 238 (“Risk, today, is predominantly tied to prior criminal
history, and prior criminality has become a proxy for race. The result is that decarcerating by
means of risk instruments is likely to aggravate the racial disparities in our already overly ra-
cialized prisons.”).
96. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 38, at 231 (“In contrast to gender and socioeconomic vari-
ables, some other risk factors in the instruments are constitutionally permissible considera-
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the counterpoint to protected characteristics such as race in terms of both
legal and ethical permissibility. For example, Richard Berk and Jordan Hyatt
claim that “[t]he explicit use of race, national origin, and other suspect
classes for forecasting, regardless of the method, would likely fail to meet the
necessary, strict scrutiny threshold. On the other hand, criminal history is
relatively uncontroversial.”97 And as summarized by Mark Moore, the
consensus view appears to be that
[s]ome characteristics [used as risk factors for violence in sentencing], such
as prior criminal conduct and current illegal drug use, are themselves
crimes and therefore of direct interest to the criminal justice system.
Others, such as race, religion, and political beliefs, are the opposite: they are
specially protected against being used by criminal justice officials in making
decisions.98
But we note that the view that criminal history is “uncontroversial” is
increasingly under attack, with some commentators arguing that “[r]acism
may well be a significant factor in the higher arrest and conviction rates
among black people to begin with” such that “including racial proxies
amounts—in effect, if not necessarily intent—to judging people by the color
of their skin.”99
Summary: Based on our review, we see the mainstream position as
discouraging the use of proxies in predictive algorithms, primarily on
normative grounds that using racial proxies is unfair and equivalent to using
race directly. As noted above, there are likely weaker constitutional
contraints on the use of proxies than the use of protected characteristics
because the current equal protection doctrine has far less of a bite when
dealing with facially neutral laws. As a result, deciding which proxies are
permissible and which are not is often an ad hoc process, with substantial
disagreement among legal scholars and policymakers.100 Specifically, the
tions. These include criminal history as well as some demographic classifications, such as age,
that do not trigger special constitutional scrutiny.”).
97. Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentenc-
ing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 226 (2015) (citing Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew
Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47 (2011)); see also
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1998).
98. Mark H. Moore, Purblind Justice: Normative Issues in the Use of Prediction in the
Criminal Justice System, in 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” 314, 317 (Alfred
Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, Jeffrey A. Roth & Christy A. Visher eds., 1986).
99. Tafari Mbadiwe, Algorithmic Injustice, NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2018, at 3, 19.
100. A related debate is what nonrace controls should be included when testing for dis-
parate impact in discrimination litigation. As Ian Ayres has noted, “in disparate impact testing,
the primary statistical concern is most often ‘included variable bias’—the worry that the statis-
tical estimates of disparate impact are biased because the regression inappropriately includes
non-race variables.” Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of “Included Varia-
ble Bias,” IAN AYRES 3 (2010), https://ianayres.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Testing%20for
%20Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GN2-FMSG]. Similarly, Jung et al. note that as
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arguments in favor of or against certain inputs often rely on normative
judgments of what is morally troubling and what is not.101 These types of
normative judgments include a wide range of perspectives, such as a
determination of how predictive the proxy is of risk, whether the risk factor
is appropriate in light of retributive goals, whether the risk factor is a
product of discrimination, and whether the risk factor cannot be changed
and is thus “static.”102 Because these normative judgments often conflict,
scholars have summarized the legal position regarding the use of racial
proxies in risk assessment as disjointed and inconsistent.103 For example,
Skeem and Lowenkamp write with respect to the legal field, “As is clear from
this brief review, critics disagree in calling potentially race-related risk
factors like criminal history ‘in’ or ‘out’ for the purposes of sentencing.”104
At the extreme, if one believes that all racial proxies should be excluded
from predictive algorithms,105 there remains no feasible way of designing an
an extreme example, it is problematic to include control variables in a regression that
are obvious proxies for protected attributes—such as vocal register as a proxy for gen-
der . . . . Including such proxies will typically lead one to underestimate the true magni-
tude of discrimination in decisions. But what counts as a ‘proxy’ is not always clear. For
example, given existing patterns of residential segregation, one might argue that zip
codes are a proxy for race, and thus should be excluded when testing for racial bias. But
one could also argue that zip code provides legitimate information relevant to a deci-
sion, and so excluding it would lead to omitted-variable bias.
Jongbin Jung, Sam Corbett-Davies, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, Omitted and Included Variable
Bias in Tests for Disparate Impact, SHARAD GOEL 2 (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://5harad.com/papers/included-variable-bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBN5-43AE].
101. For example, Slobogin claims that nonrace factors should be included depending on
“a normative judgment . . . about when a level of correlation is so low it requires a factor’s ex-
clusion.” Slobogin, supra note 42, at 592–93 (arguing that age and gender are permissible be-
cause they improve accuracy, but that marital and employment status may not be). But how
does one determine the “level of correlation” that determines whether a factor should be in-
cluded or not? If the correlation is high, but the factor is a strong proxy for race, does that
mean the input should nevertheless be included?
102. See Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 13, at 680–85, for a discussion of these differ-
ent principles.
103. In the lending context, Talia Gillis similarly notes that excluding inputs that are
proxies to protected characteristics “is not feasible when there is no agreed-upon definition of
a proxy, and when complex interactions between variables are unidentifiable to the human eye.
Even inputs that have traditionally been thought of as proxies for race, such as zip codes, may
be less concerning than other ways in which a borrower’s race can be recovered.” Talia Gillis,
False Dreams of Algorithmic Fairness: The Case of Credit Pricing, SCHOLARS HARV. 10–11
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gillis/files/gillis_jmp_191101.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7RLD-SBSK].
104. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 13, at 684.
105. See, e.g., Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 1314; see also Kristen M. Altenburger
& Daniel E. Ho, When Algorithms Import Private Bias into Public Enforcement: The Promise
and Limitations of Statistical Debiasing Solutions, 175 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
98, 117–18 (2018) (noting that even seemingly “socially acceptable” inputs may themselves
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algorithm because every possible input is likely correlated with race. As some
have noted, “[i]f you wanted to remove everything correlated with race, you
couldn’t use anything. That’s the reality of life in America.”106 We return to
this question in our empirical results below.
C. Trade-Off Between Fairness and Accuracy
We conclude this Part by discussing an alternative view of protected
characteristics that prioritizes algorithmic accuracy. The consensus view
discussed above defines a predictive algorithm as “fair” if it is does not use
any information stemming from membership in a protected class, either
directly through the use of the protected characteristic or indirectly through
the use of proxies. For example, some scholars have suggested that
“antidiscrimination regimes could develop specific criteria for requiring
firms that are at substantial risk of engaging in proxy discrimination to
deploy ‘ethical algorithms’ that explicitly seek to eliminate the capacity of
any facially-neutral considerations to proxy for prohibited characteristics.”107
This definition of fairness comes with an important trade-off in terms of
accuracy. Given a large literature that shows that traits like race and gender
are often statistically correlated with risk,108 choosing to exclude protected
characteristics comes at the cost of predictive accuracy.109 Removing
correlated inputs that serve as proxies for protected characteristics also
comes with a loss in accuracy.110 Berk and Hyatt, for example, note the
proxy for race such that “because race and gender may affect everything, settling on pretreat-
ment covariates (or socially acceptable predictors) is challenging to say the least”).
106. Nadya Labi, Misfortune Teller, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2012), https://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/misfortune-teller/308846/ [https://perma.cc/F35P-9QLP]
(quoting Ellen Kurtz, director of research for the Philadelphia Adult Probation and Parole De-
partment in 2012).
107. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 1266–67.
108. See, e.g., Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-analysis of the Predic-
tors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 576 (1996).
109. See, e.g., Pari McGarraugh, Note, Up or Out: Why “Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical
Risk Assessment Is Appropriate at Sentencing and Inappropriate at Parole, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1079, 1102 (2013) (“In order to create a risk assessment instrument that does not offend the
Constitution, race and ethnicity, factors closely overlapping with race and ethnicity, and gen-
der must be purged from the list of inputs. But because race and gender are fairly reliable pre-
dictors of criminal behavior, removing them will reduce the predictive capability of risk
assessments.”); see also Kristy Holtfreter & Rhonda Cupp, Gender and Risk Assessment: The
Empirical Status of the LSI-R for Women, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 363 (2007) (arguing for
separate risk-assessment instruments for men and women given different pathways to crime
for men and women).
110. See, e.g., Calders & Žliobaitė, supra note 23, at 54 (“The first possible solution is to
remove the sensitive attribute from the training data. For example, if gender is the sensitive
attribute in university admission decisions, one would first think of excluding the gender in-
formation from the training data. Unfortunately, . . . this solution does not help if some other
attributes are correlated with the sensitive attribute. . . . The next step would be to remove the
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concern that some algorithmic inputs may be proxies for race, but conclude
that if “one could purge actuarial methods of all racial factors captured
indirectly through proxy predictors[, i]t is almost certain that forecasting
accuracy would decline.”111
These two competing goals can lead to divergent views on the
permissibility of including protected characteristics. As Oleson notes, there
appear to be “two cultures,” one which takes the stance that all predictive
variables should be used, and another which takes the stance that traits like
race and gender are “off-limits.”112
In fact, the degree to which an input enhances an algorithm’s accuracy
may be a factor that is considered by courts.113 For example, the degree to
which a protected characteristic improves predictive accuracy may
determine whether an algorithm survives strict or intermediate scrutiny
because promoting accuracy can be a way of achieving a government’s
compelling interest.114 In a string of recent state supreme court cases dealing
with the constitutionality of algorithms in the criminal justice system, courts
have generally emphasized the importance of accuracy in constructing risk-
assessment instruments. Although none of these cases have dealt with equal
protection challenges, courts have noted that personal characteristics, in-
cluding protected characteristics like gender, may need to be taken into ac-
count in forming risk predictions because promoting accuracy is an
important goal that serves both the state and criminal defendants.115 In State
correlated attributes as well. This seems straightforward in our example dataset; however, it is
problematic if the attribute to be removed also carries some objective information about the
label.”).
111. Berk & Hyatt, supra note 97, at 227.
112. Oleson, supra note 59, at 1352.
113. See, e.g., Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 572–73 (Ind. 2010); State v. Loomis,
881 N.W.2d 749, 763–64 (Wis. 2016).
114. Melissa Hamilton argues that if race and ethnicity significantly improve predictive
accuracy,
then including them would appear to be narrowly tailored to the government’s compel-
ling interests. . . . If, instead, . . . race or ethnicity was not a significant correlate . . . then
developers should, practically and constitutionally, exclude it because there would be no
fit with the policy’s compelling need, and certainly the use of the classification would
not be narrowly tailored.
Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 231, 259 (2015). Even Starr claims that if there is a “marginal gain in predictive accura-
cy” from adding characteristics like race and gender, her “constitutional objections . . . would
be alleviated.” Starr, supra note 38, at 232 (citing a few studies that purport to show that in-
cluding demographic and socioeconomic factors does not significantly increase predictive ac-
curacy).
115. In Malenchik v. State, a 2010 case decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana, the de-
fendant was sentenced to six years in prison (two years suspended) after pleading guilty to re-
ceiving stolen property and admitting to being a habitual offender. 928 N.E.2d at 566. Prior to
sentencing, the county probation department prepared a presentence investigation report. As
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v. Loomis, for instance, a defendant was sentenced due in part to a risk-
assessment tool known as COMPAS and argued, among other claims, that
the algorithm’s use of gender violated his due process rights.116 The Supreme
part of this report, the probation department completed a Level of Service Inventory-Revised
(LSI-R) risk assessment. Id. at 567. The probation department also conducted a Substance
Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (SASSI). On the basis of these risk assessments, the defend-
ant was classified as high-risk/needs and as having a “high probability of having a Substance
Dependence Disorder.” Id. The scores from both LSI-R and SASSI were referenced two times
by the judge at sentencing, who noted, among other things, “[Y]our LSIR score is high. Your
SASSI score is high with a high probability of substance dependence disorder.” Id. (alteration
in original). After sentencing, the defendant appealed and argued that the trial court’s consid-
eration of the LSI-R score was erroneous for a variety of reasons, citing to the court of appeals’s
prior precedent in Rhodes v. State, where it had disapproved generally of the use of the LSI-R.
896 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “it is an abuse of discretion to rely on
scoring models to determine a sentence”).
As part of his claim that the trial court’s consideration of the LSI-R was improper, the de-
fendant argued that factors such as economic status and personal preferences, inputs into the
LSI-R, are discriminatory. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 574. However, the court rejected this ar-
gument, noting that Indiana’s law required such factors to be included in the presentence in-
vestigation report and that “supporting research convincingly shows that offender risk
assessment instruments, which are substantially based on such personal and sociological data,
are effective in predicting the risk of recidivism and the amenability to rehabilitative treat-
ment.” Id. The Supreme Court of Indiana went on to laud the use of such risk assessments,
stating that these “evidence-based sentencing practices [hold] considerable promise” and that
they are “well supported by empirical data and provide target areas to change an individual’s
criminal behavior, thereby enhancing public safety.” Id. at 569–70 (citing Christopher T. Low-
enkamp & Kristin Bechtel, The Predictive Validity of the LSI-R on a Sample of Offenders Drawn
from the Records of the Iowa Department of Corrections Data Management System, FED. PROB.,
Dec. 2007, at 25, 27–29).
116. In another recent state court decision dealing with risk assessments, State v. Loomis,
a 2016 decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the defendant Eric Loomis was charged with
five criminal counts related to a drive-by shooting. While he denied participating in the shoot-
ing, he pled guilty to “attempting to flee a traffic officer and operating a motor vehicle without
the owner’s consent.” 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016). Prior to sentencing, a probation of-
ficer prepared a presentence investigation report, which included a COMPAS risk assessment.
Id. at 755. At Loomis’ sentencing, the trial judge referred to this COMPAS assessment, stating
to the defendant:
You’re identified, through the COMPAS assessment, as an individual who is at high risk
to the community. In terms of weighing the various factors, I’m ruling out probation
because of the seriousness of the crime and because your history, your history on super-
vision, and the risk assessment tools that have been utilized, suggest that you’re ex-
tremely high risk to re-offend.
Id. at 755. Loomis was subsequently sentenced to six years in prison and five years of extended
supervision. Id. at 756. The defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief requesting a new
sentencing hearing. Id. Specifically, he challenged the court’s consideration of the COMPAS
algorithm, arguing that it violated his due process rights for several reasons, one of which was
that the risk assessment improperly considered gender. Id. at 757. Notably, Loomis did not
bring an equal protection claim regarding the use of gender. Ultimately, the court concluded
that because the sentencing court essentially gave minimal weight to the COMPAS assessment
and would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the risk score, the trial court’s use of
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Court of Wisconsin, however, determined that there was a “factual basis un-
derlying COMPAS’s use of gender . . . . [because] it appears that any risk as-
sessment tool which fails to differentiate between men and woman will
misclassify both genders.”117 As a result, the court concluded that “if the in-
clusion of gender promotes accuracy, it serves the interests of institutions
and defendants, rather than a discriminatory purpose,” but also found that
the defendant had failed to show that the sentencing judge actually relied on
gender as a factor in determining his sentence.118
As a result, some legal scholars have argued that exclusion of race and
racial proxies would “compromis[e] the ability of the government to achieve
its compelling interest (preventing crime).”119 Thus, for an individual who
seeks to maximize the accuracy of an algorithm, no input characteristics
should be off-limits, including protected characteristics and their proxies.
II. PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In this Part, we review the most commonly used predictive algorithms in
the criminal justice system to determine how these algorithms deal with the
direct and proxy effects of race.120 We first describe the most commonly used
predictive algorithms at each stage of the criminal justice system, from
policing to pretrial decisions to sentencing to probation. While not meant to
be an exhaustive survey of all the predictive algorithms available, we believe
this review captures the most widely used and representative algorithms in
the criminal justice system. We then describe how each of these predictive
algorithms deals with direct and proxy effects of race.
A. Survey of Predictive Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System
Policing: Predictive algorithms are increasingly used to predict crime in
the United States, a phenomenon broadly known as predictive policing. The
most commonly used predictive-policing algorithm is PredPol, which was
created by the Los Angeles Police Department and UCLA in 2012 to predict
when and where specific crimes are most likely to occur in Los Angeles.121
The algorithm has subsequently been adopted by over sixty police
the algorithmic risk assessment did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 770–
71.
117. Id. at 766.
118. Id. at 766–67.
119. Oleson, supra note 59, at 1386.
120. For a general overview of risk assessments in the criminal justice system, see Bran-
don L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2020).
121. See Overview, PREDPOL, https://www.predpol.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/HX5S-
NLFJ]; Ali Winston & Ingrid Burrington, A Pioneer in Predictive Policing is Starting a Trou-
bling New Project, VERGE (Apr. 26, 2018, 1:36 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/26/1728
5058/predictive-policing-predpol-pentagon-ai-racial-bias [https://perma.cc/JRQ4-GG2L].
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departments across the country, including departments in Kansas,
Washington, and South Carolina.122 PredPol currently uses only three input
variables to predict the incidence and location of future crimes: crime types,
crime locations, and crime dates and times from historical data.123 The
PredPol documentation explicitly states that “[n]o demographic, ethnic or
socio-economic information is ever used. This eliminates the possibility for
privacy or civil rights violations seen with other intelligence-led policing
models.”124
There are also a number of predictive-policing algorithms that are used
in just one city. One of the most prominent city-specific algorithms is the
Strategic Subject List (SSL), or “heat list,” which was created in 2013 in
Chicago to predict an individual’s probability of involvement in gun
violence, either as a perpetrator or victim.125 Using data on arrestees from
Chicago, the algorithm predicts the probability that individuals will be
involved in a shooting and ranks individuals on a risk scale of zero to 500.126
SSL currently uses eight input variables to predict the risk of gun violence:
the number of times the individual has been the victim of a shooting
incident; the number of times the individual has been the victim of an
aggravated battery or assault; the number of prior arrests for violent offenses;
the number of prior arrests for narcotics offenses; the number of prior
arrests for unlawful use of a weapon; age as of the most recent arrest; gang
affiliation; and trends in recent criminal activity.127 SSL explicitly excludes
race and gender as algorithmic inputs.128
Pretrial Decisions: In the context of the pretrial system, the most
commonly used predictive algorithm is the Public Safety Assessment (PSA)
tool created by Arnold Ventures, formerly the Laura and John Arnold
122. Emily Thomas, Why Oakland Police Turned Down Predictive Policing, VICE (Dec.
28, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezp8zp/minority-retort-why-oakland-
police-turned-down-predictive-policing [https://perma.cc/26S8-4VHP]; Caroline Haskins,
Academics Confirm Major Predictive Policing Algorithm is Fundamentally Flawed, VICE (Feb.
14, 2019, 12:57 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwbag4/academics-confirm-major-
predictive-policing-algorithm-is-fundamentally-flawed [https://perma.cc/AC82-B8HP].
123. Predictive Policing: Guidance on Where and When to Patrol, PREDPOL, https://www
.predpol.com/how-predictive-policing-works [https://perma.cc/NDN8-ETZ2].
124. Id.
125. See Asher & Arthur, supra note 5; see also Jessica Saunders, Priscillia Hunt & John S.
Hollywood, Predictions Put into Practice: A Quasi-experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predic-
tive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347 (2016).
126. See Asher & Arthur, supra note 5.
127. Strategic Subject List, CHI. DATA PORTAL, https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-
Safety/Strategic-Subject-List/4aki-r3np [https://perma.cc/EQG7-A8MV].
128. Id.
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Foundation, to predict the risk of pretrial misconduct.129 The PSA has been
rapidly adopted by at least forty jurisdictions to date, including Charlotte,
Chicago, and Phoenix,130 and promises to be one of the most influential
criminal justice developments of the recent era. The PSA predicts the
likelihood that an individual will be rearrested for a new crime if released
before trial, as well as the likelihood that he or she will not return for a future
court hearing. The PSA also identifies defendants with a high risk of being
rearrested for a violent crime.131
The PSA currently uses nine inputs to predict each outcome of interest:
age at current arrest; the pending charge at the time of the offense; whether
the current charge is for a violent offense; whether the individual has a prior
misdemeanor conviction; whether the individual has a prior felony
conviction; whether the individual has a prior violent conviction; whether
the individual has a prior failure to appear in the past two years; whether the
individual has a prior failure to appear older than two years; and whether the
individual has a prior incarceration spell.132 The PSA explicitly excludes
inputs such as race, gender, education, socioeconomic status, and
neighborhood of residence.133
In creating the PSA, Arnold Ventures wanted to create an objective and
fair pretrial decision tool, which it interpreted as “meaning that [the tool]
should not contain factors that would lead defendants to be treated
differently because of their race, gender, or socioeconomic status.”134 In
addition, Arnold Ventures has stated that “[t]o design a risk assessment that
violated any of these principles would not only conflict with our shared
values of fairness and justice, in addition to the law, but would also do
nothing to enhance the predictive accuracy of risk assessments.”135 Citing
129. Emily Hamer, Controversial Algorithms Help Decide Who Stays in Jail, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Feb. 17, 2019), https://apnews.com/794c27c772ae4450acb978f4b84f4619 [https://perma
.cc/792L-GMZS].
130. Pretrial Risk Assessment Now Available to All Interested Jurisdictions; Research Advi-
sory Board Announced, ARNOLD VENTURES (July 11, 2018), https://www.arnoldventures.org
/newsroom/laura-and-john-arnold-foundation-makes-pretrial-risk-assessment-available-to-
all-jurisdictions-announces-expert-panel-to-serve-as-pretrial-research-advisory-board
[https://perma.cc/64C4-TETW]; 21 Cities, States Adopt Risk Assessment Tool to Help Judges








134. Anne Milgram, Alexander M. Holsinger, Marie Vannostrand & Matthew W.
Alsdorf, Pretrial Risk Assessment: Improving Public Safety and Fairness in Pretrial Decision
Making, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 216, 220 (2015).
135. Id.
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research that shows that race and gender are not the best predictors of
pretrial risk,136 Arnold Ventures concludes that “there is simply no need to
choose between the predictive accuracy of a risk assessment and the fair
treatment of all individuals, regardless of race, gender, or socioeconomic
status.”137
There are also versions of pretrial risk-assessment tools that are used by
just one city or state. One of the earliest is the Virginia Pretrial Risk
Assessment Instrument (VPRAI), developed by the Virginia Department of
Criminal Justice Services in 2003.138 The VPRAI calculates the risk of pretrial
misconduct using eight factors: whether the current charge is a felony;
whether the defendant has another pending charge; the defendant’s criminal
history; whether the defendant has two or more failures to appear; whether
the defendant has two or more violent convictions; whether the defendant
lived at the current residence for less than one year; whether the defendant
was employed at the time of arrest; and whether the defendant has a history
of drug abuse.139 These factors are then converted into a risk level, which is
used as an input into the Praxis decisionmaking tool that provides
recommendations for release and detention, as well as the appropriate terms
of pretrial supervision.140 Factors like race and gender are not included.
Sentencing: Risk-assessment tools are also commonly used at sentencing.
One of the first risk-assessment tools used at sentencing was developed by
the Virginia Sentencing Commission in 1995, known as the Nonviolent Risk
Assessment (NVRA).141 The risk-assessment tool was mandated by the
Virginia General Assembly, with the goal of diverting 25% of nonviolent
offenders to alternative sanctions in lieu of incarceration by identifying low-
risk individuals.142 Prior to 2012, the Commission included eleven factors to
predict recidivism, including gender, age, marital status, employment status,
136. Id. (citing K Bechtel, Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Alex Holsinger, Identifying the
Predictors of Pretrial Failure: A Meta-analysis, FED. PROB., Sept. 2011, at 129, 132–33, and Ma-
rie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, FED. PROB.,
Sept. 2009, at 5, 18).
137. Id.
138. Common Pretrial Risk Assessments, MAPPING PRETRIAL INJUSTICE,
https://pretrialrisk.com/the-basics/common-prai/ [https://perma.cc/4ZYN-E8YQ].
139. MONA J.E. DANNER, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & LISA M. SPRUANCE, RACE AND
GENDER NEUTRAL PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT, RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
SUPERVISION: VPRAI AND PRAXIS REVISED 4 (2016), https://university.pretrial.org
/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=7ebee4a7-4bde-62f5-
c031-6a3df7a4bc13 [https://perma.cc/BT98-XBYF].
140. Id. at 1.
141. Brandon Garrett & John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in
Sentencing, JUDICATURE, Summer 2019, at 42, 45.
142. See BRIAN J. OSTROM, MATTHEW KLEIMAN, FRED CHEESMAN, II, RANDALL M.
HANSEN & NEAL B. KAUDER, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN
VIRGINIA 9, 17 (2002).
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current offense information, prior record, and prior juvenile
incarceration.143
In 2012, the Virginia Sentencing Commission revised the risk-
assessment instrument using data on eligible drug and property offenders,
and the instrument is currently administered only to offenders who would
otherwise be recommended for incarceration under the state’s sentencing
guidelines.144 As part of this retesting, the Commission further restricted the
factors used to predict risk, eliminating factors such as employment status
and marital status.145
The Commission also originally found that race was highly predictive of
recidivism.146 However, it chose to exclude race from the risk assessment; it
viewed including race as “inappropriate” because “race was ‘standing in’ for
other factors that are difficult, and often impossible, to measure. . . . [such as]
economic deprivation, inadequate educational facilities, family instability,
and limited employment opportunities, many of which disproportionately
apply to the African-American population.”147 Interestingly, the
Commission noted that by excluding race, the “procedure inevitably led to
the loss of some predictive efficiency.”148
In the past several years, other state legislatures and sentencing
commissions have expressed growing interest in the use of algorithms at
sentencing and have begun developing their own risk-assessment tools. For
example, the Pennsylvania legislature mandated the development of a risk-
assessment sentencing tool in a 2010 senate bill in an effort to reduce the
increasing prison populations by diverting low-risk offenders out of prison.
In developing its proposal—which has not yet been enacted—the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission considered including factors such as
age, gender, and the number and types of prior convictions.149 Importantly,
143. Id. at 27.
144. John Monahan, Anne L. Metz & Brandon L. Garrett, Judicial Appraisals of Risk As-
sessment in Sentencing, 36 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 565, 567 (2018).
145. See Garrett & Monahan, supra note 141 (“In 2012, the commission revised and re-
validated the NVRA on large samples of eligible drug and property offenders. For example, the
NVRA for the crime of larceny now consists of five risk factors: offender age at the time of the
offense; gender; prior adult felony convictions; prior adult incarcerations; and whether the of-
fender was legally restrained (e.g., on probation) at the time of the offense.”).
146. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 142, at 27–28.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 28 n.10.
149. See PA. COMM’N ON SENT’G, VALIDATION OF A RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT BY
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the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission purposely excluded the use of race
in its risk-assessment tool.150
Parole: There are several generic risk-assessment tools designed for
parole decisions, with many of these tools subsequently adapted for
sentencing decisions as well. The most commonly used risk-assessment
instrument in this context is the Correctional Offender Management
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), which is used in many states
across the country to assist in the placement and management of
offenders.151 Developed by a company called Northpointe (recently renamed
Equivant), the COMPAS system uses answers from a 137-item questionnaire
to predict the risk of committing a new crime within two years and then
classifies offenders on a scale of one through ten.152 Broadly speaking, these
factors include questions regarding current charges, criminal history, history
of noncompliance on probation or parole, family and peers, residential
stability, education, employment, and traits such as anger and criminal
150. See Mitch Smith, In Wisconsin, a Backlash Against Using Data to Foretell Defend-
ants’ Futures, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/us/backlash-
in-wisconsin-against-using-data-to-foretell-defendants-futures.html [https://perma.cc/5HCJ-
B7YD]. Interestingly, the Pennsylvania Commission’s interim report suggests that race may
not be fully excluded in a statistical sentence, noting that “[w]hile race and county were found
to be significant predictors of recidivism, they are not included in the risk scale. They are, how-
ever, statistically controlled for in the analyses, which means that the effects of the other factors
are included only after eliminating the effects of race and county.” PA. COMM’N ON SENT’G,
supra note 149, at 12 n.8.
151. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/NE4G-R4KF]. In recent years, the
COMPAS algorithm has faced intense public scrutiny. In 2016, a ProPublica report analyzed
the risk predictions on arrestees from Broward County, Florida and alleged that the COMPAS
algorithm was biased against Black defendants, and specifically that Black individuals are al-
most twice as likely as white individuals to be labeled a higher risk but not actually reoffend.
See id. Although this allegation was challenged by both the algorithm’s creator Northpointe
and various academics, who noted that the algorithm exhibited similar rates of recidivism
among white and Black offenders who received the same score (i.e., equal predictive accuracy),
the ProPublica story generated a large debate about the appropriate use of such algorithms in
the criminal justice system and a discussion on competing notions of algorithmic fairness. Sam
Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller & Sharad Goel, A Computer Program Used for Bail
and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear.,
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-
propublicas/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review); see also Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullaina-
than & Manish Raghavan, Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, ARXIV
(Nov. 17, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NVL-QVHW].
152. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidi-
vism, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 17, 2018, at 1, 1; Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 151.
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attitudes.153 While the algorithm used by COMPAS is proprietary, it is
known that COMPAS does not use an offender’s race in generating
predictions, although other demographic characteristics such as age and
gender are used.154
A second commonly used risk-assessment instrument is the Level of
Service Inventory Revised (LSI-R). Developed in the mid-1980s, the LSI-R is
frequently used at both sentencing and probation stages of the criminal
justice system to “guide sentencing decisions, placement in correctional
programs, institutional assignments, and release from institutional
custody.”155 The LSI-R uses fifty-four factors in the “areas of Criminal
History, Education and Employment, Financial, Family, Accommodations,
Leisure and Recreation, Companions, Alcohol and Drugs, Emotional and
Personal Issues, and Attitudes and Orientation.”156 These factors then
generate a risk prediction of each offender’s likelihood of recidivism. Gender
and race/ethnicity are not included among the various risk factors.157
A third commonly used parole risk-assessment tool is the Salient Factor
Score (SFS), originally created by the U.S. Parole Commission for use in
federal parole guidelines.158 Designed to predict the risk of future offending,
the most current iteration (issued in 1991) of the SFS includes factors such as
prior convictions, incarcerations, age at commencement of current
commitment, recent commitment-free period, parole revocation, and
custody status.159 Importantly, however, the creators of the SFS were
concerned about fairness and deliberately chose to exclude characteristics
that were deemed unfair. For example, gender and race were excluded from
153. See Sample COMPAS Risk Assessment: COMPAS “CORE,” PROPUBLICA (May 23,
2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103-Sample-Risk-Assessment-
COMPAS-CORE.html [https://perma.cc/TF5W-492Y].
154. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 151; see, e.g., Dressel & Farid, supra note 152, at 1
(“Although the data used by COMPAS do not include an individual’s race, other aspects of the
data may be correlated to race that can lead to racial disparities in the predictions.”).
155. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP & EDWARD J. LATESSA, VALIDATING THE LEVEL OF
SERVICE INVENTORY REVISED IN OHIO’S COMMUNITY BASED CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 5–6,
https://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/reports/project_reports/OHIOCBCFLSI-R.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9DL-S335]. Importantly, however, the creators of the LSI-R have noted
that their risk-assessment tool “is not a comprehensive survey of mitigating and aggravating
factors relevant to criminal sanctioning and was never designed to assist in establishing the just
penalty.” Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 572 (Ind. 2010) (quoting D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES
L. BONTA, THE LEVEL OF SERVICE INVENTORY–REVISED USER’S MANUAL 3 (2001)).
156. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 567; Alexander M. Holsinger, Christopher T. Lowenkamp
& Edward J. Latessa, Ethnicity, Gender, and the Level of Service Inventory-Revised, 31 J. CRIM.
JUST. 309, 310 (2003) (describing the LSI-R).
157. Holsinger et al., supra note 156, at 312–13.
158. See Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED.
SENT’G REP. 167, 168 (2014).
159. Id. at 168 tbl.1.
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the SFS even though doing so weakened predictive accuracy.160
Characteristics such as current age, employment, education, residential
status, and family characteristics were initially included in earlier versions of
the SFS but eventually discarded because they were deemed “heavily
correlated with race,” with the U.S. Parole Commission deciding that their
use would be “unjust.”161
Risk Assessments in Other Contexts: Risk-assessment instruments are
also increasingly common in a number of related contexts. For example,
many jurisdictions are now using predictive algorithms to predict the risk of
future violence in both criminal and civil settings. One prominent example is
the Classification of Violence Risk (“COVR”), which was constructed using
data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study to predict the risk
of future violence for individuals with mental disorders.162 The study
collected information on 134 risk factors on over 1,000 patients in acute civil
psychiatric institutions, who were then followed after their discharge from
the hospital.163 These risk factors included characteristics such as the
seriousness and frequency of past requests, age, gender, unemployment, and
diagnosis of illnesses like antisocial personality disorder and
schizophrenia.164 Using these inputs, MacArthur researchers placed patients
into one of five risk categories using a “classification tree” methodology.165
The MacArthur researchers explicitly excluded race from the algorithm “[t]o
avoid any possible misinterpretation of our risk assessment procedures as a
form of ‘racial profiling.’ ” The researchers also note that “[t]he revised
models without race differed only trivially in accuracy from the original ones
that included race.”166
A number of jurisdictions are also beginning to use predictive
algorithms to identify children who are at risk of abuse and neglect. For
example, in August 2016, the Allegheny County Department of Human
Services implemented the Allegheny Family Screening Tool (AFST), a
predictive algorithm to improve call-screening decisionmaking in the
160. Id. at 172.
161. Id. at 168; see also Peter B. Hoffman, Screening for Risk: A Revised Salient Factor
Score (SFS 81), 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 539 (1983).
162. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Pamela Clark Robbins & John Monahan, Violence and
Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
566, 566 (2000).
163. The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, MACARTHUR RSCH. NETWORK ON
MENTAL HEALTH & L. (Apr. 2001), https://macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html [https://perma
.cc/G272-3C4T].
164. See JOHN MONAHAN, HENRY J. STEADMAN, ERIC SILVER, PAUL S. APPELBAUM,
PAMELA CLARK ROBBINS, EDWARD P. MULVEY, LOREN H. ROTH, THOMAS GRISSO & STEVEN
BANKS, RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND
VIOLENCE 134 (2001) for a detailed description of method.
165. Id. at 115, 124.
166. Id. at 119 n.1.
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county’s child welfare system.167 The AFST includes factors such as criminal
history in the predictive algorithm,168 but race is explicitly excluded as an
input. Government reports justified the exclusion of race by explaining that
“in conjunction with the researchers’ finding that including race in the
model did not significantly improve its accuracy, administrators, in
conjunction with ethics and legal staff, determined that race would be
omitted as a factor for determining the risk score.”169
B. Summary of Predictive Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System
In this Section, we summarize the findings from our survey of
commonly used algorithms in the criminal justice system. Specifically, we
summarize how each of the algorithms appears to deal with race and racial
proxies. Table 1 lists each of these commonly used predictive algorithms. For
each algorithm, we list the setting in which the algorithm is generally
employed, whether race is excluded as an input, and whether some notable
nonrace correlates are excluded as inputs.











1. PredPol Policing Yes Yes Yes No
2. SSL Policing Yes Yes Yes No
3. PSA Pretrial Yes Yes Yes No
4. VPRAI Pretrial Yes Yes No No
5. VA NVRA
(pre-2012)








Yes No No No
8. SFS Parole Yes Yes Yes No
Note: This table summarizes the most commonly used predictive algorithms in the criminal justice
system and how they deal with both race and nonrace correlates. See the text for additional details.
167. HORNBY ZELLER ASSOCS., INC., ALLEGHENY COUNTY PREDICTIVE RISK MODELING
TOOL IMPLEMENTATION: PROCESS EVALUATION 3, 7 (2018).
168. TIM DARE & EILEEN GAMBRILL, ETHICAL ANALYSIS: PREDICTIVE RISK MODELS AT
CALL SCREENING FOR ALLEGHENY COUNTY (2017).
169. HORNBY ZELLER ASSOCS., INC., supra note 167, at 7; DARE & GAMBRILL, supra note
168.
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Based on our review, none of the most commonly used predictive
algorithms in the criminal justice system directly use race as an input.170 The
universal approach is to explicitly exclude race as an algorithmic input, with
some recognition that accuracy is reduced as a result. We view the exclusion
of a race in all of these commonly used predictive algorithms as a consistent
extension of the mainstream legal position that including race would likely
be unconstitutional.171 The decision to exclude race as an algorithmic input,
despite the lack of settled legal precedent on the issue, is likely because the
“[e]xplicit use of race, ethnicity, or religion . . . is widely regarded as
unseemly.”172 As some have argued, the exclusion of race from predictive
algorithms in the criminal justice system “appears to reflect corporate risk
aversion, not an effort at legal compliance.”173 We believe that explicit
exclusion of race is also likely due to a perception that inclusion would
violate antidiscrimination law, as reviewed in Section I.A. As Deborah
Hellman has argued, “algorithms are designed to be ‘race blind’ because their
designers, as well as many legal scholars, assume that use of racial classifica-
tions within algorithms is legally prohibited.”174
Predictive algorithms in the criminal justice system are much more
varied in how they deal with nonrace correlates and the proxy effects of race.
Six of the predictive algorithms we reviewed exclude at least employment or
education, two nonrace correlates that commentators have expressed
growing concerns with due to racial proxy effects, while the remaining
algorithms do not explicitly exclude these nonrace correlates. PredPol, for
example, uses “[n]o demographic, ethnic or socio-economic infor-
170. The stance towards other protected characteristics, such as gender, is more varied,
with some risk-assessment instruments explicitly including gender and others explicitly ex-
cluding gender. Compare, e.g., Dressel & Farid, supra note 152 (COMPAS), with CHI. DATA
PORTAL, supra note 127 (SSL).
171. See Tonry, supra note 158, at 169. Despite what he perceives as “toothless” legal con-
straints, Tonry notes that “[r]ace, ethnicity, and religion are not to my knowledge anywhere
used as an explicit factor in prediction instruments or in sentencing or parole policies” because
“[e]xplicit use of race, ethnicity, or religion . . . is widely regarded as unseemly, and so the issue
is unlikely to arise.” Id. at 169, 170; see also Luis Daniel, The Dangers of Evidence-Based Sen-
tencing, GOVLAB (Oct. 31, 2014), http://thegovlab.org/the-dangers-of-evidence-based-
sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/AN8P-MBCW] (“Overwhelmingly, states do not include race in
the risk assessments since there seems to be a general consensus that doing so would be uncon-
stitutional.”); Berk & Hyatt, supra note 97, at 227 (“[A]ctuarial methods need not include race
as a predictor, and to the best of our knowledge, most do not.”); Nicholas Scurich & John Mo-
nahan, Evidence-Based Sentencing: Public Openness and Opposition to Using Gender, Age, and
Race as Risk Factors for Recidivism, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 36, 37 (2016) (“No risk assessment
instrument explicitly includes race as a risk factor in sentencing . . . .”).
172. Tonry, supra note 158, at 170.
173. Huq, supra note 21, at 1079. But as he notes, “[c]urrent law does not address wheth-
er the availability of race as an input into the deliberative process that results in state action
violates the Equal Protection Clause on anticlassification grounds.” Id. at 1097–98.
174. Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811, 848 (2020).
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mation . . . . This eliminates the possibility for privacy or civil rights
violations.”175 The Arnold Ventures PSA also takes a principled stance
against using any “factors that would lead defendants to be treated
differently because of their race, gender, or socioeconomic status.”176 Based
on this stance, the PSA excludes both race and nonrace correlates such as
education, socioeconomic status, and neighborhood of residence.177 The SFS
also explicitly excludes characteristics such as age, employment, education,
residential status, and family characteristics precisely because they were
deemed “heavily correlated with race” such that their inclusion would be
“unjust.”178
We note that, interestingly, some of the reviewed algorithms have over
time excluded more nonrace correlates that have the potential to generate
racial proxy effects, potentially reflecting the mainstream position we
discussed in Section I.B. For example, the current iteration of the SFS (1991)
does not include employment or education, but earlier versions did include
these inputs.179 Similarly, the pre-2012 Virginia NVRA included factors such
as employment and marital status, but these factors were removed after the
post-2012 revision of the NVRA.180
In contrast, some of the predictive algorithms use many input factors
that are likely to generate racial proxy effects, including employment,
education, and other measures of socioeconomic status. As one example,
COMPAS uses information regarding family and peers, residential stability,
education, employment, and traits such as anger and criminal attitudes, all of
which are likely to be correlated with race.181
There is also considerable variation in which nonrace correlates are
considered problematic, with no clear principle guiding the choice of these
nonrace correlates. Across algorithms, what governs why some algorithms
use factors like education and employment while others reject them? Within
the same algorithm, what governs the choice to use certain racial proxies
while excluding other racial proxies? Specifically, while some of the above
algorithms exclude factors like education or employment out of a view that
these proxy effects are unfair, they also universally include characteristics
related to the current offense or the defendant’s criminal history, or
measures of past crime in an area. It is almost certainly the case that past
criminal history is a highly predictive measure of future recidivism,
suggesting that predictive accuracy is a key concern to algorithmic designers.
175. Predictive Policing: Guidance on Where and When to Patrol, supra note 123.
176. Milgram et al., supra note 134, at 220.
177. Id.
178. Tonry, supra note 158.
179. Id.
180. See VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 37–38, 46–48 (2012); Garrett
& Monahan, supra note 141.
181. See Angwin et al., supra note 151.
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But as many have pointed out, race and measures of socioeconomic status
are also highly predictive factors, and yet are often excluded.182
We view the universal inclusion of measures of past criminal history as
consistent with the mainstream position that these inputs are legally
permissible and valid. But, as we noted previously, it is almost certainly the
case that current offense and prior criminal history are highly correlated
with race. If an individual’s current offense or prior criminal history are
driven, for example, by racial biases in policing, then including these inputs
in the algorithm may lead to predictions that are also racially biased and can
result in what many perceive to be an unfair algorithm.
In summary, the most commonly used predictive algorithms in the
criminal justice system exhibit two features relevant to our analysis. First,
these algorithms follow an exclusionary approach when dealing directly with
race, omitting race as an input regardless of whether race improves the
accuracy of the underlying predictions. Second, these algorithms take a very
haphazard approach to dealing with nonrace correlates and proxy effects,
sometimes excluding inputs deemed to be correlated with race out of
fairness concerns (even if a loss to accuracy) yet also retaining others that are
also likely correlated with race, including in particular current offense and
criminal history.
III. A STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS
In this Part, we provide a simple statistical framework that formalizes
the mainstream legal consensus outlined in Part I. We then use this
framework to illustrate how the direct and proxy effects of race can lead to
algorithmic predictions that disadvantage one group relative to another. We
illustrate these direct and proxy effects through the use of simple examples,
showing exactly how both direct use of race and indirect use of nonrace
correlates can generate unwarranted disparities.
A. Categorizing Algorithmic Inputs
We begin by categorizing the potential algorithmic inputs into three
mutually exclusive categories: (1) protected characteristics, (2) correlates of
protected characteristics, and (3) noncorrelates of protected characteristics.
This simple categorization will allow us to both formalize the mainstream
legal consensus described in Part I and illustrate how the direct and proxy
effects of race impact predictive algorithms. The definition of each category
of algorithmic input is as follows.
Protected Characteristics: The first set of potential algorithmic inputs
consists of protected characteristics, denoted by 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. By definition,
protected characteristics are algorithmic inputs that trigger heightened
182. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 142, at 27–28.
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scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, including both suspect and
quasi-suspect classes. Examples include race, national origin, religion, and
gender. We will focus on race as our canonical example of a protected
characteristic in all our theoretical and empirical exercises moving forward,
but all of our results are easily extended to consider other protected
characteristics.183
Correlates of Protected Characteristics: The second set of potential
algorithmic inputs consists of correlates of protected characteristics, denoted
by 𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. Correlated characteristics include all algorithmic inputs that
are correlated with protected characteristics such as race. In the context of
race and the criminal justice system, these nonrace correlates may include
zip code of residence, education level, and employment status.184 However,
whether an algorithmic input is actually correlated with race is an empirical
question that may vary across contexts.
Noncorrelates of Protected Characteristics: The third and final set of
algorithmic inputs we consider consists of inputs that are not correlated with
protected characteristics, denoted by 𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. For simplicity, we
assume that 𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 are also uncorrelated with 𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, but all of
our results are easily extended to allow for some correlation between𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. In the context of race and the criminal justice
system, these uncorrelated characteristics may include criminal history,
which some have argued is not a proxy for race.185 However, as above,
whether an algorithmic input is actually uncorrelated with race is an
empirical question that may vary across contexts.
B. Benchmark Statistical Model
Let the statistical relationship between the outcome of interest and the
full set of observable potential algorithmic inputs be equal to:𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
(Equation 1)
where, for simplicity, we assume that each set of input characteristics enters
linearly and additively. We begin with the most simple statistical framework
for two main reasons. First, this linear framework helps to clearly illustrate
the key concepts of this Article. Second, in the context of the criminal justice
system, the focus of our paper, commonly used algorithms are in practice
created using linear and additive statistical models, where each risk factor is
183. See infra Section VI.A.
184. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 12, at 838 (“[S]ocioeconomic and family variables that [the
instruments] include are highly correlated with race, as is criminal history, so they are likely to
have a racially disparate impact.”).
185. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 13.
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associated with a numeric value and numeric values are summed to create a
final “risk score.” Thus, we view this simple linear model as reflective of
current practice in this setting. We consider extensions to this framework in
Part VI.
Under the statistical relationship in Equation 1, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is the observed
outcome for individual 𝑖𝑖. In the criminal justice context, this could be, for
example, the likelihood that an individual would fail to appear at a future
court appearance or that she would commit a crime in the future. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
includes all protected characteristics, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 includes all correlated
input characteristics, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 includes all uncorrelated input
characteristics. 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is an error term that includes both idiosyncratic noise and
systematic unobserved characteristics of individual 𝑖𝑖. This error term
represents the part of the outcome that is left unexplained by the full set of
observable potential inputs.
In our statistical framework, 𝛽𝛽0 represents the constant term, and 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2,
and 𝛽𝛽3 represent the predictive relationship between each set of potential
algorithmic inputs and the outcome of interest. We assume that 𝛽𝛽1 ≠ 0,𝛽𝛽2 ≠ 0, and 𝛽𝛽3 ≠ 0, such that each set of potential inputs has predictive
power for the outcome of interest. In other words, we take as given that each
category of potential algorithmic inputs helps predict the outcome of
interest, holding aside the question of legal permissibility.
Following the definition of the potential algorithmic inputs outlined
above, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is the set of potential inputs that is correlated with the set
of protected characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. To allow for this correlation, we
assume that the relationship between 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is equal to:𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖
(Equation 2)
where 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 represents the relationship between 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is an error term. If 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 0, this would indicate that 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is
positively correlated with 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 .
C. The Direct and Proxy Effects of Algorithmic Inputs
We can now formalize how the direct and proxy effects of race can lead
to algorithmic predictions that disadvantage one group relative to another.
We will establish two important facts in this Section: (1) including a
protected characteristic such as race will lead to predictions that allow for the
direct effects of race, generating unwarranted disparities under the
mainstream legal position; (2) including correlated characteristics will lead
to predictions that allow for the indirect effects of race through proxy effects,
even when race itself is excluded, again generating unwarranted disparities
under the mainstream legal position. By design, we allow all correlated
characteristics to have the potential to generate racial proxy effects that
many would argue are unwarranted. This position is broad in defining all
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proxy effects as unwarranted, but we view this choice as most consistent with
the mainstream legal consensus186 and principled because it does not rely on
an ad hoc classification of which types of racial proxies are socially
acceptable and which are socially unacceptable.187 We will also illustrate
these ideas by means of simple examples, showing exactly how both direct
use of race and indirect use of nonrace correlates can generate unwarranted
disparities.
Direct Effects and Unwarranted Disparities: The first important fact
illustrated by our statistical framework is that including a protected
characteristic such as race will lead to predictions that allow for the direct
effects of race, generating unwarranted racial disparities.
To form predictions that incorporate the direct effects of protected
characteristics such as race, we estimate the following statistical relationship
using a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:188𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
(Equation 3)
With all inputs included in the regression, the estimated coefficients yield
uncontaminated (in the statistical sense) estimates of 𝛽𝛽0, 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, and 𝛽𝛽3.We
can then form the following prediction:𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = ?̂?𝛽0 + ?̂?𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ?̂?𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ?̂?𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
(Equation 4)
where ?̂?𝛽1, ?̂?𝛽2, and ?̂?𝛽3 are the estimated relationship between each set of
algorithmic inputs and the outcome of interest. Equation 3 and Equation 4
together illustrate that algorithmic predictions rely on a two-step procedure.
First, we estimate the underlying statistical model in order to obtain our
coefficient estimates ?̂?𝛽1, ?̂?𝛽2, and ?̂?𝛽3—the “estimation step.” Second, we use
those estimated coefficients to predict the outcome for each individual,
186. See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 17, at 2224 (“Among racial-justice advocates engaged
in the debate, a few common themes have emerged. The first is a demand that race, and factors
that correlate heavily with race, be excluded as input variables for prediction.” (footnote omit-
ted)).
187. Specifically, we deviate from a classification scheme used by Pope and Sydnor,
which groups inputs into those that are “socially acceptable,” “socially unacceptable,” and
“contentious.” See Pope & Sydnor, supra note 23. As noted by Altenburger and Ho, “such clas-
sification can be highly contested.” Altenburger & Ho, supra note 105, at 118. We share the
view of Altenburger and Ho that a “commonsense classification of ‘socially acceptable’ does
not necessarily imply statistical independence. Many predictors that may superficially seem
‘socially acceptable’ are in fact highly correlated with race.” Id. at 111.
188. OLS is one of the most common methods of estimating a linear regression model.
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relying on their own values of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃—
the “prediction step.”
By design, predictions formed using Equation 4 lead to different
predictions for otherwise similar individuals who differ only in terms of a
protected characteristic. In the context of race and the criminal justice
system, suppose that 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if
an individual is Black and equal to 0 if an individual is not Black. If ?̂?𝛽3 > 0,
then Black individuals will receive higher risk scores than white individuals
who are otherwise identical in terms of the other algorithmic inputs.
To provide a concrete illustrative example of these direct effects,
suppose that there are one hundred total individuals (fifty Black and fifty
white), with the distribution of characteristics as follows in Table 2.
TABLE 2: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE TO ILLUSTRATE THE DIRECT AND PROXY
EFFECTS OF RACE
Note: This table presents hypothetical relationships between failure to appear, prior criminal history,
and race. Individuals who fail to appear if released are denoted in dark gray, while individuals who
will appear at all court appearances are denoted in light gray. Each figure represents five individuals,
for a total population of 100 individuals. See the text for additional details.
We are interested in predicting the probability that an individual fails to
appear at a required future court appearance. In Table 2, individuals who
will fail to appear (FTA) if released are denoted in dark gray, while
individuals who will appear at all court appearances are denoted in light
gray. In our hypothetical example, we have assumed a positive correlation
between an individual being Black and the probability of FTA, as well as a
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positive correlation between having a prior criminal record and FTA. These
assumptions largely mirror the patterns observed in real-world data, but are
not critical to the point we are making here. In the hypothetical example
illustrated in Table 2, eight out of every ten Black individuals have a prior
criminal history and three out of every ten white individuals have a prior
criminal history.
Mapping the example in Table 2 to our statistical framework, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is an
indicator variable for FTA, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is an indicator equal to 1 if an
individual is Black and equal to 0 if an individual is white, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is
an indicator equal to 1 if an individual has a prior criminal history and equal
to 0 if an individual does not have a prior criminal history. We first estimate
Equation 3, where we control for race through 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and prior criminal
history through 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. These estimates are reported in Table 3.
TABLE 3: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF DIRECT EFFECTS
Prob of FTA
(1)








Note: This Table presents a hypothetical example of the direct effects of race. We report OLS esti-
mates of the relationship between FTA, prior criminal history, and race using the hypothetical data
from Table 2. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
The results from Table 3 reveal that, in our hypothetical example, having
a prior criminal history increases the probability of FTA by 54.1 percentage
points. Table 3 also shows that there is a direct effect of race in our
hypothetical example, with Black individuals having a 33.0 percentage point
higher probability of FTA than white individuals. In other words, the
predicted relationship between the likelihood of FTA and both race and
prior criminal history is:𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 0.038 + 0.541 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻)+0.330 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
Given this predicted relationship, allowing for a direct effect of race
means that Black individuals will receive a predicted risk score that is 33.0
percentage points higher than white individuals with exactly the same prior
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criminal history, at least in our hypothetical example. The possibility that
Black individuals will be treated differently than otherwise identical white
individuals is at the heart of the mainstream argument that including race in
predictive algorithms would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.189 To address this legal concern, most if not all predictive algorithms
therefore exclude race as an input.190
The use of direct effects can result in large racial gaps in predicted risk. If
predictions were race neutral, the average predicted risk for white
individuals is 0.37 and the average predicted risk for Black individuals is
0.64.191 When direct effects are used to predict risk, the average predicted
risk for white individuals is 0.20 and the average predicted risk for Black
individuals is 0.80. Thus, when direct effects are incorporated into
algorithmic predictions, Black individuals are disadvantaged relative to white
individuals. If release decisions are made on the basis of predictions that
incorporate direct effects, fewer Black individuals will be released relative to
release decisions made on the basis of predictions that are race neutral.
Proxy Effects and Unwarranted Disparities: The second important fact
illustrated by our statistical framework is that including correlated
characteristics will lead to predictions that allow for the indirect effects of
race through proxy effects, even when race itself is excluded, again
generating unwarranted racial disparities.
To form predictions that incorporate the proxy effects of protected
characteristics such as race, we estimate the following statistical relationship,
omitting the protected characteristics as inputs:𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾2 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
(Equation 5)
We can then form the following prediction:𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾�0 + 𝛾𝛾�1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾�2 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
(Equation 6)
where 𝛾𝛾�1 and 𝛾𝛾�2 are the estimated relationship between each set of inputs
and the outcome of interest. Again, note that these predictions are formed in
189. See Oleson, supra note 59, at 1386, and Kopf, supra note 66, at 213, for scholars who
argue that direct effects of race should be included because they increase predictive accuracy, a
compelling government interest.
190. See supra Part II.
191. Here, race neutrality is achieved using the proposed “colorblinding-inputs” algo-
rithm described in Section IV.B. Race neutrality using the proposed “minorities-as-whites”
algorithm described in Section IV.C would result in averaged predicted risk for white individ-
uals of 0.20 and average predicted risk of Black individuals of 0.53. Both proposed race-neutral
algorithms would reduce the disadvantage of Black individuals relative to white individuals, as
compared to an algorithm that incorporates direct effects of race.
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a two-step procedure that includes a first estimation step and second
prediction step.
The coefficient 𝛾𝛾�2 estimated in Equation 5, is, in general, not identical to
the estimated coefficient ?̂?𝛽2 estimated in Equation 3. Recall that we have
assumed that 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is correlated with 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, and that 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is
predictive of the outcome such that 𝛽𝛽3 ≠ 0. From these two assumptions, it
is straightforward to show that 𝛾𝛾�2 will not equal to ?̂?𝛽2 due to proxy effects. In
other words, because of proxy effects, the predictive relationship between the
outcome of interest and the correlates of protected characteristics is not the
same depending on whether one includes or excludes the protected
characteristics in the estimation process.
The importance of these proxy effects can be expressed in terms of the
standard omitted-variable-bias (OVB) formula from the economics
literature, which describes the relationship between regression estimates in
models with different sets of controls.192 We can illustrate these proxy effects
by substituting the expression for 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 from Equation 2, which showed
the statistical relationship between 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , into Equation
1, which showed the statistical relationship between 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 and𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. Doing so yields the following
expression:𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = (𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛼𝛼0) + 𝛽𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) ⋅𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + (𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖)
(Equation 7)
The standard OVB formula shows us that 𝛾𝛾�2, found in Equation 6, is not
a consistent estimate of 𝛽𝛽2, found in Equation 1, but rather the expression(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃). Intuitively, 𝛽𝛽2 includes the portion of the correlated
characteristics that is orthogonal to (or uncorrelated with) protected
characteristics, and 𝛽𝛽3𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 includes the portion of the correlated
characteristics that is purely a proxy for protected characteristics. One can
think of 𝛽𝛽2 as capturing predictive variation in the correlated characteristics
within a protected class, and 𝛽𝛽3𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 as the predictive variation in the
correlated characteristic across protected classes.
The estimated coefficient 𝛾𝛾�2 is therefore “contaminated” (again in the
statistical sense) by the proxy effect of race, 𝛽𝛽3𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. These kinds of proxy
effects emerge precisely because protected characteristics are excluded from
the estimating equation. As a result, the remaining correlated characteristics
act as partial proxies for the protected characteristics. Indeed, the OVB
formula shows us that proxy effects will emerge anytime 𝛽𝛽3 ≠ 0 and𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ≠ 0, or when excluded protected characteristics and included inputs
192. See, e.g., JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 59 (2009).
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are correlated and the protected characteristics are predictive of the
outcome. In fact, one can think of including the protected characteristics in
the estimation process as a way to remove the proxy effects from the
correlated inputs.
These proxy effects emerge regardless of whether we are identifying the
“true” underlying causal relationship between inputs and the outcome of
interest. If an algorithm correctly identifies the true underlying causal
relationship, then the coefficients obtained from the full specification in
Equation 1 can be interpreted as identifying the causal effects of each set of
inputs. In this scenario, excluding a protected characteristic leads to proxy
effects from the correlated inputs. But even if the algorithm does not
estimate the true causal relationship, such that Equation 1 does not represent
the causal effects of each set of inputs, proxy effects still emerge when
protected characteristics are omitted. This is because the OVB formula that
characterizes the “bias” is a mechanical characterization of the relationship
between the coefficents when protected traits are excluded (e.g., Equation 6)
versus when protected traits are included (e.g., Equation 2).193 Thus, the
statistical fact of proxy effects is not dependent on whether an algorithm has
identified causal estimates, and in fact, predictive algorithms do not seek or
claim to be estimating causal relationships. The exercise of prediction is not
generally about establishing causation.
To provide a concrete illustrative example of these proxy effects, we
return to the hypothetical distribution of characteristics described in Table 2.
Recall that our hypothetical example assumes a positive correlation between
an individual being Black and the probability of FTA, as well as a positive
correlation between having a prior criminal record and FTA. We also
assume a positive correlation between having a prior criminal record and
being Black, which is what leads to the emergence of proxy effects in our
hypothetical example. A visual illustration of proxy effects in this
hypothetical can be seen here:
193. See, e.g., id. at 59 (“In fact, the OVB formula is a mechanical link between coefficient
vectors that applies to short and long regressions whether or not the longer regression is caus-
al.”).
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The above diagram presents a direct pathway between race and FTA and
a direct pathway between prior criminal history and FTA. But the diagram
also illustrates that there is a pathway between race and prior criminal
history, which could reflect, for example, discriminatory policing. In theory,
we want to capture only the direct pathway between prior criminal history
and FTA, which we can obtain by including race in the estimation equation.
But when we exclude race, prior criminal history enters into our estimation
through a direct pathway and a proxy pathway.
To see how these proxy effects affect algorithmic predictions, Table 4
presents estimates from a series of OLS regressions of FTA on possible
inputs using the hypothetical relationships described in Table 2. Column 1
of Table 4 controls only for prior criminal history, excluding race following
mainstream practice. In this specification, the estimated coefficient on prior
criminal history is equal to 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, where 𝛽𝛽3𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is the proxy effect
of race. Column 2 adds an indicator for an individual being Black versus
white, resulting in an estimated coefficient on prior criminal history that
only reflects the race-orthogonal (or race-independent) predictive
relationship between that input and the probability of FTA, 𝛽𝛽2.
The results from Table 4 show that the proxy effects of race inflate the
coefficient on prior criminal history, such that individuals with a prior
criminal history will receive a predicted risk that is 70.7 percentage points
higher than individuals with no prior criminal history. Recall that the race-
independent predictive relationship is only 54.1 percentage points, meaning
that the proxy effects of race add 16.6 percentage points to this estimated
coefficient. As a result, the inflated coefficient on the prior criminal history
variable will result in Black individuals receiving, on average, higher risk
predictions due to the positive correlation between race and prior criminal
history. Intuitively, this occurs because the predictive weight on criminal
history will be overweighted relative to the race-independent predictive
relationship when there are proxy effects. This inflation leads individuals
with a criminal history to be penalized relative to those without a criminal
history, and Black individuals are more likely to have criminal histories.
Thus, because of proxy effects, membership in a racial group can still
indirectly affect algorithmic predictions even when race itself is excluded as
an input.
These proxy effects can also lead to racial gaps in predicted risk. Recall
that if predictions were race neutral, the average predicted risk for white
individuals is 0.37 and the average predicted risk for Black individuals is
0.64. When proxy effects are used to predict risk (even when direct effects
are excluded), the average predicted risk for white individuals is 0.32 and the
average predicted risk for Black individuals is 0.67. Thus, proxy effects in
algorithmic predictions also disadvantage Black individuals relative to white
individuals.
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Observations 100 100 ---
R2 0.494 0.576 ---
Note: This Table presents a hypothetical example of the proxy effects of race. We report OLS
estimates of the relationship between FTA, prior criminal history, and race using the hypothetical
data from Table 2. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
Summary: We have demonstrated that the use of individual race can
lead to direct effects that result in unwarranted disparities. We have also
shown that excluding race but including any race correlate can lead to
substantial proxy effects that also lead to racial disparities. Thus, simply
excluding race is insufficient at guaranteeing that risk predictions are truly
race neutral.
IV. FORMALISTIC AND STATISTICAL SOLUTIONS TO ENSURING RACE
NEUTRALITY
In this Part, we discuss three potential solutions that can eliminate the
direct and proxy effects of race and nonrace correlates in predictive
algorithms. The first formalistic solution follows the mainstream legal
consensus by excluding both race and all nonrace correlates from the
predictive algorithm, an approach that we argue is unlikely to work in
practice because nearly all algorithmic inputs are correlated with race. Even
if there remain some inputs that are uncorrelated with race, the set of
permissible inputs under this formalistic solution is likely so small that the
accuracy of the algorithm will be substantially degraded. We then propose
two statistical solutions that build on the fact that algorithmic predictions
are formed through an estimation step and prediction step. Our first
recommended solution purges all algorithmic inputs of the proxy effects of
race in the estimation step of the predictive algorithm, and then uses these
“colorblind” inputs to predict outcomes in the prediction step. Our second
recommended solution instead uses only white individuals in the estimation
step of the predictive algorithm, and then uses these “colorblind” estimates
to predict outcomes for both white and Black individuals in the prediction
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step. Our two recommended solutions allow us to address direct and proxy
effects of race without jettisoning all race-correlated inputs.
A. Formalistic Solution: The Excluding-Inputs Algorithm
We have shown that because the mainstream practice advocates for an
outright exclusion of race, algorithms will automatically generate proxy
effects if any correlated input is used. Taking these positions as given, we
now identify the type of algorithm supported by legal scholars who seek to
eliminate both direct and proxy effects of race from predictive algorithms.
We call this solution the “excluding-inputs” algorithm. This algorithm
explicitly excludes using race directly, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, and excludes using any
correlated inputs, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. By excluding race and all race correlates, the
excluding-inputs model is mechanically fair in that it does not use race in
forming predictions, either directly or through proxy effects. The only
remaining inputs that are permissible under the excluding-inputs model are
uncorrelated inputs, or 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. We believe that this solution most
intuitively follows from legal definitions of fairness given our survey of risk-
assessment tools as reviewed in Part II. These tools generally exclude race
explicitly and often exclude factors that are correlated with race out of a view
that their inclusion would be illegal, unethical, and/or unjust. As a result,
some hold the view that the fewer the inputs, the better, as the legal position
is based on excluding as many problematic inputs as possible. For example,
practitioners have claimed that “[a]n effective risk assessment must be
gender and race neutral . . . . The more risk factors you have, the less likely
you’ll be able to eliminate gender and racial bias.”194 Thus, the excluding-
inputs algorithm is likely to be very parsimonious.
Estimation of the Algorithm: To illustrate how this algorithm would
form predictions, we return to the two-step process described above in
Section III.C. We first estimate the following statistical relationship, using
only uncorrelated inputs:𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
(Equation 8)
We can then form the following predictions:𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
(Equation 9)
194. See Issie Lapowsky, One State’s Bail Reform Exposes the Promise and Pitfalls of Tech-
Driven Justice, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/bail-reform-
tech-justice/ [https://perma.cc/SZ3B-E6ZB].
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where 𝛿𝛿1 is the estimated relationship between the uncorrelated
characteristics and the outcome of interest. The estimated coefficient 𝛿𝛿1
from this model is not affected by any direct or proxy effects of race, as we
have assumed that 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 are uncorrelated with the other input
factors. As a result, the predictions from the excluding-inputs algorithm will
not generate unwarranted racial disparities in predicted outcomes.
However, an important concern with this algorithm is that it comes with
a substantial cost in terms of predictive accuracy. This model will generally
be much less accurate than models that use 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and/or 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
because it purposely excludes the largest set of factors that are predictive of
the outcome of interest. The loss in predictive accuracy can be large, with the
exact loss depending on the statistical usefulness of the inputs that are
excluded.
In the most extreme case, the excluding-inputs algorithm is infeasible if
all characteristics are either protected or correlated, as is likely to be the case
in settings such as the criminal justice system.195 This is because avoiding
proxy effects through the excluding-inputs algorithm requires that predictive
algorithms only use inputs that are completely uncorrelated with race, a
nearly impossible task given the influence of race in nearly every aspect of
American life today. In that scenario, there would be no way of using an
algorithm to form predictions.
How do commonly used algorithms fare compared to this traditional
solution? Perhaps because of the likely impossibility of finding uncorrelated
inputs, most if not all predictive algorithms today likely fail to meet the
standard of race neutrality under the “excluding-inputs” solution. Recall
from our survey of commonly used risk-assessment instruments in Part II
that some algorithms include socioeconomic factors such as education or
employment, and all reviewed algorithms included measures of past criminal
history. The inclusion of these factors, which are likely to be highly
correlated with race, will result in algorithms that some may argue are
unfair. As a result, there is no guarantee that the estimates from these
commonly used algorithms rely only on 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and are truly race
neutral.
Indeed, the approach taken by commonly used algorithms is
simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive, in the sense that it is not
satisfying to someone who prioritizes fairness and not satisfying to someone
who priorities accuracy. Excluding inputs correlated with race because of
equity concerns throws out all the predictive power from race-correlated
inputs, even the predictive power that is independent of race. Including
inputs correlated with race because of accuracy concerns results in
unwarranted racial disparities because of proxy effects.
The challenge of finding uncorrelated inputs puts algorithmic creators
in an understandably difficult situation of trying to minimize unwarranted
195. See infra Section IV.C.
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racial disparities without jettisoning all possible inputs. With this practical
concern in mind, we now turn to our two recommended solutions, which
allow algorithmic creators to retain all predictive inputs while
simultaneously eliminating the direct and proxy effects of race.
B. Our First Solution: The Colorblinding-Inputs Algorithm
We call our first statistical solution the “colorblinding-inputs”
algorithm. Like the excluding-inputs algorithm, this solution also eliminates
both direct and proxy effects of race when forming predictions, thereby
eliminating unwarranted racial disparities. Unlike the excluding-inputs
algorithm, however, the colorblinding-inputs algorithm does not exclude
race and race correlates in the estimation step. In fact, it uses all inputs to
estimate predictive relationships, in contrast to the current approach of
using ad hoc human judgment to decide which race-correlated inputs are
permissible, which we believe leaves much to be desired from either a
fairness or accuracy perspective. Because the colorblinding-inputs algorithm
allows us to use all possible correlated characteristics purged of their proxy
effects, this statistical solution can achieve fairness without as large a sacrifice
on predictive accuracy compared to the formalistic solution of wholly
excluding correlated inputs. Thus, the colorblinding-inputs algorithm can
preserve a large amount of predictive accuracy because race-correlated in-
puts often contain information orthogonal of race that is predictive of the
outcome of interest. At the extreme, our solution allows one to use an
algorithm even if every possible input is correlated with race, a scenario in
which the formalistic solution would be impossible to implement.
As we will demonstrate below, the key feature of the colorblinding-
inputs algorithm is that it explicitly uses race in the estimation step in order
to colorblind all nonrace inputs, and then ignores individual race
information in the prediction step. In other words, all possible inputs are
used to estimate the algorithm, but only nonrace information from each
given individual is used when the algorithm is applied to their specific case.
Estimation of the Algorithm: To construct our colorblinding-inputs
model, we follow the approach developed by Devin Pope and Justin Sydnor,
which utilizes only the predictive power from input variables that is
orthogonal to (or uncorrelated with) protected characteristics.196 For
example, we want to utilize only the variation from each input that is
independent of its association with race, allowing us to purge predictions of
all proxy effects.
Formally, this model is estimated again using a two-step procedure. In
the first estimation step, we estimate the benchmark statistical case from
Equation 1 that includes the full set of observable input characteristics:
196. Pope & Sydnor, supra note 23.
November 2020] Equal Protection Under Algorithms 347𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
(Equation 10)
where, as discussed previously, the estimates from this model yield the
coefficients ?̂?𝛽1, ?̂?𝛽2, and ?̂?𝛽3. Estimating this benchmark model allows us to
obtain predictive weights on correlated characteristics (?̂?𝛽2) that are not
contaminated by proxy effects, exactly because we explicitly include𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. Thus, this first estimation step ensures that we eliminate all
proxy effects from including 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. Intuitively, we ensure that the
estimated relationship between our outcome of interest and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is
uncontaminated by only keeping the predictive power from 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 that
is orthogonal to (or uncorrelated with) 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. As a result, we are able to
“colorblind” the correlated inputs, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.
In the second prediction step, we use these “colorblind” inputs to form
predictions. We also ensure that no direct effects of race are used to make
predictions. To do so, we use the predictive power contained in ?̂?𝛽1 and ?̂?𝛽2
(purged of proxy effects), but not ?̂?𝛽3 (the direct effect of protected
characteristics), to form risk predictions. To do this, we form predictions
that use the average value of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 across all individuals (rather than
individual-level information), 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, but the actual input values of𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 for each specific individual. We therefore
form the following prediction:𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 = ?̂?𝛽0 + ?̂?𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+?̂?𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ?̂?𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
(Equation 11)
By using 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 instead of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, we ensure that two
individuals who differ only in terms of a protected characteristic will not
receive different predictions under the model. And we ensure that protected
characteristics do not contaminate the predictions through 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 . Our
colorblinding-inputs model therefore eliminates racial disparities driven by
both direct or proxy effects, achieving race neutrality.
To provide a concrete example, we return to our hypothetical example
from Table 2. In that hypothetical, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable for FTA,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is an indicator equal to 1 if an individual is Black, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
is an indicator equal to 1 if an individual has a prior criminal history. In the
first estimation step, we estimate a model of FTA controlling for both race
and prior criminal history, yielding the coefficients reported in Table 3.
Specifically, having a prior criminal history increases the predicted risk of
FTA by 54.1 percentage points, and being Black increases the predicted risk
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of FTA by 33.0 percentage points. By including race, we ensure that the
weight on prior criminal history is not contaminated by proxy effects. In the
second prediction step, rather than use the real individual-level values for
race, which would lead to higher predicted risk for Black individuals
compared to otherwise similar white individuals, we input the same race
value, 𝑅𝑅, for all individuals. Here, as race is an indicator variable, 𝑅𝑅 is simply
the average rate of Black individuals in the hypothetical population, which is
50% by construction.197 Thus, both white and Black individuals with no
priors receive the same risk prediction, and both white and Black individuals
with priors receive a predicted risk that is 54.1 percentage points higher than
individuals with no prior criminal history. These risk predictions statistically
ensure that Black and white individuals who are otherwise identical will
receive the same predicted risk, eliminating both direct and proxy effects of
race.
C. Our Second Solution: The Minorities-as-Whites Algorithm
We call our second solution the “minorities-as-whites” algorithm. This
solution also eliminates both direct and proxy effects of race when forming
predictions, thereby eliminating unwarranted racial disparities. Unlike the
excluding-inputs algorithm, this approach does not exclude any race-
correlated inputs in the estimation step, allowing us to achieve fairness
without as large a loss in predictive accuracy.
In much the same way as the colorblinding-inputs algorithm, the
minorities-as-whites algorithm uses only the predictive power from each
input within race. In a scenario in which the relationship between each input
and the outcome of interest is identical for white and nonwhite individuals,
the minorities-as-whites algorithm and colorblinding-inputs algorithm will
yield identical predictive weights on 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , and𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. But the two algorithms will differ when the relationship between
inputs and outcome of interest are different for white and nonwhite
individuals (e.g., the effect of age on risk is different for white versus
nonwhite individuals). One can think of the predictive weights that emerge
from the colorblinding-inputs algorithm as a weighted average of the
“minority” weights and “white” weights.
In this situation where minority weights and white weights differ, the
difference between the two algorithms is that the minorities-as-whites
algorithm uses only the predictive power from inputs among white
individuals, not both white and minority individuals, thereby ensuring that
the algorithm treats minority individuals exactly the same way it treats white
individuals. That is, we use only white individuals in the first estimation step
of the predictive algorithm, then rely on the resulting relationships in the
second prediction step to predict outcomes for both white and nonwhite
197. See Table 2.
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individuals. In spirit, our minorities-as-whites algorithm is based on what
economists call a “Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition,”198 a method typically
used to explore the role of group differences versus discrimination in driving
racial differences in outcomes. In other settings, researchers have used
similar methods to generate ‘‘unbiased’’ or “proxy-free” AFQT scores by
predicting AFQT scores for white and nonwhite individuals through an
estimation equation using coefficients/weights for white individuals.199
Which baseline population to use in the first estimation step is a choice.
Just as one can design a minorities-as-whites algorithm, one can also easily
design a whites-as-minorities algorithm. Or one can choose a particular
weighted average, as in the colorblinding-inputs algorithm. But why might
we want to limit the estimation step to white individuals? By focusing only
on white individuals as the baseline population in the first estimation step,
there may be less concern that inputs like criminal history are an outgrowth
of discrimination. For example, one might believe that measured criminal
history is not a true reflection of past criminality among nonwhite
individuals because of certain policing practices. But if one believes that bias
in policing is not an issue among white defendants and that criminal history
is an accurate reflection of past criminality for these individuals, estimating
the relationship between criminal history and future risk using white
individuals alone can eliminate any proxy effects. In addition, focusing only
on white individuals in the first estimation step can also address concerns
about measurement error in the outcome of interest—say rearrest for a new
crime. If risk is measured as rearrest, an outcome that can also be plagued by
bias, focusing on a group where measured rearrest is more objective may
eliminate another form of discrimination being baked into the algorithm.
Estimation of the Algorithm: To construct our minorities-as-whites
model, we estimate the predictive relationship between each input and
outcome of interest for the population of white individuals, and then apply
these predictions equally to both white and nonwhite individuals.
Formally, our model is estimated in two steps. In the first estimation
step, we estimate the benchmark statistical model from Equation 1 that
includes the full set of observable input characteristics, but for white
individuals only:𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑊𝑊 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑊𝑊 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑊𝑊 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊
(Equation 12)
198. Alan S. Blinder, Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Stuctural Estimates, 8 J.
HUM. RES. 436 (1973); Ronald Oaxaca, Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Mar-
kets, 14 INT’L ECON. REV. 693 (1973).
199. William M. Rodgers III & William E. Spriggs, What Does the AFQT Really Measure:
Race, Wages, Schooling and the AFQT Score, REV. BLACK POL. ECON., Spring 1996, at 13.
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where the estimates from this model yield the coefficients for white
individuals ?̂?𝛽𝑊𝑊1, ?̂?𝛽𝑊𝑊2, and ?̂?𝛽𝑊𝑊3.
In the second prediction step, we ensure that no direct effects of race are
used to make predictions, that is, that a white and nonwhite individual who
are otherwise identical receive the same risk predictions. To do so, we form
the following predictions for white and nonwhite defendants:𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 = ?̂?𝛽0𝑊𝑊 + ?̂?𝛽1𝑊𝑊 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+?̂?𝛽2𝑊𝑊 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ?̂?𝛽3𝑊𝑊 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
(Equation 13)
by applying the same coefficients ?̂?𝛽𝑊𝑊1, ?̂?𝛽𝑊𝑊2, and ?̂?𝛽𝑊𝑊3 for all races.
To provide a concrete example, return again to our hypothetical
example from Table 2. Under this hypothetical, recall that 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is an indicator
variable for FTA, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is an indicator equal to 1 if an individual is
Black, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is an indicator equal to 1 if an individual has a prior
criminal history. In the first estimation step, we estimate predictions of FTA
controlling for prior criminal history among only the population of white
individuals. This first step yields the statistical relationship that having a
prior criminal history increases the risk of FTA by 66.6 percentage points. In
the second prediction step, we apply this relationship equally for both white
and Black individuals, such that white and Black individuals with a prior
criminal history receive risk predictions that are 66.6 percentage points
higher than individuals with no prior criminal history. As a result, we ensure
that Black and white individuals who are otherwise identical will receive the
same predicted risk.
D. Legality of Our Two Statistical Solutions
Before we move on to an empirical assessment of how much our two
proposed statistical solutions improve upon commonly used algorithms, we
discuss the legality of our proposed solutions, the colorblinding-inputs and
minorities-as-whites algorithms. The most salient distinction (from a legal
perspective) of our two statistical solutions relative to the formalistic
excluding-inputs solution (which prohibits the use of race and all race
correlates) is that both our statistical proposals explicitly require the
consideration of race in the estimation step. Specifically, the colorblinding-
inputs algorithm uses race in the first estimation step in order to eliminate
proxy effects but does not use individual race information in the second
prediction step. Similarly, the minorities-as-whites algorithm considers race
in the first estimation step in order to remove nonwhite individuals from the
sample used to estimate the model, before proceeding to the second
prediction step. Critically, the use or consideration of race in the first
estimation step serves the distinct purpose of achieving a race-neutral
prediction. To the best of our knowledge, neither of our two proposed
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algorithms are used in practice today. This is likely because of the formalistic
prohibition on the use of protected characteristics under the Equal
Protection Clause, a position that fails to take into account the statistical
reality of how algorithms work.
Nevertheless, a growing number of scholars, like us, have emphasized
the need for the law to permit the use of protected characteristics in the first
estimation step, as specified in our two proposals. For example, Indrė
Žliobaitė and Bart Custers have argued that “in order to make sure that
decision models are non-discriminatory, for instance, with respect to race,
the sensitive racial information needs to be used in the model building
process. Of course, after the model is ready, race should not be required as
an input variable for decision making”200—just as we propose in our
statistical solutions. Thus, the authors conclude that “collecting sensitive
personal data is needed in order to guarantee fairness of algorithms, and law
making needs to find sensible ways to allow using such data in the modeling
process.”201
Similarly, in the Title VII context, Harned and Wallach advocate for the
use of a “middle ground . . . in which the system is blinded to sensitive at-
tributes only during deployment and not during training,”202 precisely the
procedure underlying our two statistical solutions. In contrast to a formalis-
tic approach that forbids the sensitive attribute (which they claim is legally
compliant but does not mitigate discrimination given proxy effects) and an
approach that fully uses the attribute (which they argue would likely be per-
ceived as direct evidence of disparate treatment and thus illegal), Harned and
Wallach argue that the “middle ground” of using the attribute in the first es-
timation step but not the second prediction step should be legally permissi-
ble.203 Indeed, the authors analogize these algorithms to legally accepted
auditing procedures, found in contexts like employment and university ad-
missions.204 As a result, they claim that this type of algorithm “avoids dispar-
ate treatment claims because it does not use racial classifications for decision
making.”205 Ignacio Cofone also analogously argues that an algorithm that
mitigates bias in the first estimation step and not the second prediction step
“addresses discrimination by dealing with the input data not the decision
process . . . . Therefore, it would not fall under the constitutional challenges
based on disparate treatment.”206
200. Indrė Žliobaitė & Bart Custers, Using Sensitive Personal Data May Be Necessary for
Avoiding Discrimination in Data-Driven Decision Models, 24 ARTIFICIAL INTEL. & L. 183, 183
(2016).
201. Id. at 199.
202. Harned & Wallach, supra note 72 (manuscript at 18).
203. Id. (manuscript at 20–22).
204. Id. (manuscript at 22).
205. Id.
206. Cofone, supra note 91, at 1421–24, 1429–31.
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For the same reasons, we also firmly believe that our two proposed
solutions should be permissible under the equal protection doctrine and
antidiscrimination law. One might at first object to our proposals because
they appear “counterintutive” in considering a protected characteristic in the
design of the algorithm. Thus, a naive observer may argue that our proposals
are illegal because they run up against the anticlassification principle, which
many argue drives our understanding of the equal protection doctrine.207
But this formalistic objection fails to take into account the previously
demonstrated statistical reality of direct and proxy effects and unnecessarily
distorts the anticlassification principle. At its heart, the anticlassification
principle rests on a view that “the Constitution protects individuals, not
groups, and so bars all racial classifications, except as a remedy for specific
wrongdoing.”208 But what the principle prohibits is differential treatment on
the basis of a protected characteristic.209 And our two proposed algorithms
are built to prevent precisely this type of differential treatment: to ensure
that decisions are not made with respect to a protected trait, either directly
or indirectly, which statistically requires the use of race in the estimation step
but not the prediction step.210 Thus, we argue that if a formalistic
207. For example, some commentators have observed of the colorblinding-inputs algo-
rithm that “[c]ounterintuitively, the first step in this process is for the statistical model under
consideration to be re-estimated in a way that explicitly includes data on legally prohibited
characteristics.” Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 1314; see also Sam Corbett-Davies &
Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine
Learning, ARXIV (Aug. 14, 2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.00023.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UJ3-
CTQS] (“It can feel natural to exclude protected characteristics in a drive for equity . . . . In
contrast to the principle of anti-classification, it is often necessary for equitable risk assessment
algorithms to explicitly consider protected characteristics.”).
208. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281 (2011); see also Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the heart of this interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as individu-
als, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. It is for this reason that we must
subject all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny . . . .”); Charles R. Lawrence III, Essay,
Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 928, 950 (2001) (associating the anticlassification principle with “[l]iberal legality[,]
[which] sees the equality principle as primarily concerned with protecting individuality, and
views racial discrimination as unjust because when we judge a person based on her race we
disregard her unique human individuality”).
209. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205, 227 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to a federal program designed to provide highway contracts to disadvantaged
business enterprises, where it was presumed that socially and economically disadvantaged in-
dividuals include “Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific
Americans, and other minorities” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(2)–(3) (1988))); see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (applying strict
scrutiny when “the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
classifications”).
210. Anya Prince and Daniel Schwarcz note, with respect to these algorithms, that “[i]n a
very real sense, the process explicitly discriminates with respect to membership in a legally pro-
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interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause prohibits our proposals, it does
more harm than good by undermining the very objective of the
anticlassification principle. As Harned and Wallach put it, in the context of
Title VII,
This tension arises from our attempt to stretch human laws to apply to ma-
chines even though human decision-making processes are quite different
from automated decision-making processes. In other words, when
stretched to apply to machines, laws designed to regulate human behavior
may even be detrimental to the very people that they were designed to pro-
tect.211
In recent work, Benjamin Eidelson also argues that treating people as
individuals, a core commitment underlying the anticlassification approach
to race and equal protection, may require shedding the requirement of
colorblindness. In laying out a new account of what it means to treat people
as individuals, Eidelson notes:
Indeed, in a society characterized by racial bias, attending to race will often
be necessary to treating a person respectfully as an individual—because race
will mediate evidential connections between her record of choices or
achievements and what the Court calls “her own essential qualities.”
Colorblindness, which is so often justified as a way of respecting people as
individuals, thus stands in the way of doing exactly that.212
Further, we believe that the use of race in the first estimation step does
not even constitute the type of “express racial classification” that triggers
strict scrutiny. Legal scholars have noted courts have not always applied
strict scrutiny to governmental actors’ use of race, such as the use of racial
descriptions of criminal suspects by law enforcement,213 the Census’
collection of race and ethnicity information,214and race-conscious adoption
placements by social service agencies.215 As Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel state,
for example, “[w]hile state action doctrine may limit the reach of the
anticlassification principle, it is commonly assumed that all use of race by
state actors is subject to strict scrutiny. This is not in fact the case.”216
tected group in order to prevent the effects of such discrimination from being felt by these in-
dividuals.” Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 1315. We, however, contest the view that using
a protected trait in the first estimation step is a form of explicit discrimination.
211. Harned & Wallach, supra note 72 (manuscript at 21).
212. Eidelson, supra note 57, at 1607.
213. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding use of race in
suspect descriptions).
214. See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 814–15 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that
census questions concerning race and ethnicity do not violate the Fifth Amendment).
215. See R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Prefer-
ences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875, 904–05 & n.135 (1998).
216. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassifica-
tion or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 19 (2003).
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Similarly, Richard Primus has stated that “many practices that do involve
government actors’ identifying people by race are not always subject to strict
scrutiny. . . . [N]ot all instances in which the government explicitly considers
the race of individuals are ‘express racial classifications’ for purposes of equal
protection doctrine. Some are, and some are not.”217 Because our two
proposed algorithms do not use racial classifications for the purposes of
decisionmaking—rather, our algorithms use race as a factor precisely to en-
sure that race is never used as a criterion based on which individuals are
treated differently—our approaches should not be considered “express racial
classifications.” As with the use of collection of race information for the
Census,
“Statistical information as such is a rather neutral entity which only be-
comes meaningful when it is interpreted.” . . . [There is a] distinction be-
tween collecting demographic data so that the government may have the
information it believes at a given time it needs in order to govern, and gov-
ernmental use of suspect classifications without a compelling interest.218
In addition, our two proposed algorithms should not trigger strict
scrutiny because race is never the sole criterion used in any step of the design
of the algorithm, let alone never a categorical determinant of government
decisiomaking. As stated by R. Richard Banks, “[a]lthough the members of
the Court disagree on the threshold use of race that triggers strict scrutiny, a
majority of the Court seems to embrace the view that a minimal reliance on
race does not trigger the racial classification rule.”219 To support this propo-
sition, Banks cites to litigation under the Voting Rights Act, where the Su-
preme Court has stated that “[s]trict scrutiny does not apply merely because
redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. . . . For strict scrutiny
to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate districting principles
were ‘subordinated’ to race.”220 Thus, while our two proposals are “race con-
scious” in some sense, they do not allow any decisionmaking to be based
fundamentally on race.
Furthermore, we view our proposed solutions as consistent with an
alternative conception of equal protection, the antisubordination principle.
As summarized by David Strauss,
This principle holds that the evil of discrimination does not lie in the use of
a racial (or other similar) criterion for distinguishing among people. Rather
the evil of discrimination is the particular kind of harm that it inflicts on
the disadvantaged group—in varying formulations, it subordinates
217. Primus, supra note 37, at 505–06.
218. Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (quoting United States v. New Hampshire, 539 F.2d
277, 280 (1st Cir. 1976)).
219. Banks, supra note 215, at 904–05.
220. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958–59 (1996) (plurality opinion) (quoting Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)).
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them . . . . According to the anti-subordination principle, where that
particular kind of harm is absent, there is no unlawful discrimination, even
if a racial classification is used.221
Many argue that these antisubordination principles have been reflected
in case law, such as in Strauder v. West Virginia, where the Supreme Court
condemned “discriminations which are steps towards reducing [Black indi-
viduals] to the condition of a subject race.”222 Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia,
the Court struck down antimiscegenation laws, in part because they are “jus-
tifi[ed only ]as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”223 Siegel
has argued, with respect to Brown v. Board of Education, that “many justifi-
cations offered for Brown sounded like an antisubordination defense of the
opinion might today.”224 We view both of our statistical proposals, which
consider race in the estimation step race precisely to avoid inflicting harm on
disadvantaged groups through proxy effects that can reflect past
discrimination (such as discriminatory policing), as fully consistent with the
antisubordination principle.
Ultimately, we believe that our approaches do not violate the core tenets
that underlie the equal protection doctrine and should be legally permissible.
Because our proposed solutions consider race only in the first estimation
step and do so precisely to purge algorithmic predictions of any proxy
effects—thus not permitting individual predictions to be based on racial-
group membership—our approaches are very much in line with the goal of
treating citizens as individuals and the goal of not inflicting harm on
disadvantaged groups.225
221. Strauss, supra note 20, at 1; see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex,
Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007–08 (1986) (“Th[e] [anti-
subordination] approach seeks to eliminate the power disparities between men and women,
and between whites and non-whites . . . . From an anti-subordination perspective, both facially
differentiating and facially neutral policies are invidious only if they perpetuate racial or sexual
hierarchy.”); Siegel, supra note 208, at 1288–89 (“[T]he antisubordination principle is con-
cerned with protecting members of historically disadvantaged groups from the harms of unjust
social stratification. . . . Because the antisubordination principle focuses on practices that dis-
proportionally harm members of marginalized groups, it can tell the difference between benign
and invidious discrimination.”).
222. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
223. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
224. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1474 (2004).
225. An algorithm that uses race in the second prediction step is a potentially different
story, an issue we address in Section VI.B. But even in that context, where the algorithm may
constitute an “express racial classification,” some scholars have argued that the algorithm could
withstand strict scrutiny under a form of algorithmic affirmative action. See, e.g., Jason R. Bent,
Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action Legal?, 108 GEO. L.J. 803, 849–51 (2020).
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E. Racial Disparities Under Our Two Statistical Solutions
Above, we have presented two statistical solutions, the colorblinding-
inputs and minorities-as-whites algorithms. We believe that these two
statistical solutions, in contrast to the formalistic excluding-inputs
algorithm, not only are implementable in practice but also better advance the
widespread goal of policymakers and legal advocates who seek to eliminate
both direct and proxy effects of race in predictive algorithms.
It is important to note, however, that neither of our two statistical
solutions would result in complete racial balance in terms of resulting
algorithmic predictions or outcomes. Specifically, predictions for the
minority population and predictions for the white population are not
guaranteed to be identical. Why is this? Recall that we have defined
predictions as race neutral if algorithmic predictions have been purged of
both direct and proxy effects of race, a view that we believe best captures the
leading legal consensus. Any remaining racial disparities after elimination of
direct and proxy effects are thus, by definition, not unwarranted. Under both
our statistical solutions, algorithmic predictions would still result in some
racial gaps so long as characteristics of individuals vary by protected class.
For example, even if we eliminate the direct and proxy effects of race, it may
still be the case that having a prior criminal history leads to higher predicted
risk,226 as is almost always the case in commonly used algorithms. If Black
individuals, on average, are more likely to have a prior criminal history
compared to white individuals, risk predictions may still be higher on
average for Black individuals relative to white individuals. In our view, these
remaining racial gaps are not unwarranted, and we are not aware of any
definition of algorithmic fairness that requires predictions by race to be
equal. In fact, as legal scholars have pointed out, “racial balance . . . is not
legally mandated, and efforts to pursue that goal might themselves be struck
down on constitutional grounds.”227
Some may argue that the overrepresentation of prior criminal records
for Black individuals relative to white individuals is not due to valid
differences in criminal behavior, but rather discrimination—a critique that is
sometimes referred to as “measurement error” in predictive inputs that is
correlated with race. We are sympathetic to this critique, but unfortunately,
we are not aware of any systematic approach to dealing with these
measurement issues, when dealing with either algorithms or human
decisionmakers. For example, we are not aware of any government that
attempts to correct for mismeasurement of, say, prior conviction records by
adjusting what it means to have a prior conviction for Black offenders versus
white offenders. The only real solution to this specific issue is to understand
the possible sources of measurement error and find inputs that do not suffer
226. See supra Table 4.
227. Sunstein, supra note 93, at 509.
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from measurement error, a worthwhile goal when dealing with both
algorithms and human decisionmaking and an area that we believe is ripe for
future research.
Our two statistical solutions also do not directly address measurement
error in the outcome of interest or “label,” focusing instead on direct and
proxy effects from inputs. But a challenge for almost all algorithms is
measurement error in the outcome itself, which may be systematically
correlated with race, and thus exhibit another source of potential unfairness.
For example, in the criminal justice context, we rarely observe actual
criminal activity, relying instead on arrests or convictions. These observable
outcomes may be imperfect measures of underlying activity that are
differentially mismeasured by race due to structural inequalities, as would be
the case if criminal justice actors were racially biased. The solution to this
particular form of bias is challenging but requires carefully choosing
observable outcomes that are good stand-ins for the underlying outcome of
interest and that are less likely to suffer from mismeasurement.
V. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF OUR PROPOSED STATISTICAL SOLUTIONS
In this Part, we present our main empirical results using data from the
pretrial system in New York City. We begin with a brief overview of the New
York City pretrial system and our data. We then demonstrate that
commonly used algorithms are likely to generate unwarranted racial gaps by
including variables that, in practice, are all highly correlated with race. We
then show that, as a result, these algorithms generate economically
meaningful proxy effects and unwarranted racial disparities. We conclude by
showing that our two proposed statistical solutions substantially reduce the
number of Black defendants detained compared to more commonly used
algorithms.
A. The New York City Pretrial System
Background on Arraignment and Bail: In the United States, the bail
system is meant to allow all but the most dangerous criminal suspects to be
released from custody while ensuring their appearance at required court
proceedings and, in some jurisdictions, also ensuring the public’s safety. The
federal right to nonexcessive bail is guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution,228 with almost all state constitutions granting similar
rights to defendants.229 In New York, the state constitution states that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed.”230 New
228. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
229. Ariana Lindermayer, Note, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations
of the State Constitutional Right to Bail, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 267, 283–84 (2009).
230. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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York’s bail statute also grants a right to some form of bail for most
defendants. According to § 510.10 of New York Criminal Procedure Law
(CPL),
When a principal, whose future court attendance at a criminal action or
proceeding is or may be required, initially comes under the control of a
court, such court must, by a securing order, either release him on his own
recognizance, fix bail or commit him to the custody of the sheriff.231
Excepting cases wherein the defendant is charged with a Class A felony or
has two previous felony convictions, the court may order recognizance or
bail for a defendant.232 If the defendant only has charges that are less than
felony grade, the court must order recognizance or bail.233 New York law
also states that the sole purpose of bail is to ensure that the defendant returns
to court such that the only consideration at arraignment is the defendant’s
risk of failure to appear, and not dangerousness to the community.234
In New York City, the pretrial process generally starts when a police
officer brings the arrestee to the precinct for processing, where the defendant
is photographed and fingerprinted. While the defendant’s criminal history is
being processed, the arresting officer meets with an assistant district attorney
to draft a complaint to begin the prosecution process. Meanwhile, the
defendant is interviewed for a bail recommendation by the Criminal Justice
Agency (CJA), which has created a pretrial risk-assessment instrument that
predicts the risk of failing to appear for future court dates, known as the
“CJA score.”235 The DCJS and CJA reports, along with the complaint, are
then delivered to court arraignment clerks to file the defendant’s
information, a docket number is assigned, and the case is initialized in the
court’s computerized records. The arraignment process cannot proceed until
all of these documents are submitted into the system. The defendant’s
counsel is finally given an opportunity to interview the defendant prior to
arraignment.236
231. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10 (McKinney 2020).
232. Id. § 530.20(2)(a).
233. Id. § 530.20.
234. See id. § 510.30 (“With respect to any principal, the court in all cases, unless other-
wise provided by law, must impose the least restrictive kind and degree of control or restriction
that is necessary to secure the principal’s return to court when required.”); see also Sardino v.
State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 448 N.E.2d 83, 85 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that in New York, the
“only matter of legitimate concern” when setting bail is “whether any bail or the amount fixed
was necessary to insure the defendant’s future appearances in court”).
235. Sainath R. Iyer, Will NYC’s New Pre-Trial Risk Assessment Be Race Neutral?, N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM (Nov. 5, 2017), https://nyujlpp.org/quorum/iyer-nyc-pretrial-
risk-assessment-race/ [https://perma.cc/BNB3-4GV5].
236. OFF. OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF THE N.Y.C. CRIM. CT., CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 18–20 (2014) [hereinafter NYC 2013 ANNUAL REPORT].
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During this period between arrest and arraignment, most arrestees in
New York City are transferred to holding cells in each borough’s criminal
court, with arraignments usually taking place within twenty-four hours of
arrest.237 However, not all arrested individuals will be held in holding cells
prior to arraignment. For certain individuals with no outstanding warrants
at the time of arrest, the arresting police officer may use his or her discretion
to issue a Desk Appearance Ticket (DAT).238 This DAT allows the arrested
individual to be released but requires them to return to court for a later
prescheduled arraignment. Twenty-eight percent of all misdemeanor arrests
were issued a DAT in 2016.239 Between DATs and non-DATs, in 2016,
249,776 criminal cases were arraigned in New York City, with these cases
largely comprised of misdemeanor charges (82%).240
At arraignment, the first court appearance in the criminal justice process
in New York City, an arraignment judge notifies the defendant of the
charges he faces and the rights he has.241 In contrast to some other
jurisdictions, almost half of all case filings are disposed of at arraignment in
New York City.242 For many misdemeanor defendants, the case is dismissed
at arraignment or adjourned in contemplation of dismissal (ACD).243 In
2013, for example, about 80% of first-time nonviolent-misdemeanor youth
had their cases resolved with an outright dismissal or ACD.244
For the cases that are not disposed of at arraignment, the assigned
arraignment judge has several options when setting the pretrial-release
conditions. First, defendants who show a minimal risk of flight may be
released on their promise to return for all court proceedings, known broadly
as release on recognizance (ROR). In practice, about 70% of defendants in
New York City are released via ROR at arraignment such that no bail is set
and no other court conditions are mandated.245 Second, defendants may be
required to post some sort of bail payment to secure release if they pose an
appreciable risk of flight, which makes up most of the remaining 30% of
237. INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. & INCARCERATION REFORM, A MORE JUST
NEW YORK CITY 37 (2017) [hereinafter THE LIPPMAN REPORT], https://static1.squarespace
.com/static/5b6de4731aef1de914f43628/t/5b96c6f81ae6cf5e9c5f186d/1536607993842/Lippman
%2BCommission%2BReport%2BFINAL%2BSingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/JKM4-KTVY].
238. Id. This is permitted if the arrest charge is a violation, misdemeanor, or Class E
felony. DATs are not permitted for other types of felonies (e.g., Class A–D felonies).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. NYC 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 236, at 18–19.
242. Id. at 19.
243. THE LIPPMAN REPORT, supra note 237, at 37.
244. See id.
245. Id. at 42.
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cases.246 If the defendant is remanded or is unable to make the set bail, he or
she is detained until the adjudication of their case.247 For more serious
crimes, the arraignment judge may require that the defendant be detained
pending trial by denying bail altogether.248 Bail denial is often mandatory in
first- or second-degree murder cases, but can be imposed for other crimes
when the bail judge finds that no set of conditions for release will guarantee
appearance.249 For example, prior to recent bail reform in New York City, a
Class A felony, which includes murder, kidnapping, arson, and high-level
drug possession and sale, almost always resulted in a denial of bail. These
cases make up about 0.8% of all cases in New York City.250 Finally, about
1.5% of cases are sent to a supervised release program as an alternative to
pretrial detention.251
The assigned arraignment judge is granted considerable discretion in
evaluating each defendant’s circumstances when making decisions about
release. With the exception of circumstances as detailed in NY CPL § 530
that prohibit discretion altogether, the assigned judge is meant to base his or
her decision on the following mandated factors:
The principal’s activities and history; . . . the charges facing the
principal; . . . The principal’s criminal conviction record if any; The
principal’s record of previous adjudication as a juvenile delinquent . . . or a
youthful offender, if any; The principal’s previous record with respect to
flight to avoid criminal prosecution; If monetary bail is authorized,
according to the restrictions set forth in this title, the principal’s individual
financial circumstances . . . . Where the principal is charged with a crime or
crimes against a member or members of the same family or
246. In New York City, arraignment judges are required by law to set at least two forms
of bail in these cases. Id. at 44 (citing People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 967 N.E.2d 671 (N.Y.
2012)). The two most common bail options used are cash bail and insurance-company bail
bond, despite there being nine forms of bail authorized by law. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10
(McKinney 2020); THE LIPPMAN REPORT, supra note 237, at 44. Cash bail requires the
individual to pay the full bail amount up front in order to secure release while insurance-
company bail bond requires an individual to deposit 10% of the bond amount as collateral with
a bail-bond company. Infrequently used alternatives include credit-card bail, which allows an
individual to use a credit card to pay bail of $2,500 or less; partially secured bonds, which
require the individual to pay only a percentage of the total bail amount up to 10%; and
unsecured bonds that do not require up-front payment. For both secured and unsecured
bonds, the defendant is only liable for the rest of the bond if he or she fails to return to court.
THE LIPPMAN REPORT, supra note 237, at 44. In New York, there is a 3% surcharge on all cash
bail if the defendant is convicted, which the government keeps. N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys.,
Bail, NYCOURTS.GOV (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal
/bail.shtml [https://perma.cc/N89J-PPLE].
247. N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., supra note 246.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See THE LIPPMAN REPORT, supra note 237, at 41 n.23.
251. See id.
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household . . . any violation by the principal of an order of protection
issued by any court . . . and the principal’s history of use or possession of a
firearm.252
Much of this information will be available in the defendant’s rap sheet,
DCJS, and CJA reports. While New York’s bail statute also requires that
judges take into account a defendant’s “financial circumstances” when
setting bail,253 many have noted that there is little evidence that judges
consider individual ability to pay in practice.254 In considering these factors
and arguments made by both prosecutors and defense counsel, it is
estimated that the average arraignment in New York City lasts only six
minutes given the caseload and number of arraignment judges available.255
Changes to the NYC Pretrial System: There have been several important
changes to the pretrial system in New York City in recent years. Several
charitable bail funds have, for example, started operating in New York since
the enactment of a 2012 law that allows for the operation of bail funds that
post bail in misdemeanor cases where bail is set at $2,000 or less.256 These
bail funds include the Bronx Freedom Fund, the Brooklyn Community Bail
Fund, and the Liberty Fund.257 In 2016, the Mayor’s Office of Criminal
Justice also created a supervised-release program with the goal of diverting
3,000 defendants each year who would otherwise be detained due to inability
to pay bail to community supervision.258 Under this supervised-release
program, individuals receive supervision and conditions that are based on a
risk-assessment screening created by the NY Criminal Justice Agency.
Individuals charged with most misdemeanor and nonviolent felony charges
are eligible for the program.259 In 2018, the Mayor’s Office also announced
the creation of an online bail-payment system out of recognition of the
extensive and difficult process for paying bail in person during business
252. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 2020).
253. Id. § 510.30(1)(f).
254. THE LIPPMAN REPORT, supra note 237, at 44 (“[I]f a person is on public assistance
and you know they are receiving $300 a month, and you give them a $5,000 bail . . . that’s a
ransom—not a bail.”).
255. See Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on
Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529, 533 (2017).
The Criminal Court and its judges have the responsibility of conducting arraignments in New
York City. Id.
256. THE LIPPMAN REPORT, supra note 237, at 44–46.
257. Id.
258. THE LIPPMAN REPORT, supra note 237, at 45; Supervised Release Program, CTR. FOR
CT. INNOVATION, https://www.courtinnovation.org/node/20042/more-info [https://perma.cc
/BZ5Z-MP82].
259. THE LIPPMAN REPORT, supra note 237, at 45.
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hours.260 Under the new online system, sureties no longer need to pay bail in
person, individuals living out of state can pay bail on behalf of a defendant,
and payment can now be shared across multiple people and multiple credit
cards.261
Most recently, in April 2019, New York passed legislation on bail
reform, effective January 2020.262 Among these reforms, the most notable
include the elimination of money bail and pretrial detention for nearly all
misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies.263 Electronic monitoring is also
prohibited in most misdemeanor cases.264 Among violent felonies, judges
may set bail if they find that less restrictive means of release, such as
nonmonetary conditions or electronic monitoring, are not sufficient to
assure a person’s return to court.265 The law also mandates consideration of
ability to pay when imposing bail.266 In addition, the law gives a grace period
for the issuance of bench warrants, prohibiting courts from issuing a warrant
for forty-eight hours whenever a defendant fails to appear, unless the
defendant is charged with a new crime or there is evidence of a “willful”
failure to appear.267 With respect to risk-assessment instruments, the law
requires that such instruments be publicly available, free of bias due to “race,
national origin, sex, or any other protected class,” and validated for
predictive accuracy.268
B. Data Description
This Section summarizes the most relevant information regarding our
administrative-court data from New York City and provides summary
statistics. We have data on all arraignments in New York City between
November 1, 2008 and November 1, 2013, totaling 1,460,462 cases in all.269
These data contain information on a defendant’s gender, race, date of birth,




262. MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK:




264. Id. at 5.
265. Id. at 2, 5.
266. Id. at 4.
267. Id. at 7.
268. Id. at 6.
269. These data exclude undocketed arrests as well as the substantial number of arrests
for nonfingerprintable charges such as violations, infractions, and many misdemeanors (i.e.,
VTL 511s).
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and county of arrest. The data also include extensive information that is
available to the arraignment judge at the time of bail, including detailed
information on the charge in the current offense, history of prior criminal
convictions obtained from the rap sheet, and a history of past failures to
appear. We also observe whether the defendant was released on
recognizance at the time of arraignment or was assigned some form of bail,
as well as whether the defendant eventually secured release on bail prior to
case disposition. Finally, we can measure whether a defendant subsequently
failed to appear for a required court appearance or was arrested for a new
crime before case disposition because the data contain defendant identifiers
that allow us to match the same individual across different cases. Given that
nonappearance at court is the only legitimate concern taken into account at
the time of setting bail in New York, our primary measure for pretrial
misconduct is an indicator for failing to appear.
We make three restrictions to our final estimation sample. First, we limit
the sample to non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic white male defendants
charged with either a felony or misdemeanor (N = 718,305 cases from
345,940 unique defendants). Thus, our empirical results will focus on Black-
white male disparities to illustrate our key concepts but our proposed
statistical solutions can be easily extended to allow for other racial/ethnic
comparisons or gender disparities, as we will discuss in Section VI.A.
Second, we further limit the sample to cases that were not adjudicated or
disposed of at arraignment and where we are not missing any information
on background characteristics (N = 379,048 cases from 212,000 unique
defendants). This restriction allows us to observe the sample of defendants
who had a bail hearing. Finally, we further limit the sample to the
approximately 85% of defendants who are released before trial and, as a
result, who are relevant for our analysis (N = 264,379 cases from 180,887
unique defendants).270 The final sample thus contains 264,379 cases from
180,887 unique defendants.
270. Focusing on the sample of defendants actually released before trial raises a common
issue known as “selection.” Selection occurs because outcome data can be missing in a nonran-
dom way, where here we only observe pretrial-misconduct outcomes for individuals that judg-
es decided to release before trial. The predictive relationship between inputs and outcome may
thus be biased by selection. This is a common issue with risk-assessment instruments, which
are validated on a sample of released defendants. E.g., Shawn Bushway & Jeffrey Smith, Sen-
tencing Using Statistical Treatment Rules: What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us, 23 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 377, 378 (2007) (“[T]he data used in the formal risk assess-
ments in the criminal justice and criminology literature are generated by processes of informal
risk assessment and treatment assignment. Current sentences embody efforts by judges, prose-
cutors, parole boards and other actors in the criminal justice system to use the information
available to them (only some of which is observed by researchers) to predict risk and to assign
punishments based on those predictions. As a result, it is impossible without additional strong
assumptions to distinguish the ‘true’ behavior of individual offenders from the behavior that
results from their non-random treatment within the existing system.”).
364 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:291
Table 5 reports summary statistics for our estimation sample, both
overall and separately by race. The typical released defendant in New York
City is 31.8 years old and has 2.0 prior misdemeanor convictions, 0.5 prior
felony convictions, and 1.6 prior failures to appear. Fifty percent of released
defendants also have a prior violent felony conviction, with 12% having a
violent felony charge on the current case. Nineteen percent are charged with
at least one drug charge, 6.0% with at least one DUI charge, 9.0% with at
least one property charge, and 43.0% with at least one violent charge.
Twenty-three percent are charged with other types of offenses, including
prostitution, gambling, and public order offenses.
In terms of outcomes, 82.0% of released defendants are released ROR at
arraignment, with the remaining 18.0% released on money bail of some sort.
Fifteen percent of released defendants do not appear at one or more court
appearances on the current case, while 27.0% are rearrested prior to case
disposition.
Compared to released white defendants, released Black defendants have
1.1 more prior misdemeanor convictions, 0.4 more prior felony convictions,
and 1.0 more prior failures to appear. Released Black defendants are also 4.0
percentage points more likely to have a violent felony charge on the current
case. Released Black defendants are also arrested in counties with $8,200
lower income than released white defendants, largely reflecting the
difference in where these defendants reside. Finally, released Black
defendants are 1.0 percentage point more likely to be released ROR
compared to released white defendants, but are 6.0 percentage points more
likely to not appear at court and 11.0 percentage points more likely to be
rearrested prior to case disposition.
C. Proxy Effects in Commonly Used Algorithms
This Section argues that commonly used algorithms in the criminal
justice system result in unwarranted racial gaps under the mainstream legal
position. These commonly used algorithms do so because they include
variables that, in practice, are highly correlated with race, such as criminal
history and current charge. In doing so, these algorithms use inputs that are
“almost tantamount to using race,”271 which introduces proxy effects in
forming predictions, generating arguably unwarranted racial disparities.
To demonstrate how proxy effects infiltrate commonly used algorithms,
we focus on a statistical model that is inspired by one of the most prominent
models in the pretrial context, the Arnold Ventures PSA. The PSA was
designed with the goal of being both objective and fair, “not contain[ing]
factors that would lead defendants to be treated differently because of their
race, gender, or socioeconomic status.”272 For this reason, the PSA excludes
271. O’Neil, supra note 71.
272. Milgram et al., supra note 134, at 220.
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factors that Arnold Ventures deem to be inconsistent with fairness under the
law, including race, gender, socioeconomic status, and neighborhood, or
what we might call 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. However, the PSA does include inputs such
as prior criminal history and detailed charge characteristics that may or may
not be correlated with protected characteristics such as race, or what we call𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. Under the legal consensus of fairness, we
believe the PSA’s mission statement of not treating individuals differently
because of race depends on whether inputs like prior criminal history are
correlated with race. If, in fact, inputs like prior criminal history are not
correlated with race, proxy effects will not be present, allowing us to form
risk predictions that are truly race neutral. If, however, these inputs are
correlated with race, unwarranted disparities will emerge as a result of proxy
effects.
366 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:291







Panel A: Defendant Characteristics (1) (2) (3)
Defendant Age 31.8 34.0 31.1
Violent Felony Charge 0.12 0.09 0.13
Prior Misdemeanor Convictions 2.00 1.09 2.29
Prior Felony Convictions 0.50 0.22 0.59
Prior Violent Felony Convictions 0.15 0.06 0.17
Prior Failures to Appear 1.64 0.86 1.89
County Income 78,300 84,500 76,300
Drug Charge 0.19 0.18 0.20
DUI Charge 0.06 0.12 0.04
Property Charge 0.09 0.10 0.09
Violent Charge 0.43 0.39 0.44
Other Charge 0.23 0.21 0.23
Panel B: Arraignment Outcomes
Released Before Trial 1.00 1.00 1.00
ROR at Arraignment 0.82 0.82 0.83
Money Bail at Arraignment 0.18 0.18 0.17
Panel C: Pretrial Outcomes
Failure to Appear 0.15 0.10 0.16
Rearrest Prior to Disposition 0.27 0.19 0.30
Observations 264,379 63,880 200,499
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of defendants from the New York City
pretrial system. The sample consists of male Black and white defendants who were arrested and
charged between 11/2008 and 11/2013, whose cases were not adjudicated at arraignment, and who
were released before trial. See the text for additional details on the specification and sample.
The key question we now consider here is whether the inputs similar to
those used in the Arnold Ventures PSA are, in fact, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 or𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 in real-world data. We test whether the types of input variables
used in the PSA are 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 or 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 in two ways. First, we
examine whether each potential input variable is correlated with race by
regressing an indicator for a defendant being Black on each of these
variables. These regressions allow us to assess whether being Black is
significantly associated or correlated with other characteristics, such as
having a prior conviction. Due to data constraints, we are not able to use
identical inputs as the PSA. To be as consistent as possible with the PSA, we
consider the following input variables available in our data: defendant age;
an indicator for whether the current charge is for a violent felony; the
number of past misdemeanor convictions; the number of past felony
convictions; the number of past violent felony convictions; the number of
prior failures to appear; average income in the county of arrest; and
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indicators for whether the current charge includes a drug, DUI, property, or
violent charge. Our statistical model does not include inputs like education
or employment status, which some commonly used algorithms use.273 Again,
if a potential input variable is uncorrelated with race (but correlated with
pretrial misconduct), then it is 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 in our statistical framework. If,
on the other hand, a variable is correlated with race, then it is 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 in
our statistical framework.
Table 6 presents the results from this first empirical test using our
dataset on released male Black and released male white defendants from
New York City. Columns 1–8 present tests of the independent correlation
between defendant race and the listed input variables using these data.
Column 9 presents a test of the joint correlation between defendant race and
all of the listed input variables. The results show that all of the listed input
variables are significantly correlated with defendant race, both
independently and jointly. We find, for example, that Black defendants are
both younger and more likely to have a violent felony charge compared to
white defendants, correlations that will lead to proxy effects were these input
variables to be included in an algorithm. Black defendants also tend to have
more prior convictions, come from counties with lower incomes, be less
likely to have DUI and property charges, and be more likely to be charged
with a violent offense—again, correlations—that will lead to proxy effects if
these inputs are included.
273. See supra Table 1.
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Our second test examines how the weight on each input variable
changes when we account for proxy effects by regressing an indicator for
failing to appear at court on all input variables, both with and without an
additional control for defendant race that removes any potential proxy
effects. Recall from our hypothetical example in Table 4 that there are no
proxy effects when we control for all input variables and defendant race.
Thus, we can test whether an input variable is contaminated by race by
comparing how the coefficient on an input variable changes once we control
for defendant race compared to when we do not control for defendant race.
The magnitude of the change in coefficients is captured by the standard
omitted-variable-bias (OVB) formula described previously in Equation 7.
Table 7 presents the results from this second empirical test using the
same dataset on released Black and released white defendants from New
York City. Column 1 presents results that include the full set of input
variables, including defendant race—the benchmark statistical model. Each
input variable is significantly associated with the outcome variable: failure to
appear. In particular, Column 1 of Table 7 shows that there is a statistically
significant relationship between race and the probability of failure to appear,
with our estimates suggesting that Black defendants are 3.5 percentage
points more likely to not appear at court compared to otherwise similar
white defendants, the direct effect of race.
Column 2 presents results from the commonly used algorithm in the
spirit of the PSA that uses the same set of nonrace input variables, but
excluding defendant race. We call this the “excluding-race” model. Column
3 reports the difference between the estimated coefficients for the two
statistical models. Consistent with our results from Table 6, we see that
models like the PSA include significant information about defendant race
through the proxy effects of other input variables. For example, being ten
years older is associated with a 2.6 percentage point lower probability of
failure to appear in the benchmark model, but is associated with a 2.8
percentage point lower probability of failure to appear when race is
excluded. Another coefficient that changes substantially is the weight given
to a current DUI charge. Compared to other charges, a defendant charged
with a DUI is 6.4 percentage points less likely to fail to appear under the
benchmark model, but 7.2 percentage points less likely to fail to appear when
race is excluded. These predictive weights change across the two models
precisely because our input variables are contaminated by race. In other
words, simply excluding race from a regression, as done under commonly
used algorithms, does not eliminate the proxy effects of race when correlated
inputs are included, and can generate unwarranted racial disparities.
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TABLE 7: COMPARISON OF BENCHMARK AND RACE-BLIND STATISTICAL
MODELS








Defendant Age in 10s -0.026*** -0.028*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Violent Felony Charge -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Prior Misdemeanor Convictions -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Prior Felony Convictions -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Prior Violent Felony Convictions 0.007*** 0.008*** -0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Prior Failures to Appear 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
County Income in 10,000s 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Drug Charge -0.038*** -0.039*** 0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
DUI Charge -0.064*** -0.072*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Property Charge -0.013*** -0.015*** 0.002***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000)




Constant 0.179*** 0.215*** -0.036***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 264379 264379 ---
R2 0.045 0.043 ---
Note: This table uses information from the New York City pretrial system. The sample consists of
male Black and white defendants who were arrested and charged between 11/2008 and 11/2013,
whose cases were not adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released before trial. The dependent
variable is an indicator for failing to appear. Columns 1 and 2 report results from an OLS regression
of an indicator for pretrial failure to appear on the listed inputs. Column 3 reports the difference in
the coefficients for each variable between Column 1 and Column 2. See the text for additional details
on the specification and sample.
Overall, the results from this Section tell us that commonly used
algorithms such as the PSA likely include information about defendant race
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through the proxy effects of other input variables. Even input variables that
are relatively noncontroversial in the law and policy sphere, such as current
charge and prior criminal history, are contaminated by these proxy effects
because of their strong correlation with race and can lead to unwarranted
disparities when used in predictive algorithms. More concretely, if the goal is
to have an algorithm that is free of all direct and proxy effects of race,
commonly used algorithms fail to deliver. Thus, these results suggest that
commonly used algorithms that purport to satisfy race neutrality through
the formalistic solution of excluding problematic inputs do not in fact attain
this goal.
These results also demonstrate that there are likely no truly uncorrelated
input variables in real-world data, and, as a result, that likely all of the
commonly used algorithms may violate core principles underlying
antidiscrimination law by allowing race to contaminate predictions of risk.
Thus, the results indicate that we must use alternative algorithms if we want
to purge predictions of all direct and proxy effects of race.
D. Comparison of Different Predictive Algorithms
We conclude this Part by showing how our two statistical solutions fare
in terms of racial disparities and predictive accuracy compared to commonly
used predictive algorithms using our data on released defendants from New
York City.
Predictive Weights on Colorblinding-Inputs and Black-as-White
Algorithms: We begin by identifying the predictive weights on each input
under the colorblinding-inputs algorithm in comparison to other statistical
models. Table 8 shows how the weight on each input factor used to predict
pretrial risk changes depending on the type of predictive algorithm. Column
1 presents the benchmark statistical model, which includes the full set of
input variables, including defendant race. Column 2 presents results from
commonly used algorithms that use the same set of nonrace input variables,
but exclude defendant race. Finally, Column 3 presents results under our
proposed colorblinding-inputs algorithm, which also requires the inclusion
of all defendant characteristics including race in the first estimation step,
precisely to eliminate nonrace inputs of their proxy effects. Column 4
reports the difference in the predictive weight on each input between
Columns 1 and 3.
The key takeaway from Table 8 is that the coefficients in the
colorblinding-inputs model (Column 3) are, by design, identical to those
under the benchmark statistical model (Column 1). This is because the
coefficients from Table 8 reflect the predictive relationships that come out of
the first estimation step. The colorblinding-inputs model requires that we
include race, just as in the benchmark model, when estimating the
coefficients on all other input variables in order to eliminate racial proxy
effects, as described previously in Section IV.B. As we will show in
simulations below, however, the predictions for individuals under the
colorblinding-inputs model and the benchmark statistical model will not be
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the same. That is because the colorblinding-inputs model does not use
individual race information in the second prediction step, thereby ensuring
that two individuals who differ only in terms of race will not receive different
predictions under the model.
Note also that, as shown previously in Table 7, the predictive weights on
each input are in general different between the benchmark statistical model
(Column 1); the commonly used approach, which excludes race (Column 2);
and the colorblinding-inputs model (Column 3). Again, this difference is
attributable to the proxy effects that emerge when race is excluded as in
Column 2, but correlated nonrace inputs are nevertheless included.
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TABLE 8: COMPARISON OF BENCHMARK, COMMONLY USED, AND
COLORBLINDING-INPUTS STATISTICAL MODELS









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Defendant Age in 10s -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.026*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Violent Felony Charge -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.056*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Prior Misdemeanor
Convictions
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Prior Felony Convictions -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Prior Violent Felony
Convictions
0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Prior Failures to Appear 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
County Income in 10,000s 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Drug Charge -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.038*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
DUI Charge -0.064*** -0.072*** -0.064*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Property Charge -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.013*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Violent Charge -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Black 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant 0.179*** 0.215*** 0.179*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Observations 264379 264379 264379 ---
R2 0.045 0.043 0.045 ---
Note: This table reports the correlation between failure to appear and algorithmic inputs using in-
formation from the New York City pretrial system. The sample consists of male Black and white de-
fendants who were arrested and charged between 11/2008 and 11/2013, whose cases were not
adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released before trial. The dependent variable is an indica-
tor for failing to appear. Columns 1–3 report results from an OLS regression of an indicator for pre-
trial failure to appear on the listed inputs. Column 4 reports the difference in the coefficients for each
variable between Column 1 and Column 3. See the text for additional details on the specification and
sample.
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We now show the predictive weights on each input under the
minorities-as-whites algorithm (or Black-as-white algorithm in our setting),
in comparison to other statistical models. Table 9 presents these results.
Column 1 presents the benchmark statistical model, which includes the full
set of input variables, including defendant race. Column 2 presents results
from commonly used algorithms that exclude defendant race. And Column
3 presents results under our proposed Black-as-white algorithm, which
applies the whites-only predictive relationship between each input and the
outcome of interest for all defendants, both white and Black. Column 4
reports the difference in the predictive weight on each input between
Columns 1 and 3.
Table 9 reveals that in general, a Black-as-white algorithm will yield
substantially different predictive weights on each input relative to both the
benchmark statistical model and the commonly used approach that excludes
race. Intuitively, these weights will differ because the Black-as-white
algorithm is only estimating the relationship between each input and the
outcome of interest within one population of defendants. For example,
under the benchmark statistical model, a defendant who is ten years older is
associated with a 2.6 percentage-point reduction in the probability of failing
to appear. And under the commonly used approach, being ten years older is
associated with a 2.8 percentage-point decrease in the probability of failing
to appear. But under the Black-as-white model, a defendant who is ten years
older is associated with only a 1.2 percentage-point reduction in the
probability of failing to appear.
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TABLE 9: COMPARISON OF BENCHMARK, COMMONLY USED, AND BLACK-AS-
WHITE STATISTICAL MODELS









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Defendant Age in 10s -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Violent Felony Charge -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.031*** -0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Prior Misdemeanor Convic-
tions
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Prior Felony Convictions -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.014*** 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Prior Violent Felony Convic-
tions
0.007*** 0.008*** 0.002 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Prior Failures to Appear 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.028*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income in 10,000s 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Drug Charge -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.002 -0.036***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
DUI Charge -0.064*** -0.072*** -0.042*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Property Charge -0.013*** -0.015*** 0.026*** -0.039***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Violent Charge -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.028*** -0.028***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Black 0.035***
(0.002)
Constant 0.179*** 0.215*** 0.122*** 0.057***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 264379 264379 63880 ---
R2 0.045 0.043 0.033 ---
Note: This table reports the correlation between failure to appear and algorithmic inputs using
information from the New York City pretrial system. The sample consists of male Black and white
defendants who were arrested and charged between 11/2008 and 11/2013, whose cases were not
adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released before trial. The dependent variable is an
indicator for failing to appear. Columns 1–3 report results from an OLS regression of an indicator
for pretrial failure to appear on the listed inputs. Column 4 reports the difference in the coefficients
for each variable between Column 1 and Column 3. See the text for additional details on the
specification and sample.
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Racial Disparities and Predictive Accuracy: We now evaluate the
performance of our proposed statistical solutions relative to other algorithms
by measuring racial disparities in pretrial release. To evaluate our statistical
algorithms, we use the estimates from Table 8 and Table 9 (which reflect the
first estimation step) to construct risk predictions for every defendant in our
sample under each algorithm (the second prediction step). Recall from Part
IV that both our proposed algorithms do not use individual-level race
information to form risk predictions in the second step.
Having formed risk predictions under each algorithm, we then simulate
different release policies, calculating the fraction of Black (versus white)
defendants among those released and the FTA rate among the released
under each hypothetical policy. The goal of each algorithm is to have the
lowest possible FTA rate and no unwarranted disparities between Black and
white defendants. Recall that we define unwarranted racial disparities as
differences in the treatment of otherwise similar individuals due solely to
membership in a particular racial group, either through direct or proxy
effects of race. Again, we view this definition as most consistent with the
mainstream legal view of fairness. The goal of each algorithm is not,
however, to release an equal number of Black and white defendants. Under
the law, racial disparities are not illegal per se,274 but rather only those
disparities driven by race or motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
To examine racial disparities in pretrial release, Figure 1 reports the
share of released defendants who are Black if we were to make pretrial
release decisions using each of the different predictive algorithms. The x-axis
in Figure 1 varies the percentage of all defendants that are released, ranging
from 0 to 100%—what we call the “release threshold.” The y-axis reports the
fraction of released defendants that are Black at each release threshold. As a
reference, 76% of the estimation sample is comprised of Black defendants,
which is what the y-axis would report when the x-axis is at 100% release. We
consider four total algorithms: (1) the benchmark statistical model that uses
all inputs, including race, (2) the commonly used model that uses all inputs
but excluding race, (3) our proposed colorblinding-inputs model, and (4)
our proposed Black-as-white model.
This figure reveals that the benchmark statistical model always results in
the lowest share of Black defendants among the released at each release
threshold. This occurs because the benchmark statistical model uses race as a
predictive input, giving rise to direct race effects. Given that being Black is
positively associated with the risk of failing to appear (see Table 7),275 Black
defendants will receive higher risk predictions than otherwise similar white
defendants, resulting in lower rates of pretrial release for Black individuals.
274. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 93, at 509 (“In terms of existing law, racial balance, as
such, is not legally mandated, and efforts to pursue that goal might themselves be struck down
on constitutional grounds.”).
275. See supra Table 7.
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The commonly used model that excludes race improves upon this
benchmark statistical model by increasing the share of released defendants
that are Black. At all possible release thresholds, the commonly used model
results in a higher share of released defendants that are Black relative to the
benchmark statistical model. This occurs because the direct effects of race
are eliminated when race is excluded as a predictive input.
However, our proposed colorblinding-inputs model results in an even
higher share of Black defendants being released relative to both the
benchmark model and the commonly used model. This pattern holds for all
possible release rates, with the largest differences at particularly low overall
release rates. The reason that our proposed colorblinding-inputs model
increases the fraction of Black defendants released, regardless of the overall
release rate, is that it purges all the input variables of racial proxy effects.
These proxy effects are exactly what lead to the relative overdetention of
Black defendants in the commonly used algorithm. Similarly, our proposed
Black-as-white algorithm generally results in a higher share of Black
defendants released relative to the commonly used model. These results
indicate that racial disparities in pretrial detention can be further reduced
under our proposed statistical solutions relative to the typical algorithm used
in practice today.
FIGURE 1: RACIAL DISPARITIES UNDER DIFFERENT PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS
Note: This figure plots the percent of released defendants who are black under different predictive
algorithms and release rates using information from the New York City pretrial system. The sample
consists of male black and white defendants who were arrested and charged between 11/2018 and
11/2013, whose cases were not adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released before trial. See
the text for additional details on the specification and sample.
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To provide some more concrete examples of the differences in the racial
composition of released defendants across the various algorithms, Table 10
presents a selected subset of these simulations to precisely illustrate the
differences in racial disparities among the types of algorithms. We consider
hypothetical scenarios where we release 50, 70, or 90% of all individuals in
our data and report the share of Black defendants among the released.
Columns 1–4 report the fraction of individuals released that are Black under
the benchmark, excluding race, colorblinding-inputs, and Black-as-white
models, respectively. Column 5 reports the difference in share released that
are Black between the commonly used excluding-race model and the
colorblinding-inputs model. Column 6 reports the difference in share
released that are Black between the commonly used excluding-race model
and the Black-as-white model.
These results again show that our proposed colorblinding-inputs
statistical model would significantly increase the fraction of Black
individuals released compared to both the benchmark statistical model and
the commonly used model that simply excludes race as a predictive input.
The use of the benchmark model would, for example, lead to 63.6% of
released defendants being Black if the overall release rate was set at a
threshold of 50% (Column 1). The commonly used model would increase
the fraction of released defendants who are Black to 69.5% (Column 2),
consistent with the fact that the benchmark model penalizes Black
defendants by allowing for direct race effects.
However, our proposed colorblinding-inputs model further increases
the fraction of released defendants who are Black to 70.4% (Column 3),
almost a full percentage-point increase compared to the commonly used
algorithm (Column 5). If applied citywide, a back-of-the-envelope
calculation implies this model would release an additional 3,500 Black
defendants during our sample period compared to the typical algorithm
used today if 50% of all defendants are released. In a similar nature, our
proposed Black-as-white model increases the fraction of released defendants
who are Black by 0.8 percentage points relative to the commonly used
algorithm (Columns 4 and 6), which could lead to the release of an
additional 3,100 Black defendants during our sample period. As a reference
point, a typical jursidiction releases between 30 and 70% of its pretrial
population,276 so we view these changes as realistic.
276. For example, “[b]etween 1990 and 2004, 62% of felony defendants in State courts in
the 75 largest counties were released prior to the disposition of their case.” THOMAS H. COHEN
& BRYAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 214994, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS (2007),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [http://perma.cc/2VQA-APWJ]. Average pre-
trial detention rates range from 30% to 70% for misdemeanor defendants in Harris County.
Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misde-
meanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 736–37 tbl.1 (2017).
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We find that these increases in the number of released Black defendants
persist even at very high release rates. For example, if a city wanted to release
90% of all defendants, a release threshold that is substantially higher than
currently used in most jurisdictions, both our proposed algorithms would
continue to lead to nonnegligible increases in the number of released Black
defendants relative to the commonly used algorithm.
Recall that our measure of pretrial misconduct is failing to appear in
court given that nonappearance at court is by law the only legitimate
concern taken into account at the time of setting bail in New York City.277
However, our results are similar if we use our proposed algorithms to predict
the risk of being arrested for a new crime prior to case disposition. The
Appendix presents these results and simulations. For instance, if the overall
release rate was set at a threshold of 50%, our proposed colorblinding-inputs
model would lead to the release of an additional 3,300 Black defendants and
our proposed Black-as-white algorithm would lead to the release of an
additional 7,600 Black defendants compared to the commonly used
algorithm.
TABLE 10: SIMULATIONS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES UNDER DIFFERENT
PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
50% Release Rate 63.61 69.49 70.40 70.29 -0.92 -0.81
70% Release Rate 69.01 71.83 72.20 71.75 -0.37 0.08
90% Release Rate 73.84 74.28 74.33 74.49 -0.05 -0.21
Note: This table reports the percent of released defendants who are Black versus white under differ-
ent prediction models and release rates using information from the New York City pretrial system.
The sample consists of male Black and white defendants who were arrested and charged between
11/2008 and 11/2013, whose cases were not adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released be-
fore trial. Column 1 reports the percent Black released among released defendants under the bench-
mark statistical model. Column 2 reports the percent Black released among released defendants
under the commonly used model. Column 3 reports the percent Black released among released de-
fendants under the colorblinding-inputs model. Column 4 reports the percent Black released among
released defendants under the Black-as-white model. Column 5 reports the difference in the percent
Black released defendants between the commonly used and the colorblinding-inputs model. Column
277. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 2020) (“With respect to any princi-
pal, the court in all cases, unless otherwise provided by law, must impose the least restrictive
kind and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to secure the principal’s return to
court when required.”); see also Sardino v. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 448 N.E.2d 83, 84
(N.Y. 1983) (in New York, the “only matter of legitimate concern” when setting bail is “wheth-
er any bail or the amount fixed was necessary to insure the defendant’s future appearances in
court”).
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6 reports the difference in the percent Black released defendants between the commonly used and
Black-as-white model. See the text for additional details on the specification and sample.
FIGURE 2: ACCURACY UNDER DIFFERENT PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS
Note: This figure simulates the failure to appear rates for defendants who would be released under
each predictive model using information from the New York City pretrial system. The sample con-
sists of male black and white defendants who were arrested and charged between 11/2008 and
11/2013, whose cases were not adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released before trial. See
the text for additional details on the specification and sample.
We would be remiss to not also illustrate that the choice of predictive
algorithm comes with trade-offs in terms of accuracy, as mentioned in
Section I.C. Recall that the benchmark statistical model, which uses all
inputs, maximizes predictive accuracy. As we begin to eliminate direct
effects of race (as under the commonly used algorithm), and then both direct
and proxy effects of race (as under our proposed statistical solutions),
accuracy decreases. Reducing unwarranted disparities requires the statistical
model to “ignore” potentially relevant information, such as race or other
inputs that are correlated with race. Under the particular definition of
fairness outlined in this Article, an algorithm that eliminates both direct and
proxy effects of race, thereby increasing the number of released Black
defendants, is “fair” even if it comes at a cost to predictive accuracy.
To illustrate how accuracy changes across the different algorithms,
Figure 2 reports the overall FTA rates if we were to make pretrial-release
decisions using each of the four different predictive algorithms. Here, we
measure FTA rates as our outcome, where one algorithm is more accurate
than another if the FTA rate among released defendants is lower. For
example, if 50% of defendants are released, and algorithm A results in a 20%
FTA rate among the released and algorithm B results in a 30% FTA rate, we
would say that algorithm A is superior in terms of predictive accuracy.
November 2020] Equal Protection Under Algorithms 381
Consistent with our statistical framework, FTA rates are lowest for the
benchmark statistical model that uses all available information, followed by
the commonly used model and then the colorblinding-inputs and Black-as-
white model. These patterns generally hold at all release thresholds. The
reason that the benchmark statistical algorithm is most accurate is precisely
because it explicitly uses race to generate predictions, and race is highly
correlated with risk of FTA. For a similar reason, the commonly used model
is generally more accurate than our proposed solutions because it retains
some information on defendant race through proxy effects.
Table 11 presents a selected subset of our simulations to precisely
illustrate the trade-off between our definition of fairness and predictive
accuracy. Again, we consider hypothetical scenarios where we release 50, 70,
or 90% of all individuals in our data. We present the simulated FTA rate
among all released defendants under each hypothetical, where Columns 1–4
report the simulated FTA rates under the different predictive algorithms.
Column 5 reports the difference in FTA rates between the commonly used
excluding-race model and the colorblinding-inputs model, and Column 6
reports the difference in FTA rates between the commonly used model and
the Black-as-white model. The results again show that predictive accuracy is
maximized by the benchmark algorithm that explicitly includes race.
We note that the differences in accuracy among the models, in particular
between the commonly used excluding-race algorithm and our proposed
algorithms, are economically small. For example, if applied citywide in New
York City, the colorblinding-inputs model would result in an additional
seventy-six failures to appear during our sample period compared to the
commonly used algorithm if the city decided to release 50% of all
defendants.
TABLE 11: SIMULATIONS OF ACCURACY UNDER DIFFERENT PREDICTIVE
ALGORITHMS













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
50% Release Rate 8.35 8.38 8.40 8.42 -0.02 -0.04
70% Release Rate 10.13 10.20 10.23 10.29 -0.03 -0.09
90% Release Rate 12.58 12.61 12.60 12.90 0.01 -0.29
Note: This table simulates the failure to appear rates for defendants who would be released under
each predictive model using information from the New York City pretrial system. The sample
consists of male Black and white defendants who were arrested and charged between 11/2008 and
11/2013, whose cases were not adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released before trial.
Column 1 reports the FTA rate under the benchmark statistical model. Column 2 reports the FTA
rate under the commonly used model. Column 3 reports the FTA rate under the colorblinding-
inputs model. Column 4 reports the FTA rate under the Black-as-white model. Column 5 reports the
difference in FTA rates between the commonly used and the colorblinding-inputs model. Column 6
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Column 1 reports the FTA rate under the benchmark statistical model. Column 2 reports the FTA
rate under the commonly used model. Column 3 reports the FTA rate under the colorblinding-
inputs model. Column 4 reports the FTA rate under the Black-as-white model. Column 5 reports the
difference in FTA rates between the commonly used and the colorblinding-inputs model. Column 6
reports the difference in FTA rates between the commonly used and the Black-as-white model. See
the text for additional details on the specification and sample.
VI. EXTENSIONS
In this Part, we describe a number of potential extensions to our analysis
and results. We begin by discussing how our proposed algorithms can
incorporate additional protected characteristics such as gender. We then
discuss nonlinear prediction models, prediction models with nonrace
interactions, and prediction models that explicitly allow for race interactions.
We conclude by discussing how our proposed statistical models are relevant
to other contexts outside the criminal justice system.
A. Additional Protected Characteristics
Our proposed solutions can be easily adapted to deal with other
protected characteristics. For example, many scholars have also decried the
use of gender in forming predictions of risk, where generally men receive
higher risk predictions than women.278 Our proposed solutions can remove
both the direct and proxy effects of both race and gender, or any other
protected characteristic.
Specifically, a color- and genderblinding-inputs algorithm could be
estimated in a similar two-step procedure as described previously in Section
IV.B. In the first step, we would again estimate the benchmark statistical
model that includes the full set of input characteristics (including both race
and gender and all correlates). Including race and gender allows us to
eliminate the proxy effects on all other inputs that are correlated with both
race and gender. Then, in the second prediction step, to ensure that no direct
effects of race and gender are used, we would simply use the average race or
gender across all individuals to form predictions. This algorithm purges the
predictions of both direct and proxy effects along both racial and gender
dimensions, allowing for a race- and gender-neutral model.
Our minorities-as-whites solution can also be adapted to deal with other
protected characteristics. If gender were a concern, we could construct an
algorithm that treated all individuals the same as, say, white women, using
the two-step procedure described in Section IV.C. Specifically, we would
estimate the relationship between each input and the outcome of interest
within a white female population, and then apply the same estimations to
form predictions for all nonwhite and nonfemale individuals. Or, one could
construct an algorithm that treated all individuals the same, as say, white
males. As before, this algorithm does rely on a normative choice of which
278. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 12, at 806; Sidhu, supra note 22, at 699–700.
November 2020] Equal Protection Under Algorithms 383
group should be the baseline population for the first estimation step, a
decision that we think should be informed by which population is least likely
to have mismeasurement in inputs or outcomes (due to discrimination or
otherwise).
B. More Complicated Algorithms
Our proposed solutions can also be easily adapted to deal with more
complicated predictive algorithms. Here, we consider four such extensions.
Nonlinear Prediction Models: Our main proposed algorithms assume
that there is a linear relationship between each predictive input and the
outcome of interest, that is, a linear probability model accurately captures
the underlying statistical relationship. This modeling choice assumes, for
example, that an additional year of age always has the same association with
the outcome of interest (i.e., age has the same marginal effect). But one
might imagine that there are nonlinearities in this relationship. A nice
feature of both our proposed algorithms is that they can be easily adapted to
allow for nonlinearities. In the context where the outcome of interest is a
binary variable, as is almost always the case (e.g., whether a defendant fails to
appear), one can estimate the underlying statistical model using a nonlinear
model, such as a logit or probit model, and still be able to eliminate both
direct and proxy effects of race.279
Prediction Models with Nonrace Interactions: For simplicity, our main
proposed algorithms assumes a benchmark statistical model where each
input affects the outcome of interest in a linear and additive way. This
simplifying assumption assumes that there are no interaction effects between
different nonrace predictive inputs. This modeling choice assumes, for
example, that the relationship between age and the outcome of interest is
linear and the same for all individuals. In other words, suppose that being
ten years older was associated with a 5 percentage-point reduction in risk.
Our proposed models assume that this relationship is true for all individuals.
If, however, one believed that the relationship between age and the outcome
of interest differed for groups of individuals (e.g., the relationship between
age and risk is different for individuals with a prior criminal history and
individuals with no priors), our approaches could easily be adapted to allow
for these dynamics. Technically, one would allow for these relationships by
adding interaction terms between age and prior criminal history. There is no
constraint on the interactions that can be allowed between any input in𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 or 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. For example, suppose that one wants to use
this benchmark statistical model:
279. For a discussion of how to purge both proxy and direct effects of protected charac-
teristics from a logit or probit model, see Pope & Sydnor, supra note 23, at 215.
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(Equation 14)
where 𝛽𝛽1 captures the uninteracted effect of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, 𝛽𝛽2 captures the
uninteracted effect of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, and 𝛽𝛽3 captures the interacted effect of𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. Both our proposed algorithms can be readily
adapted to allow for these interactions and still purge predictions of both
direct and proxy effects of race. Under the colorblinding-inputs algorithm,
for example, one could estimate this benchmark model controlling for race
in the first estimation step and then use 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 in the second prediction
step as described in Section IV.B.
Prediction Models Explicitly Allowing for Race Interactions: One might
also want to explicitly allow interaction effects between a nonrace predictive
input and race itself in the underlying statistical model. For example, one
might want to generate predictions assuming that the relationship between
age and risk differs by defendant race. At the extreme, if one were to fully
interact each nonrace input with race, the predictive algorithm would be
equivalent to estimating separate risk predictions for white and Black
individuals. Unlike our proposed solutions, this approach would be akin to
using race in both the first estimation step and second prediction step. Such
an approach is similar to that proposed by Jon Kleinberg et al., which fully
utilizes the predictive power of all input factors, including protected
characteristics.280 Under their approach, one would allow the coefficients, or
“slopes,” on the full set of input factors to differ by race.281 This “race-
interacted” algorithm will therefore have a higher level of predictive accuracy
compared to our proposed models, as it allows for a more flexible
relationship between input factors and the outcome of interest.
This race-interacted model, however, poses legal issues because it
explicitly allows otherwise similar individuals to receive different predictions
on the basis of race. It also highlights the important trade-off between our
ability to eliminate unwarranted racial disparities (“fairness”) and predictive
accuracy, as we previously described in Section I.C. Most often, an
unconstrained race-interacted model will yield larger racial disparities in
predictions if Black defendants are statistically “riskier” than white
defendants. But predictive accuracy is likely enhanced by allowing a more
flexible underlying statistical model.
However, new approaches in computer science and economics indicate
that there are ways of eliminating the theoretical trade-off between accuracy
280. Kleinberg et al., supra note 23, at 22–23.
281. Id. at 24.
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and fairness, which sharply contrasts with the general view among legal
scholars that the “only way to ensure that decisions do not systematically
disadvantage members of protected classes is to reduce the overall accuracy
of all determinations.”282 For example, the existing computer science and
economics literature has regularly argued that “[a]bsent legal constraints,
one should include variables such as gender and race for fairness
reasons. . . . [T]he inclusion of such variables can increase both equity and
efficiency.”283 How could an algorithm that uses race in forming predictions
not increase racial disparities? One approach, as suggested by Kleinberg et
al., is to achieve the desired racial composition by “setting a different
threshold for different groups,”284 an approach that explicitly requires
disparate treatment of individuals and constitutes ex post racial balancing.
Under this approach, one can use the more accurate risk predictions from
the race-interacted algorithm but fix the racial composition ex post to the
desired level, which can improve upon predictive accuracy because “society
is still served best by ranking as well as possible using the best possible
predictions.”285
While we are in favor of this approach from a statistical perspective (in
the sense that it can achieve the same desired racial composition at higher
accuracy), we have concerns about its legality given that it would require
explicit ex post racial balancing or fixing of a racial quota. As Deborah
Hellman as similarly argued, “[t]he use of different cut scores would consti-
tute disparate treatment on the basis of race.”286 Such an approach may run
into a potential challenge given the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v.
DeStefano.287 In Ricci, the city of New Haven, Connecticut administered
exams to be used in promoting the city’s firefighters. After exams were
taken, the city noted that using the exams would result in a racially disparate
impact because no Black candidates would have been immediately eligible
for promotion on the basis of the exam results.288 Thus, to avoid disparate
impact liability under Title VII, the city decided to throw out the exams after
some firefighters threatened to sue if promotions were based on the exam
scores, alleging that the tests were discriminatory.289 A group of white and
Hispanic firefighters who would have been promoted based on their exam
performance then sued the city, alleging that the city’s refusal to use the
exams subjected them to disparate treatment on the basis of race in violation
282. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 721–22.
283. See, e.g., Kleinberg et al., supra note 23, at 23.
284. Id. at 23–25.
285. Id. at 23.
286. Hellman, supra note 174, at 848.
287. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
288. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562.
289. Id.
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of both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.290 A five-person majority
of the Court held that the city’s race-based action violated Title VII,
constituting disparate treatment, because there was no strong basis in
evidence that the city would have been subject to disparate impact liability
had it not thrown out the exams.291 Thus, Ricci suggests that typically a
decisionmaker cannot engage in disparate treatment on the basis of a
protected characteristic in order to avoid a disparate impact.
Other scholars like Harned and Wallach share the view that directly
using race to make decisions (such as in the second prediction step) would
constitute disparate treatment and thus be illegal.292 Moreover, these authors
argue that even if the ultimate goal of directly using protected traits is to
mitigate bias, “the stigma involved in racial classifications can constitute a
cognizable harm” and “[o]nly in very limited circumstances can two differ-
ent standards . . . be legally applied on the basis of a sensitive attribute.”293 In
contrast, Jason Bent has argued the direct use of race to make decisions
should be a form of legally permissible “[a]lgorithmic [a]ffirmative [a]ction,”
and that there is a “significant difference between discarding a biased algo-
rithm and fixing a biased algorithm by introducing a race-aware fairness
constraint.”294
Machine-Learning Models: Recall that we have illustrated our two
proposed solutions when the underlying statistical model is linear, which we
believe captures the state of most algorithms used in the criminal justice
system. Above, we described how our proposals can also work easily using
nonlinear models such as logit or probit. But a natural question is how our
approaches might work using a machine-learning algorithm. In recent work,
Talia Gillis argues that one of our proposed solutions, the colorblinding-
inputs algorithm (what she refers to as the “orthogonalization” method),
“goes wrong in the machine learning context.”295 Using a lasso regression, a
form of machine learning that selects inputs so as to avoid overfitting the
model, Gillis shows that race is chosen as an input in some training datasets
but not chosen in other training datasets.296 And even when race was chosen
by the algorithm, Gillis notes that the lasso regression can give race a differ-
290. Id. at 562–63.
291. Id. at 563, 584 (“If an employer cannot rescore a test based on the candidates’ race,
§ 2000e-2(l), then it follows a fortiori that it may not take the greater step of discarding the test
altogether to achieve a more desirable racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates—
absent a strong basis in evidence that the test was deficient and that discarding the results is
necessary to avoid violating the disparate-impact provision.”). The Court reserved the question
of whether fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify discriminatory treatment under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Id.
292. Harned & Wallach, supra note 72 (manuscript at 21–22).
293. Id. at 23.
294. Bent, supra note 225, at 35.
295. Gillis, supra note 103, at 72.
296. Id. at 69–72.
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ent weight depending on the training dataset.297 Given this lack of “stability,”
Gillis argues that “[t]he orthogonalization method, which uses the coefficient
or weight on ‘race’ for the screening stage, will therefore yield different re-
sults based on the random draw.”298 As a result, Gillis argues that lawmakers
must give up on “input scrutiny.”299
We view the approach of ceding full control to the machine as unneces-
sary and inconsistent with what antidiscrimination law demands. We believe
input scrutiny is not only essential but also feasible with machine learning,
such that Gillis is incorrect to state that “[i]n the case of machine learning,
the algorithm itself determines which inputs to use and what weights to as-
sign them in reaching an accurate prediction.”300
If one acknowledges that the law requires human choice in the design of
the algorithm, we believe that the principles of our proposed algorithms con-
tinue to work even in the context of machine learning, although more work
is needed in this area. For example, as applied to our colorblinding-inputs
approach, Žliobaitė and Custers, like us, believe that while
[f]ormal conclusion for non-linear models remains a subject for future in-
vestigation. . . . [O]ur intuition from working in this field and observing the
behaviour of various data mining and machine learning models is that
similar principles apply, but to what extent, and what models are more or
less sensitive, remains to be researched.301
Given the input-selection instability that might arise from certain forms
of machine learning, the procedure for implementing the colorblinding-
inputs algorithm needs to be slightly modified. But it is easy to imagine this
variant of the core procedure: (1) first, we colorblind the inputs by residual-
izing/orthogonalizing the effect of race from each input characteristic;302 (2)
then we give the machine-learning algorithm the colorblinded inputs in a
modified dataset to form estimations and predictions. This modified proce-
dure, which at its core mirrors the two-step procedure we described in Sec-
tion IV.B. when using a linear regression, is likely to work in the machine-
learning context because it takes away the choice of the machine to select
race as an input (as shown in Gillis’s naive simulation); rather, the machine-
learning algorithm is given all possible nonrace inputs that have already been
purged of proxy effects. And if we turn to our second proposed “minorities-
as-whites” algorithm, unaddressed by Gillis, we see no concerns with using
297. Id.
298. Id. at 72.
299. Id. at 12.
300. Id. at 36.
301. Žliobaitė & Custers, supra note 200, at 193.
302. Formally, one could convert all input variables into indicator variables, which ad-
dresses concerns about nonlinearities. Then one could individually “colorblind” each input by
residualizing/orthogonalizing each input with respect to race. These modified inputs can then
be used by the machine-learning algorithm.
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machine-learning algorithms; the white baseline population data would be
given directly to the algorithm, and thus the machine-learning algorithm
does not have the choice to select race as an input. As a result, both our ap-
proaches can be adapted to the machine-learning context by altering the in-
puts or data that are given to the algorithm.
None of the ideas we propose are new to the machine-learning commu-
nity. The core idea underlying our algorithms is well known to the computer
science literature and often referred to as “preprocessing” the training da-
ta.303 This concept and approach have been shown to work even with com-
plex machine-learning models. For example, Faisal Kamiran and Toon
Calders show that preprocessing techniques such as “[m]assaging the da-
taset” or “[r]eweighing” or “[s]ampling” the dataset can “lead to an effective
decrease in discrimination with a minimal loss in accuracy,” particularly as
compared to simply excluding protected traits and/or their proxies.304 Given
such developed preprocessing methods, even legal scholars have advocated
for these techniques as a way of regulating machine-learning algorithms to
be compliant with antidiscrimination law. Cofone, for example, states that
“while blocking data on protected categories is unhelpful, shaping the infor-
mation that includes protected categories can be effective at eliminating bias
from the data that decision-making models are trained with and, in turn,
eliminating discrimination from such models.”305 Thus, we believe that ar-
guments that our approaches cannot work in the context of machine learn-
ing are, at best, overstated and rely on a faulty and narrow conception of
how antidiscrimination law can constrain machine learning.
C. Other Contexts
Our proposed statistical solutions can be easily applied to other contexts
that face similar concerns about direct and proxy effects of protected
characteristics, including credit and lending decisions and employment and
hiring decisions.
Credit and Lending: Take, for example, credit and lending, where federal
laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics. For
instance, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics such as race, gender,
303. See, e.g., Faisal Kamiran & Toon Calders, Classifying Without Discriminating, IEEE
XPLORE 1–6 (2009) [hereinafter Kamiran & Calders, Classifying Without Discriminating],
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4909197?arnumber=4909197 [https://perma.cc/LZ2W-
FPM9] (describing a preprocessing approach that modifies the training data to yield an unbi-
ased dataset); Faisal Kamiran & Toon Calders, Data Preprocessing Techniques for Classification
Without Discrimination, 33 KNOWLEDGE INFO. SYS. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Kamiran & Calders,
Data Preprocessing Techniques].
304. See Kamiran & Calders, Data Preprocessing Techniques, supra note 303, at 2–3.
305. Cofone, supra note 91, at 1432.
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or national origin.306 Regulation B of the ECOA lists many factors that
cannot be used in empirically derived credit-scoring systems, including
public-assistance status, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin,
and sex.307 In fact, Regulation B states that, generally, creditors may not even
request or collect information about an applicant’s race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex.308
Scholars have summarized these laws as follows: “In essence, the law
requires that lenders make decisions about mortgage loans as if they had no
information about the applicant’s race, regardless of whether race is or is not
a good proxy for risk factors not easily observed by the lender.”309 These laws
have also been interpreted to prohibit the use of “redlining,” or geographic
discrimination using zip codes as proxies for the racial composition of
neighborhoods.310
As applied to predictive algorithms, legal scholars have generally
interpreted these laws to preclude the direct consideration of protected
characteristics such as race and gender in credit-scoring algorithms.311 In
addition, many are worried about proxy effects of these protected
characteristics, noting that other traits used in credit scoring, such as social-
media practices (used by newer companies to determine creditworthiness),
may be proxies for protected characteristics.312 Even arguably neutral factors
commonly considered, such as amounts owed, new credit, length of credit
history, credit mix, and payment history, may be highly correlated with race,
generating racial proxy effects even when race itself is not directly used.313
306. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).
307. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2020).
308. Id.
309. Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1998, at 41, 43.
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18
YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 182 (2016); Gillis & Spiess, supra note 25, at 467 (“One aspect of many
antidiscrimination regimes is a restriction on inputs that can be used to price credit. Typically,
this means that protected characteristics, such as race and gender, cannot be used in setting
prices. Indeed, many antidiscrimination regimes include rules on the exclusion of data inputs
as a form of discrimination prevention.”).
312. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 311, at 163, 182–83.
313. See id. at 182; Berger, supra note 1. In contrast, FICO does not consider characteris-
tics such as race, color, religion, national origin, gender, and marital status, or neighborhood.
See What’s Not in My FICO Scores, MYFICO, https://www.myfico.com/credit-education
/whats-not-in-your-credit-score [https://perma.cc/K2DT-SLB6]. In recent years, alternative
credit-scoring companies like ZestFinance have emerged, relying on much more information
than traditionally used under its motto “All data is credit data.” See James Rufus Koren, Some
Lenders Are Judging You on Much More Than Finances, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-new-credit-score-20151220-story.html [https://perma
.cc/UP4X-XQ9P]. ZestFinance uses thousands of pieces of consumer data to predict the likeli-
hood that a borrower will repay their debts. Id.
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Some scholars have cautioned that lenders may even deliberately target
certain racial or ethnic groups by using “facially-neutral proxy variables in its
scoring model as stand-ins for characteristics like race.”314 Thus, scholars like
Mikella Hurley and Julius Adebayo propose that credit scores “not treat as
significant any data points or combinations of data points that are highly
correlated to immutable characteristics.”315
A formalistic excluding-inputs algorithm may prohibit credit-scoring
companies from using race and correlates of race from algorithms, or those
deemed “highy correlated.” But again, we note that this is likely to be
impractical given that many, if not all, inputs are highly correlated with race.
These nonrace inputs are also likely to have substantial predictive power,
even independent of their correlation within race.316 Indeed, as shown in a
lending simulation by Gillis and Spiess, “if there are other variables that are
correlated with race, then predictions may strongly vary by race even when
race is excluded, and disparities may persist” such that “[t]o the extent that
disparate impact plays a social role beyond acting as a proxy for disparate
treatment, we may not find it sufficient to formally exclude race from the
data considered.”317
In contrast, our two proposed statistical solutions could reduce racial
disparities in credit scoring relative to commonly used algorithms while
preserving predictive power. But for our proposals to work, policymakers
must shed their naive understanding of statistics, as some regulations (like
Regulation B of the ECOA) prohibit creditors from even requesting or
collecting information such as race. If this information cannot be collected
and thus used in the first estimation step as required under our proposals,
there is no way of truly eliminating racial proxy effects.
Employment and Hiring: In the employment context, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin.318 Broadly speaking, there are two types of
Title VII claims. Under the first theory, known as “disparate treatment”
discrimination, an intentional policy of discriminating against a protected
314. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 311, at 191.
315. Id. at 206.
316. For example, a 2007 study by the Federal Trade Commission found that credit in-
formation is highly predictive of risk even within racial groups, suggesting that credit infor-
mation is not solely proxying for race. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE
SCORES: IMPACTS ON CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 23 (2007), https://www.ftc.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/reports/credit-based-insurance-scores-impacts-consumers-auto
mobile-insurance-report-congress-federal-trade/p044804facta_report_credit-based_insurance
_scores.pdf [https://perma.cc/S355-GBRN] (“Credit-based insurance scores appear to have
little effect as a ‘proxy’ for membership in racial and ethnic groups in decisions related to in-
surance.”).
317. Gillis & Spiess, supra note 25, at 469, 471.
318. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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group is prohibited.319 Under the second theory, known as the “disparate
impact” doctrine, a facially neutral policy that nonetheless leads to an
adverse impact on a protected class is prohibited unless the employer can
offer a sufficient explanation that the practice in question is job related and
consistent with business necessity.320 Even if the employer meets that
burden, plaintiffs can still win if they can demonstrate the existence of an
available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and
serves the employer’s legitimate needs.321
Although many legal scholars have questioned whether Title VII is
sufficient for dealing with the types of issues introduced by the use of
algorithms,322 a similar debate arises surrounding the direct and proxy
effects of protected characteristics like race. Pauline Kim argues that a
“formalist reading of Title VII might appear to prohibit any use of variables
capturing sensitive characteristics in a data model. Certainly, a simple model
that relied on race or other protected characteristics as the basis for adverse
decisions would run afoul of Title VII’s prohibitions.”323 Similarly, Solon
Barocas and Andrew Selbst have stated with respect to algorithms in the
employment context that “considering membership in a protected class as a
potential proxy is a legal classificatory harm in itself” and that “[u]nder
formal disparate treatment, this is straightforward: any decision that
expressly classifies by membership in a protected class is one that draws
distinctions on illegitimate grounds.”324
But as we noted above and as some of these scholars acknowledge,
excluding these variables is problematic due to the existence of proxy effects
that stem from other inputs.325 As Kim has noted:
[R]estricting access to sensitive information is not likely to be effective in
preventing classification bias that results from data analytic models. If the
data being mined is rich enough, other seemingly neutral factors may
closely correlate with a protected characteristic, permitting a model to
effectively sort along the lines of race or another protected characteristic.
Factors such as where someone went to school or where they currently live
may be highly correlated with race. Behavioral data, such as an individual’s
319. See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
320. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (holding that the re-
quirement that applicants have a high school diploma or a passing score on a written test is
forbidden unless it has “a demonstrable relationship to successful performance”). Twenty years
after Griggs, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted, which included a provision codifying the
prohibition on disparate-impact discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
322. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 694 (concluding that Title VII is “not well
equipped” to address data mining).
323. Kim, supra note 21, at 917–18.
324. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 695, 719.
325. Kim, supra note 21, at 918.
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Facebook ‘likes,’ can also predict sensitive characteristics like race and sex
with a high degree of accuracy. Because other information contained in
large datasets can serve as a proxy for race, disability, or other protected
statuses, simply eliminating data on those characteristics cannot prevent
models that are biased along these dimensions.326
As a result, she argues that “a simple prohibition on using data about
race or sex could be either wholly ineffective or actually counterproductive
due to the existence of class proxies.”327 Similarly, Barocas and Selbst note
that when there is correlation between a protected characteristic and other
traits, “data mining . . . can indirectly determine individuals’ membership in
protected classes and unduly discount, penalize, or exclude such people
accordingly.”328
Once again, however, our two statistical proposals could be used in
employment algorithms. Rather than forbidding the use of protected
characteristics and their correlates under a formalistic interpretation of
antidiscrimination law, our solutions would allow employers to retain some
predictive power while eliminating direct and proxy effects from
predictions.329 Our proposals therefore have the potential to reduce race or
gender disparities in employment and hiring.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we provide a new statistical and legal framework to
understand the legality and fairness of using protected characteristics in
predictive algorithms under the Equal Protection Clause. We challenge the
mainstream legal position that the use of a protected characteristic always
violates the Equal Protection Clause. We are also highly skeptical of the
current legal push toward adopting a formalistic view of algorithms that
requires the exclusion of race and all nonrace correlates in predictive
algorithms, as nearly all potential algorithmic inputs are likely to be
correlated with race. Our skepticism is supported by our empirical tests
using information from the New York City pretrial system, where we find
that all commonly used algorithmic inputs are correlated with race in our
data. These results suggest that the formalistic legal position of excluding
race and all race correlates from predictive algorithms is impractical, and
may actually undermine the goals of equal protection if implemented
incorrectly.
326. Id. at 898.
327. Id. at 918.
328. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 692.
329. For a strong legal defense of these ideas applied to Title VII, see Harned & Wallach,
supra note 72.
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Our Article offers two more practical solutions to eliminate
unwarranted racial disparities in predictive algorithms, both grounded in the
underlying statistical properties of algorithms and the practical reality that
most, if not all, potential inputs are correlated with race. We argue that our
proposed algorithms are fully consistent with the principles of the equal
protection doctrine because they ensure that individuals are not treated
differently on the basis of membership in a protected class, in stark contrast
to commonly used algorithms that unfairly disadvantage Black individuals
relative to white individuals despite the exclusion of race. We also
demonstrate that our proposed algorithms could have large consequences
for the racial composition of detained defendants. In empirical tests from the
New York City pretrial system, our algorithms substantially reduce the
number of Black defendants detained compared to commonly used
algorithms.
Our findings require a fundamental rethinking of the equal protection
doctrine as applied to predictive algorithms. To fully ensure that individuals
are not treated differently solely on the basis of membership in a protected
class, the equal protection doctrine must shed its overly formalistic
interpretation of equal treatment that requires predictive algorithms to be
blinded to race through exclusion. The equal protection doctrine must
instead embrace the statistical reality that virtually all algorithmic inputs are
correlated with race and allow for new statistical approaches that can truly
ensure that all individuals are treated equally under the law.
394 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:291
APPENDIX
TABLE A1: SIMULATIONS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES – PREDICTING REARREST FOR
NEW OFFENSE













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
50% Release Rate 58.55 65.95 66.83 68.00 -0.88 -2.05
70% Release Rate 67.26 70.16 70.82 71.51 -0.66 -1.35
90% Release Rate 73.71 74.23 74.34 74.49 -0.10 -0.26
Note: This table reports the percent of released defendants who are Black versus white under differ-
ent prediction models and release rates using information from the New York City pretrial system.
The outcome variable is whether a defendant is arrested for a new crime prior to case disposition.
The sample consists of male Black and white defendants who were arrested and charged between
11/2008 and 11/2013, whose cases were not adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released be-
fore trial. Column 1 reports the percent Black released among released defendants under the bench-
mark statistical model. Column 2 reports the percent Black released among released defendants
under the commonly used model. Column 3 reports the percent Black released among released de-
fendants under the colorblinding-inputs model. Column 4 reports the percent Black released among
released defendants under the Black-as-white model. Column 5 reports the difference in the percent
Black released defendants between the commonly used and the colorblinding-inputs model. Column
6 reports the difference in the percent Black released defendants between the commonly used and
Black-as-white model. See the text for additional details on the specification and sample.
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FIGURE A1: RACIAL DISPARITIES – PREDICTING REARREST FOR NEW OFFENSE
Note: This figure plots the percent of released defendants who are Black under different predictive
algorithms and release rates using information from New York City pretrial system. The outcome
variable is whether a defendant is arrested for a new crime prior to case disposition. The sample con-
sists of male Black and white defendants who were arrested and charged between 11/2008 and
11/2013, whose cases were not adjudicated at arraignment, and who were released before trial. See
the text for additional details on the specification and sample.
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